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Abstract
Friend  of  Government or Da m n e d  T ory:
T he Creation  of the Loyalist identity  
in  Revolutionary  N ew Ham pshire , 1 7 7 4 - 1 7 8 4 .
BY
J.L. Walsh  
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
September 1996
The dissertation examines the creation of loyalist identity during 
the American Revolution. Two distinct identities were fashioned, one 
by the loyalists themselves and a second competing identity which 
was created for them by their opponents, the radical faction of the 
revolutionary movement. Both identities were created consciously 
and for political or economic motives.
The identity created by the loyalists through their actions and 
words is to be found in a close reading of the claims filed with the 
Claims Commission created by Parliament in 1783. The dissertation 
argues that loyalists self-fashioned an individual political identity, as 
part of the creation of a self-conscious minority seeking redress from 
the British government for the losses they suffered during the war, 
and as individual participants in an ideational community formed by 
the trauma of a generation at war. The self-fashioned identity found 
its expression in the memorials presented to the Claims Commission 
and in the public and private writings of various participants.
Simultaneously, the rebel leaders, writers, and ideologues created 
another identity for their enemies. Through legal fictions such as bills 
of attainder and confiscation, through pamphlets, and through
vii
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newspapers, rebel leaders and writers created an identity for the 
loyalists as traitors, bloodthirsty acolytes of a demonized British King, 
and enemies of the country of their nativity. The content of the 
claims are supported and supplemented by petitions, trial 
transcripts, newspaper accounts, and pertinent official documents of 
the "rebel" government.
The dissertation enters into the ongoing discussion concerning the 
communal history of self-conscious minorities, as well as an 
exploration of political identity. The work also analyzes the 
revolution in New Hampshire in terms of a culture war, a discursive 
battle between two ideologically opposed groups, each striving to 
convince the populace in general of the desirability of embracing its 
vision of the way society ought to be. This study also adds to the 
growing num ber of works which concentrate on the loyalist 
experience at the provincial level.
viii
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1Introduction
Because human beings are bound together by sympathy, 
the reflection in the glass is necessarily not of one person 
only. The common, the shared and the general is to be 
found in the particular, if that particular is truthfully 
described, and with imagination. To discover such a 
common truth is an intrinsic good.1
A considerable number of the inhabitants of British North 
America at the outset of the rebellion in 1774-75 made a conscious 
choice to remain loyal to the constitution and crown of Great Britain. 
Those residents of New Hampshire and the other rebellious colonies 
faced hardship, harrassment, and community sanctions for as long as 
they remained in their homes. Their choice, to remain loyal, was an 
act of identification. Not only did they proclaim by their actions and 
words their loyalty to Britain, they also opened the door to a new 
identity imposed upon them from without by their rebel opponents. 
This study, though it began as a straightforward narrative of loyalist 
activity and attributes with a concentration on the province of New 
Hampshire, has been transformed by the use of the concept of 
identity. The loyalists of New Hampshire and those of the other 
provinces became, by the end of the rebellion, a scattering of self­
1Mary Wamock, Imagination & Time. Oxford: 1994. p. 144.
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2conscious minority communities, each bound together not by 
proximity but by a shared experience, a generational trauma.
As I read deeper and deeper into the largest concentrated body 
of loyalist writings, the records of the commission which examined 
the claims and losses of the American Loyalists, it became apparent 
that something more had transpired than could be described in a 
simple narrative history. As linguistic usages were replicated again 
and again (such as in the claim of Robert Fowle when he, as others 
had also, referred to "American sufferers" and identified himself as a 
"distressed loyalist"), not only in the writings of men from the same 
town or even the same province, I began to see a pattern emerging, a 
pattern that I have in terpreted  here to dem onstrate the 
transformation of the identities of men from that of British 
Americans to that of American Loyalists; from contented provincials 
to "zealous sufferers." That is, they identified themselves differently 
than they had before the rebellion as individuals and as a group.2
An individual identity consists of four personae: the "who" we 
think we are, the "who" we project ourselves to be, the "who" we are 
perceived to be by others, and the "who" others project us to be.3 
These four personae are in a constant state of flux. Changes in one 
area may precipitate changes in another. One loyalist, Stephen
2Anselm Strauss in Mirrors and Masks The Search for Identity. Glencoe, IL: 
1959. p. 21 "any group of people that has any permanence develops a 
'special language,' a lingo or jargon, which represents its way of identifying 
those objects important for group action." Strauss goes on to add that it is a 
"necessity for any group to develop a common or shared terminology."
3This is my own theory, based upon observation and my reading in the 
literature on identity and imagination.
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3Holland, began the year 1774 as Stephen Holland the respected, 
prominent, gentleman landowner residing in Londonderry, New 
Hampshire. He was a magistrate and militia officer, a veteran of the 
previous war, and an Irish emigre. All of these factors and many 
more combined to create in his mind a picture of who he was. 
Holland's identity was apolitical until he assisted in the apprehension 
and return of some deserters from the British garrison in Boston. By 
engaging in that public act, Holland sent a message to those who 
observed his actions. He was projecting a part, at least, of his identity 
as a loyal citizen of New Hampshire (the "who" we project ourselves 
to be), at this point still a royal province, one of many in British 
North America. Simultaneous to Holland's projection of his identity 
through actions, observers in the community interpreted what he 
had done as the act of someone else, someone who held the "identity" 
of an enemy to the community. This is the third persona, the "who" 
perceived by others. Some members of Holland's com m unity 
perceived him to be, by his actions, inimical to his country, to be 
other than what he perceived himself to be. Holland attemted to 
moderate the effect of his projected identity by another public 
action, the signing of the Association Test in 1776.4 One such action
4The Association Test was a printed oath sent out by the rebel government in 
Exeter in June and July of 1776 to every town in the province. Most if not all 
the other provinces circulated a similar oath, the idea for the oath having 
come from the Continental Congress. The purposes of the oath and the public 
signing "ceremony" are discussed at length in Chapter 2. The vast majority 
of the residents of New Hampshire signed the oath, the returns from which 
can be found in Nathaniel Bouton and Albert S. Batchellor, eds., New 
Hampshire Provincial and State Papers. 40 vols. Concord NH: 1874-1910. This 
study utilizes volumes VII, VIII, and XXX, which contain the Journals and 
Papers of the New Hampshire Assembly, 1774-1784, among other things, and 
hereinafter referred to as NHPP.
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4was insufficient to change the perception of his neighbors, however, 
and the persona as perceived soon became the reinvented persona as 
projected from the observers among the community. In other words, 
Holland was perceived to be an enemy, a tory, by some members of 
his community in response to the identity he projected through his 
words and actions. Once the observers had perceived Holland to be 
an enemy, they reinterpreted his actions as those of someone else, as 
the actions of someone they began to create from their perceptions of 
who Holland was. By 1777 the community had created another 
identity for Stephen Holland, one it publicly proclaimed as "who" 
Holland was, though he never embraced or accepted that identity as 
his own. The community needed a "new" Stephen Holland, one it 
could revile and charge with treason for its own political purposes. 
The rebels needed to create the new identity for Holland and all of 
the loyalists in order to discredit them in the eyes of the general 
public and secure the support of the populace for the rebel agenda.
The who we think we are is not necesarily the person we see in 
the mirror. Our self-image is not pegged to external appearance, nor 
is it necessarily tied to reality at all. Our concept of self is a product 
of imagination. We see ourselves as who we want to be. We may 
define ourselves in many ways: by personal physical characteristics, 
by intellectual or spiritual characteristics, by profession, as in the 
case of the two physician loyalists, Stephen Little and Josiah 
Pomeroy, by material attainments5 or by a combination of all of
5Michael A. Hogg, The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness From 
Attraction to Social Identity. New York: 1992. p. 36. "self regard is linked with 
what is owned, with what is one's own."
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these attributes. We may even define ourselves based on 
relationships with others. But we all have a self-concept, a mind's 
eye view of who we are and a surety of our own uniqueness.6
At the same time we each project a public image, an identity of 
who and what we want others to believe us to be. This is a mask7 we 
wear in public, a persona we put on when interacting with others. It 
may or may not correspond to our own self-image. We may have an 
image we wish to hide from others or one we believe is unworthy of 
public scrutiny. Or we may be so secure in our own self image, our 
identity, that we proclaim it publicly. In such a case the mask 
corresponds with our self perception.8 In the case of the loyalists, 
such public proclamation had enormous consequences.
A third edition of who we are is the person perceived by those 
around us. In one sense, that perceived persona may correspond 
faithfully to the mask we wear. We may successfully project an 
identity which others can perceive and accept. But observers are
6Hogg, The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness p. 90. "one's conception 
of self as unique and distinct from all other humans, and /or in terms of 
unique interpersonal relationships."
7I borrowed the idea of a mask first from Joseph Campbell who discussed 
masks in a social role in a multi-part interview with Bill Moyers. The mask 
was then reiterated by Strauss in Mirrors and Masks. Strauss's was the oldest 
book on identity consulted for this study, and one of the best written of the 
lot. The bastard children of Clio have of late revelled in their obtuseness, 
seeming to wish to conceal their work in verbal shrubbery so dense a 
Cooper's Pathfinder would be daunted.
8Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 9. "identity is connected with the fateful 
appraisals of oneself - by oneself and by others. Everyone presents himself 
to the otheres and to himself, and sees himself in the mirrors of their 
judgements. The masks he then and thereafter presents to the world and its 
citizens are fashioned upon his anticipations of their judgements. The others 
present themselves too; they wear their own brands of mask and they get 
appraised in turn."
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6weighted with their own baggage, their perceptions filtered through 
their own Kantian matrices, and what we project may not always be 
what they perceive.
A fourth identity, implicitly connected to the previous type, is 
that which is created by outsiders and imposed upon individuals or 
groups.9 Observers may take their cues from the mask we wear, but 
their own perceptions and prejudices can produce a completely 
different result. And that phenomenon may be exacerbated by some 
political or social agenda. That was certainly the case in 1774, and 
remained so for the duration of the rebellion. Whether identified by 
their own volition or singled out and painted with the broad epithet 
of traitor by enemies within the pre-war community, those who 
were labelled as loyalists suffered social and civil debilities as the 
result. The loyalist identity became the vehicle for exclusion from the 
home community and the bond that caused new communities to 
coalesce around the shared experience of the war.
Identity was also central to the culture war that coincided with 
the military struggle for or against independence. Both sides in the 
civil/culture war, the rebels and the loyalists, possessed a vision of 
what they thought the proper course was for the America of their 
future. The loyalists thought that adherence to a reformed social 
contract with the mother country was the safest and most beneficial 
course the colonies could take. The rebels on the other hand saw no 
hope in the eventual conciliation of what they perceived to be real
9The technical term is "status forcing," the imposition of identity on 
individuals or groups from outside. Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 80.
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7grievances. In the course of their ideological struggle for the 
allegiance and faith of the mass of the population, the rebel writers 
who controlled the majority of the media of the time, the presses, 
constructed a new identity for their ideological opponents.10 That 
identity, based on the rebel perceptions of the role the loyalists 
played in the conflict and their own political agendas, formed the 
basis for one portion of the new national myth created by rebel 
writers as the basis for the new country which emerged from the 
war.11
Three somewhat different perspectives on identity have 
contributed to the development of this study: the philosophical view, 
the sociological, and the social-psychological. Recently historians have 
also begun to develop arguments based on identity, and this study 
seeks to engage in that discourse among the works of Pagden, Canny, 
Greene, Elliott, and Zuckerman. Some debt is especially owed to 
Greene's essay "Changing Identity in the British Caribbean: Barbados
10Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 21. There is a tendency for groups to develop 
derogatory terms for other groups or members of groups. "Groups are 
inevitably in conflict over issues - otherwise they would not be different 
groups - and since events inevitably come to be viewed differently by those 
who are looking up or down the barrel of the gun, it is useles to talk of 
trying to eradicate from the human mind the tendency to stereotype, to 
designate nastily, and to oversimplify." See also James Davison Hunter, 
Culture Wars The Struggle to Define America. New York: 1991. and Bruce 
Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society, Comparative Studies of 
Myth, Ritual, and Classification. New York: 1989.
llnWhen nationalistic movements form, they and the countries which emerge 
from them must quite literally create new mythical national histories." 
Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 167 and see also Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism. London: 
1995. 2nd edition. Especially chapters 3 & 5.
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8as a Case Study," and John Elliott's introduction to a volume of essays 
edited by Anthony Pagden and Nicholas Canny.12
The use of identity as a tool as discussed in this study, indeed 
the whole concept of analyzing a person's identity, is certainly 
culture specific and may be historically specific as well. By that I 
mean that the concept of identity raised here may be peculiar to 
Western culture and be rendered meaningless in the traditions and 
cosmologies of peoples not descended or educated in the ideas and 
history of European civilization. This modem analysis of identity 
may be equally foreign to the actors we seek to understand through 
the study of identity. Since the loyalists acted and wrote as they did, 
two centuries of philosophers have added to the codification of 
identity. Since the 1770s, new scholarly disciplines have arisen to 
explain and categorize the whole range of the human experience into 
a series of generalizations. The complex questions of social 
relationships begin with the philosophical pursuit of who we are.
12The essays cited are especially concerned with the development of colonial 
identities vis a vis the metropolitan identity of the various homelands. They 
draw considerably on the experiences of the provincial elites and uniformly 
lament the lack of evidence regarding identity formation among the 
underclasses of their respective societies. The evidence for loyalist identity 
formation cuts across class lines, though it too does not reach as far into the 
lower strata of society as one might wish. The experiences and ideas of black 
loyalists, for instance, would contribute a whole new perspective to the story, 
and might really exemplify the term "loyalist sufferers." Nicholas P. Canny, 
"Identity Formation in Ireland: The Emergence of the Anglo-Irish;" John H. 
Elliott, "Introduction: Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World;" Anthony 
Pagden, "Identity Formation in the Atlantic World;" Jack P. Greene,
"Changing Identity in the British Caribbean: Barbados as a Case Study;" 
Michael Zuckerman, "Identity in British America: Unease in Eden;" and 
Anthony Pagden and Nicholas P. Canny, "Afterward: From Identity to 
Independence," in Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, eds., Colonial 
Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-1800. Princeton, NJ: 1987.
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9The philosophical construct of identity is concerned with 
differentiating between entities, with being able to assign a label to a 
particular thing or person and "identify" it. David Oderberg 
contended that "identity is a matter of 'succession of parts, connected 
together by resemblance, contiguity, or causation."'13 One 
philosopher, Roderick M. Chisholm, suggested that "most physical 
things are similarly reducible to evolving systems of composita."14 
That is, Chisholm and others would argue that physical objects, ships, 
chairs human beings, etc., consist of physical systems, atomic 
structure and larger, which themselves change over time. But the 
object itself remains the same. Chisholm used the example of a ship. 
If the ship, the SS Columbia, let us call it, loses a plank on a voyage 
and the plank is replaced with an aluminum one, the ship retains its 
identity as unique and distinct. Over the years it loses more and 
more planks, and those planks are replaced with aluminum planks, 
until finally the whole hull of the ship is made up of aluminum 
planks. Is it still the same ship, bearing the same name to be sure, 
but is it the same? And then he adds the question: what if the planks 
that were removed from the original ship, one by one, were re-used 
to build another ship, in the same fashion as the original, and it too 
was named the SS Columbia? Are they both the "same"? If you took 
passage on the first ship before the loss of the first plank, and then
13David S. Oderberg, The Metaphysics o f identity Over Time. New York: 1993. p. 
59.
14Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Loose and Popular and the Strict and 
Philosophical Senses of Identity," in Norman S. Care and Robert H. Grimm, 
eds., Perception and Personal Identity. Cleveland: 1969. p. 99.
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thirty years later took passage again in the all-aluminum version, 
would you be correct in calling it the same ship?
Chisholm answers that "when we say of a physical thing 
existing at one time that it is identical with, or the same as, a 
physical thing existing at some other time ('this is the same ship we 
traveled on before') we are using the expression 'the same as1 or 
'identical with' in a 'loose and popular sense.' But when we say of a 
person existing at one time that he is identical with, or the same 
person as a person existing at some other time ('the ship still has the 
same captain it had before'), we are using 'the same as' or 'identical 
with' in a 'strict and philosophical sense.'15 So Chisholm is arguing 
that human identity is not transitive. "'Continued uninterrupted 
existence is therefore implied in identity,'"16 or more simply, a 
named identity presupposes persistence over time, and a human 
identity is different from and more formal than the identification of 
other sorts of physical objects.
Once we have determined that we are real and identifiable, we 
turn to uniqueness. Mary Wamock made the individual identity 
accessible to the non-philosopher in Imagination & Time. She 
demonstrated there the distinctive nature of the human species and 
related that distinctiveness to identity. "It is not to be wondered at, 
therefore, that each one of us thinks of himself as a un ique 
individual: for so we all are. Not only are our bodies distinct from 
each other's as spatio-temporal objects, but our way of perceiving,
15Chisholm, "Senses of Identity," p. 82.
i - ^ Q u o t e d  from Thomas Reid in Chisholm, "Senses of Identity," p. 94, note 22.
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thinking and remembering, the actual pathways through which this 
is achieved are not, microscopically, identical with one another. Our 
consciousness has developed, in detail, as our own."17
Wamock further supplied the bridge between philosophy and 
social psychology. Wamock suggested that "the idea of a person who 
has a discernible identity through time is an idea that is, in an 
important sense, social. To think of myself as a continuous individual 
human is necessarily to acknowledge that there are other human 
persons in the same boat."18 Social psychologists, like sociologists, 
study identity as a means of understanding the interplay between 
humans, individuals and groups. Historians too may use that 
paradigm,19 and that is the thrust of this study. Once again Wamock 
suggested a bridge between us all: memory. "We can not only be 
identified by someone else as persisting through time; we can so 
identify ourselves by the operation of conscious memory, and the 
consequent ability to project ourselves forward into the future, as 
well as backwards into the past, to tell stories about how we came to 
be where we are."20 Those stories are both the grist of the historian's 
mill and subsequently the flour he or she produces.
17Wamock, Imagination & Time. p. 124.
18Wamock, Imagination & Time. p. 125.
19 In referring to Erik Erikson, "the notion of identity has served me, as it so 
brilliantly served him, as an agent for organizing materials and thoughts 
about certain aspects of problems traditionally intriguing to social 
psychologists." Identity can serve historians as well, as Erikson himself 
proved. Strauss, Masks and Mirrors, p. 9.
20Wamock, Imagination & Time. p. 125.
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Social psychology is deeply concerned not only with personal 
identity but even more with social interaction. To understand how 
interaction takes place and why, the social psychologist must 
understand identity. As Strauss suggested, "the act of identifying 
objects, human or physical, allows a person to organize his action 
with reference to those objects."21 Or, when we know who or what 
something is, we know what to do. Such basic human interaction is at 
the core of all social interaction, from face to face confrontations 
between a pair of individuals to the organization of societies; "the 
longstanding debate about the nature of the individual and collective 
actors has been in an important sense one concerning identity and 
processes of identification."22
We want to know about identity because identity is at the core 
of all social relationships. The breakdown of the existing society at 
the outset of the revolution precipitated the transformation of 
individual and communal identities. The rebel faction became the 
normative mode for the identitities of its members and eventual 
adherents, while some individuals who could not accept the structure 
of the new social contract became outsiders, remaining loyal to the 
status quo ante bellum. Our analysis of the loyalist identity helps to 
explain the reluctance of the other colonies of the first British Empire 
toward joining the revolutionary movement. To be sure, geographic
21Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 45.
22Burkhart Holzner and Roland Robertson, "Identity and Authority: A Problem 
Analysis of Processes of Identification and Authorization," in Roland 
Robertson & Burkhart Holzner, eds., Identity and Authority, Explorations in 
the Theory of Society. New York: 1979. p. 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
distinction played a role in the loyalty of the island colonies, as did 
fear of slave rebellion, but Canada and the Floridas were contiguous 
with the rebel provinces and remained deeply loyal. Indeed they all 
became refuges for the disapponted loyalists whose expectation of 
eventual victory was dashed.
It could be argued that the truly important transformation of 
identity took place in the years before 1774 and involved the 
colonial elites who made up the Faction23 that would lead the 
rebellion in America. Certainly a change took place which allowed or 
perhaps forced a change in perspective, a change which predicated 
the move toward independence. The radical rebel leadership no 
longer saw themselves as British Americans but as simply 
Americans.24
The identity transformation this study is concerned with did 
not take place prior to the rebellion. The change which overcame the 
loyalists was caused by the traumatic events of the period from 1774 
to 1784. Their identities changed from British Americans to 
"American sufferers," from contented and prosperous provincials to
23The term "faction" is used repeatedly in letters and in memorials to refer to 
the rebel leadership while it remained a dissenting political element. Once 
the situation had exploded into rebellion, the "faction" was transformed into 
the enemy by terms like "usurpers," and "rebels." See Earl of Dartmouth to 
Lieut.-General Thomas Gage, April 9, 1774 in K.G. Davies, ed. Documents of the 
American Revolution 1770-1783. Colonial Office Series. KX Volumes, Dublin: 
1974. Vol. VII, p. 85. See also the repeated use of the term in Ann Hulton's 
letters cited below.
240n the theoretical underpinnings of the rebel movement see Bernard 
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA: 
1967. Other works also treat the changes in the thought of the American 
leadership, among others, Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People The Rise of 
Popular Sovereignty in England. New York: 1988; Gordon S. Wood, The 
Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: 1991, stand out.
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victims both of their rebellious neighbors and of a government which 
could not or would not supply the means to preserve their world.
For some, the loyalist identity was ephemeral. A number of 
loyalists were subsumed back into English society somewhere in the 
British Isles. Stephen Holland retired to Ireland. Others became a 
part of one or another new community of loyalists in the Caribbean 
where their contributions have been appreciated and celebrated 
since. One of those was Josiah Pomeroy who waived his claim for 
compensation in return for an immediate grant to set sail for 
Jamaica.25 The majority of loyalists who left their homes ended up in 
Canada, particularly Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Even before the 
end of the war John Wentworth had assumed a new role in the 
colonial government, that of Surveyor of the King's Woods in Nova 
Scotia. Soon after the Peace of Paris he was made governor of that 
colony. Thousands of loyalists flowed into the new lands set aside by 
government in the two Canadian provinces where they built new 
communities and new lives based upon their shared identity as 
Loyalists.26
25See for instance Wilbur H. Siebert, The Legacy o f the American Revolution 
to the British West Indies and Bahamas. Columbus, Ohio: 1913.
26The most recent studies of the loyalist diaspora include a number of essays 
on the concept of community in the loyalist settlements of Canada. These 
include: Ann Gorman Condon, "The Loyalist Community in New Brunswick," 
Janice Potter-Mackinnon, "Loyalists and Community: The Eastern Ontario 
Loyalist Women," Jane Errington and George A. Rawlyk, "Creating a British- 
American Political Community in Upper Canada," and Neil Mackinnon, "The 
Nova Scotia Loyalists: A Traumatic Community," all to be found in Robert M. 
Calhoon, Timothy Barnes, and George A. Rawlyk, eds., Loyalists and 
Community in North America. Westport, CT: 1994.
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Philosophers have studied the concept of identity in its most 
abstract form. They are concerned with the most pure form of 
identity, the archetype. Social scientists (psychologists, sociologists, 
and some historians) have delved into the subject of identity for the 
purpose of understanding group dynamics. The interaction of classes, 
communities, and other groups has been investigated from the 
perspective of identity. But the uses of identity up until now have 
been for the most part confined to studies of identity based on race, 
religion, ethnicity, class, or gender.
The loyalist identity transcended those categories. There were 
black and white and Native American loyalists. There were male and 
female loyalists. There were Irish and Scotch-Irish; there were 
American bom and English bom; Presbyterians, Anglicans, probably 
Catholics and Jews, and Quakers; and loyalists came from all 
economic classes as well. This study departs from previous work to 
explore the creation of a political identity. Indeed it does not begin 
with the development of corporate identity, but rather seeks to 
explore the emergence of the personal loyalist identity on the 
individual level and then to show that the combination of the 
proclaimed identifiable loyalists took on the attributes of a loyalist 
community. The loyalists as community can be seen both as the 
actual geographic communities formed after the war in Canada and 
elsewhere, and as the ideational community of common experience, 
common trauma, which transcended geography and bound all 
loyalists regardless of their residence with the identity as members 
of a community bom  in a shared experience, a shared suffering, a 
shared betrayal, a shared exile.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
Imagination created the loyalist identity. On one level, 
individuals imagined themselves bound by ties to the government, 
the crown, the homeland, which their rebellious neighbors sought to 
break. At the same time individuals on the other side imagined them 
to be enemies and traitors to the cause of independence.
On another level the loyalists as a group imagined themselves 
as a force which fought to preserve a life they had already lost. 
While controversy raged in the years leading up to 1774, those who 
would be loyalists could not imagine the lengths to which their 
neighbors would go, and did not discern the steps that were taken. 
The loyalists did not see the slow and subtle takeover of local 
governments and presses by the Faction until the hold of the rebel 
leadership was complete. Even after the outbreak of hostilities, the 
loyalists as a group were blind to the inevitability of their loss so 
clear in hindsight. Only after the war amid regrets and 
recriminations were they forced to accept the loss of property and 
social identity they had striven to preserve. The new identity they 
then embraced was a bitter one, the "suffering loyalist," the "zealous 
sufferer."
The rebels, with the hubris of victors, began the process of 
mythologizing a new identity for their loyalist opponents early in the 
war, branding them with the mark of traitor, and eventually weaving 
a new identity for old neighbors characterized by duplicity, cupidity, 
and savage brutality. Even in New Hampshire, where the absence of 
military action provided no experience of the sort common to the 
other provinces, the retold stories of atrocities and betrayal served 
as the basis for the fabrication of a dark loyalist identity.
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The quotation which begins this introduction describes the process 
the study has taken. By examining the words and actions of the 
individual loyalist, I have sought to find the "common, the shared 
and the general." With those, we may perceive the loyalist identity, 
and understand the role of political identities as they compete to 
define communities.
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Chapter One. 
The New Hampshire Loyalists: 
Questions and Sources
I. The Loyalists
Stephen Holland was a gentleman of Irish birth, a former 
British officer who retired to the New Hampshire town of 
Londonderry following the Seven Years War. Through personality 
and wit, and not a little landed wealth, Holland waxed in prominence 
throughout the 1760s and early 1770s, achieving considerable 
influence at the town and province levels. He was, as were most men 
of his station, active in the magistracy and as a militia officer, and 
was not unknown to the governor and his circle of friends. Holland's 
wealth, his interest, was closely bound to the fate of his adopted 
home. When rebellion came to New Hampshire in December of 1774, 
Holland remained aloof (though he had already signalled his position 
by apprehending deserters from the British army and returning 
them to Boston earlier in the year). He resigned his offices at the 
town and provincial levels as soon as the reins of government were 
seized by the rebels, and apparently subsided into retirement. He 
even signed the Test Oath in 1776. By 1777, however, Holland's real 
identity became known as his actions on behalf of the British were 
revealed to his friends, neighbors, and opponents alike. Stephen
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Holland was a loyalist. At least that is how historians of the modem 
era would identify him. His contemporaries differed along political 
and cultural lines, some calling him a traitor, others calling him a 
friend of government. Whichever he was, his personal identity was 
transformed between 1774 and 1784. The wealthy gentleman from 
Londonderry became the "zealous sufferer" of London, and 
eventually the pensioned invalid living out his days in his native 
Ireland.
This study will explore that transformation of identity, a 
transformation that was not confined to Stephen Holland, but which 
applied to all of the loyalists of New Hampshire, and possibly to the 
vast majority of the loyalists of British North America. The 
transformation Holland and his fellow loyalists underwent took two 
forms. First, an internal change occurred, prompted by the decision 
to remain loyal. Whatever their personally held identities (the "who" 
they conceived themselves to be) each loyalist confronted a need to 
make a decision regarding the future of his political identity. 
Loyalists, as demonstrated in the shared language of those who left a 
written legacy, sacrificed property and security, position, and in 
some cases family,1 in order to support their shared conception of 
law and government. The events of the years from 1774 to 1784
iOne example being David Fitzrandolph of Woodbridge, CT. His "brothers took 
the opposite part." Loyalist Transcripts, Transcripts o f the Manuscript Books 
and Papers o f the Commission of Enquiry into the Losses and Services o f the 
American Loyalists Held Under Acts o f Parliament of 23, 25, 26, 28, and 29 o f  
George III, preserved amongst the Audit Office Records in the Public Record 
Office of England. Examinations in London and New York, 1783-1790. 60 vols. 
New York Public library. Microfilm Edition, Dimond Library, University of 
New Hampshire. Quotations from these volumes which include claims from 
throughout British North America will hereinafter be referred to as Loyalist 
Claims. Reference to Loyalist Claims, David Fitzrandolph, vol. XV, p. 379-388.
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produced a change in personal identity for most, if not all, of New 
Hampshire's loyalists. This change occurred at the level of personal 
identity and subsequently on the level of community identity.
Once the loyalist had broken with the faction by publicly 
affirming or projecting his new identity through words or actions, he 
was no longer a functioning member of his former community. The 
members of the local and provincial communities perceived the 
words and actions of loyalists in a new and different way. While to 
the average loyalist, his actions might seem consistent with all past 
actions, in light of circumstances those actions had new meaning to 
those members of the community who observed them. The observing 
members of the community perceived another "who", another 
persona for their loyalist neighbors.
Subsequently the rebel faction created another identity for 
their domestic opponents. Utilizing a near monopoly of the press, 
rebel writers authored a new corporate identity for the "damned 
tories." While struggling with a personal and communal identity 
crisis, the loyalists were also engaged in a culture war, a discursive 
battle which would determine the future course of American society. 
Part of the rebel strategy in that war was the alteration of the 
loyalist identity. The rebel writers created a new persona for their 
former neighbors, turning them into traitors who would betray their 
country, their families and their God on behalf of the demonized king 
of England.
Historians have argued that it was not the loyalists who 
changed. As Mary Beth Norton suggested: "...Americans did not 
"become" loyal to the empire: they remained loyal to the empire. ...
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some loyalists adhered to their original allegiance through what 
might be termed political inertia... The burden of making a break 
with the past rested with the revolutionaries, not the loyalists - 
despite radical rhetoric to the contrary."2 While it may well be true 
that the initial decision to rebel or not was in reality a more difficult 
and pronounced change for the rebels, such a conclusion does not 
obviate the central issue here. The individuals who remained loyal to 
King and country underwent a profound alteration of their personal 
identities, as well as a major shift in their perceptions of themselves 
as part of a community. For a considerable number of loyalists, their 
membership in a community was terminated, and it became 
necessary for them to find a place in a new one. For others, especially 
those who chose to keep a very low profile, geographic shifts were 
unnecessary or undesirable, and a new role was slowly created 
within the old social framework. As Norton suggested,"There must 
have been thousands of other Americans who retained their fidelity 
to the crown but who were neither willing nor able to abandon their 
homes, speak out against their rebel neighbors, or take up arms to 
defend their point of view."3
This work began with a simple question, well framed by 
Bernard Bailyn in the introduction to his biography of Massachusetts 
governor Thomas Hutchinson: "why any sensible, well informed, 
right-minded American with a modicum of imagination and common
2Mary Beth Norton, The British Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England, 
1774-1789. Boston: 1972. p. 8.
3Norton, The British Americans, p. 7.
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sense could possibly have opposed the Revolution."4 It took little 
effort to find at least some answers in the wealth of recent 
scholarship on the subject of loyalists. In the preface of what remains 
the most comprehensive study of loyalists to date, Robert M. 
Calhoon's The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781, the 
author described his study as an attempt to understand the 
motivations and perceptions of the loyalists. Calhoon stated that "the 
co-ordinated study of motivation and perception is less superficial 
than the cataloguing of attitudes and more manageable than the 
search for the deeper roots of behavior."5 The recitation of the 
"attitudes" of the loyalists had been done earliest by Van Tyne and 
then with success by Nelson.6 Indeed a superficial treatment of 
loyalist attitudes appears in most studies of the Revolution in general 
and certainly all of those concerned with the origins of the split with 
Britain. Calhoon did not avoid the exploration of publicly 
demonstrated attitudes, but sought deeper for the real motivation.
Calhoon suggested a definition for "motivation - the compelling 
reasons, influences, predispositions, and dictates of self-interest, 
temperament, conscience, intellect, fear, and plain confusion - that 
impelled the loyalists to act as they did." Calhoon also stated that the 
examination of motivation was "supplemented by an examination of 
the loyalists’ perception of their roles in society." He supplied another
4Bemard Bailyn, The Ordeal o f Thomas Hutchinson. Cambridge, MA: 1974. p. ix.
5Robert M. Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781. New
York: 1972. p. xi.
6Van Tyne, Claude H., The Loyalists in the American Revolution. Reprint.
Gloucester, MA: 1959. William H. Nelson, The American Tory. Oxford: 1961.
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useful definition: "the process of giving structure to thoughts and 
sensations, perception encompasses man's self-image, emotional and 
intellectual dexterity, and stamina, the imperatives that govern him 
in moments of conscious choice, as well as the predispositions that 
operate in periods of routine."
Calhoon and many others have suggested a number of 
"motives" - reasons why many chose loyalty as opposed to rebellion. 
By examining the traits of loyalists one can indeed define a number 
of common characteristics. Many loyalists were wealthy and a break 
with Britain might have had serious consequences on their fortunes. 
Many also held lucrative posts in the structure of the royal 
government at the provincial level. The end of royal government 
meant the end of such sources of income. Others were apparently 
motivated by family considerations; ties to staunch loyalists by blood 
or marriage often prompted a similar political stance. According to 
some, religion too played a role. Rhys Isaac and Catherine Albanese, 
among others, have demonstrated some causal relationship between 
religion and the formation of opposing ideologies in the coming of the 
Revolution. They have clearly demonstrated the uses of religion and 
religious imagery in the pursuit of a cultural victory, as well as the 
importance of ritual in revolutionary society.7 One scholar, J.C.D. 
Clark, has gone so far as to suggest that religious differences were a 
contributive cause of the Revolution, as well as of movements in
7Catherine Albanese, Sons of the Fathers, The Civil Religion o f the American 
Revolution. Philadelphia: 1976. Rhys Isaac, The Transformation o f  
Virginia,! 740-1790. Chapel Hill, NC: 1982.
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Atlantic society as a whole.8 This is not to claim that religion had no 
place in the Revolution. Clearly pastors played an important role in 
disseminating Whig ideology to the populace and had a part in 
convincing the average provincial to embrace the revolutionary 
cause.9 But as Bernard Bailyn has suggested, we know far more about 
the ideological origins of the rebellion from the side of the rebels 
than we do from the perspective of the loyalists: "recent historical 
writings have allowed us to see with some clarity the pattern of 
fears, beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions that became the ideology of 
the revolution - which alone in my judgment, explains why certain 
actions of the British government touched off a transforming 
revolution in America - ...until we look deliberately at the
8J.C.D. Clark, The Language of Liberty 1660-1832 Political Discourse and Social 
Dynamics in the Anglo American World. Cambridge: 1994. Clark's theory 
suggests that the clash between the Anglican Church and the varied 
dissenters was the primary division between loyalists and rebels. While 
religion played a part in the controversy in a variety of ways, that sort of 
dichotomy is far too simplistic and is completely without support in any of 
the sources I have found. Surely many loyalists were High Church Anglicans 
and would have welcomed the establishment of an episcopal seat in America. 
The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel had considerable influence as 
well. Part of the controversy between the colonial leadership and the 
government did revolve around the episcopacy fight, but the granting of 
political rights to Catholics in Canada was a source of irritation too. Fingers 
were pointed at Quakers because their religion forbade any participation in 
the war, yet few if any identifiable Quakers joined the loyalist exodus in New 
Hampshire. Of far more importance is the use of religious imagery by rebel 
writers. Supporters of the rebellion characterized it in colorful biblical 
imagery, while employing equally colorful descriptions of the loyalists as 
demons and savages. On religious divisions as part of the revolutionary 
controversy see also Patricia U. Bonomi, Under the Cope o f Heaven: Religion, 
Society, and Politics in Colonial America. New York: 1986; Jon Butler, Awash 
in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People. Cambridge, MA: 1990; 
and Carl Bridenbaugh, Mitre and Sceptre, Transatlantic Faiths, Ideas, 
Personalities and Politics, 1689-1775. New York: 1962.
9See Donald Weber, Rhetoric and History in Revolutionary New England. New 
York: 1988. A useful collection is John Wingate Thornton, The Pulpit o f the 
American Revolution. Reprint. New York: 1970.
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development from the other side around, we have not understood 
what the issues really were, what the struggle was all about."10 This 
study attempts in a small way to begin to answer that challenge.
All the myriad collection of motives ascribed to those who 
remained loyal fail to tell the whole story. For every wealthy loyalist 
there was a wealthy rebel. For every family relationship honored by 
a decision to retain the same political stance, there was a family tom 
apart by differences of political opinion. Men and women on both 
sides of the religious divide made their decisions concerning the 
American rebellion without considering its impact on their church 
membership or their immortal souls. Some were moved by one or 
more of the factors mentioned, while others might have been driven 
by wholly different reasons. Must there have been some all- 
encompassing reason which convinced loyalists to remain loyal at the 
outset of the rebellion?
This study argues that while interest, family, and religion 
played some part in the decision to remain loyal, the language in 
which the loyalists describe their memories demonstrates a deep 
distrust and antipathy for the forms of government by which the 
rebels took and maintained control. There was a perception on the 
part of nearly all of the loyalists studied that the rebels were 
engaged in a coup based upon illegal and unnatural acts, that the 
government imposed by the radical rebel "faction" was contrary to 
the liberties of Englishmen and a hypocritical farce compared to the 
rhetoric of liberty and justice constantly bombarding the senses of
10Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson, p. ix
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every literate resident of the province. The language of loyalists who 
voiced their beliefs during and after the rebellion indicates their 
utter loathing of the rebel government and echoes a visceral sense of 
wrongness felt by the loyalist observers. They saw an assembly 
which met in defiance of law and which itself created the system of 
committees which usurped the executive and judicial powers as 
understood by most Englishmen.
For some of the most prominent men of the province no real 
decision was needed. The majority of the provincial elite had the 
decision made for them by the actions of the crowds who mobbed 
and harassed them in the streets. The governor, John Wentworth, 
and many of his closest associates were compelled to flee before the 
end of 1775 for fear of continued mob violence. The precipitous 
nature of this flight allowed for no reflection until safety was 
assured. Upon consideration, a few returned to the province at the 
earliest opportunity. Daniel Rindge, a councillor, returned in 1778 to 
Portsmouth. George Meserve, former stamp distributor and confidant 
of Governor Wentworth, tried to return after the peace. Meserve 
attempted a suit to recover his property on the grounds that he had 
fled New Hampshire "while she acknowledged her dependence on 
Great Britain and consequently prior to the political existence of the 
United States."11 The suit was unsuccessful and Meserve died in 
England without ever receiving compensation for his losses. On the 
other hand, Robert Fowle, who departed the province in 1778 under
11 The core of this study is based upon the five manuscript volumes at the New 
Hampshire State Library, Concord, NH. Hereinafter cited as NH Claims. NH 
Claims, George Meserve, vol. II, p. 1365-66.
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indictment for counterfeiting, successfully returned to the province 
after the war and lived out his life near Rochester.
The majority of New Hampshire loyalists stood their ground for 
as long as possible. One member of the Governor's Council even 
preferred to remain. George Jaffrey of Portsmouth quietly weathered 
the rebel takeover until his arrest in November 1775. He was 
ordered to remove himself ten miles from Portsmouth or the coast 
where the rebels felt he was less of a danger, but the intervention of 
General Sullivan alleviated even that mild sentence. Jaffrey died in 
Portsmouth in 1802. Theodore Atkinson, a relative and friend of John 
Wentworth and chief justice of the province, remained as well. The 
respect accorded him by virtue of his reputation for fairness and 
honesty protected Atkinson from official sanctions and mob 
harassment until his death in 1779. But Jaffrey and Atkinson were 
old and well connected.12 They also remained quietly aloof from the 
politics of the province.13 For the average loyalist who resisted the
12It is likely that respect for their age and connections preserved the two in 
tranquility. The connotations of that respect have been best and most 
recently been described by Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism o f the American 
Revolution. More needs to be done to study the correlation between age and 
the decision to remain loyal. It would be extremely interesting to assemble a 
statistical analysis of the loyalist claimants, not only of New Hampshire but 
throughout the rebellious colonies. To do so with the 49 New Hampshire 
claimants would be fruitless, the sample too small. It would be far more 
valuable to include all the 5000 or so loyalist claimants. To incorporate such 
an effort within the confines of this study would be impossible. It is possible 
to make some generalizations, based upon the extensive information found in 
the claims, as will be seen below in Chapter Six. In general, however, I do not 
think that age was a factor in the decision to remain loyal.
13Though we might speculate that they, like Mark Hunking Wentworth, may 
have argued quietly and with dignity among their circle of acquaintances. 
The newspapers are full of complaints by radical rebel writers concerning 
an anonymous Portsmouth elite which remained throughout the war 
conspicuously loyal or at the least neutral. Those men were accused of
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rebel takeover and its continued governing, life was neither quiet 
nor secure.
Some loyalists proclaimed their identity early by their words 
and deeds. Outstanding among them was Simon Baxter of Alstead 
who began to resist the rebel takeover by protecting the court of 
quarter session in Grafton county in 1774. As a militia commander 
he refused to march his troops to Boston in 1775. By these acts he 
proclaimed his political and ideological affiliation, he proclaimed his 
personal identity as a loyalist. He then became a target for the rebel 
government. Baxter's experience also illustrates one of the strategies 
employed by the rebel government to intimidate and control its 
perceived domestic enemies. Baxter was arrested and taken before 
the local committee of safety at least thirteen times in 1776 and 
1777. While to the rebels such a record would seem reasonable as a 
means to promote internal security, to the loyalists this was an 
insufferable breach of the rights of an Englishman. Baxter was not 
alone in this sort of treatment. Many loyalist writers complained of 
similar occurrences.
The closing of the law courts from 1775 until sometime in 1777 
was a major part of the rebel strategy. By depriving the populace of 
the normal means of social control, the acts of the committees, both 
local and at the provincial level, were beyond judicial scrutiny. The
providing intelligence to the enemy, of plotting a takeover of the assembly, 
and of generally obstructing the rebel cause. Wentworth, the Governor's 
father, remained in the province until his death also, refusing to abandon 
his home to the rebels. Although there is no evidence that these elders 
actually acted from a loyalist perspective, their mere presence and the 
prominence they represented must have had some quiet influence in the 
town. If it had not, the rebel writers might not have complained so 
vociferously.
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only appeal was to the rebel dominated assembly, not an arena in 
which a loyalist could expect a fair hearing. In January of 1776 the 
rebels created a plan of government which they thought would serve 
during the period of hostilities. This "constitution of 1776" called for 
legislation which would re-establish law courts. Courts subsequently 
established remained closed pending the appointment of judges (an 
act the loyalists found to be particularly offensive since justices of 
the peace could only be commissioned under a royal writ). The new 
plan of government called for the formalization of the already sitting 
committees of safety in each town, and gave them discretionary 
powers to arrest, try and punish anyone suspected of political crimes 
as well as some police powers to protect the citizenry during times of 
uncertainty. The plan also vested executive power at the provincial 
level in the hands of a state Committee of Safety which would hold 
all of the reigns of government when the legislature was not in 
session.
Loyalists viewed this rebel government as illegitimate. In the 
shared language of a self-conscious minority they referred to the 
rebels as usurpers. The rebellion and the government it produced 
were termed "un-natural."14 The frequent use of such a term seems, 
in the intellectual and spiritual climate of the time, significant. The 
late eighteenth century was a pivotal period during which the rise of
14Though this study is particularly concerned with New Hampshire as a "case 
study" of the development of the loyalist identity, an examination of the 
claims from other provinces has shown that the language ascribed to the 
loyalists of New Hampshire was used by the loyalists of the other provinces 
as well. See for example, Loyalist Claims, Weart Banta, vol. XV, p. 295-302; 
Reverend George Panton, vol. XV, p. 15-28; Reuben Tucker, vol. XIV, p. 103- 
116. etc.
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scientific rationalism was superseding superstition. The ideas of 
"natural" and "unnatural" held meaning in both a scientific sense and 
in a religious-spiritual sense. By attributing characteristics of the 
"unnatural" to the rebel movement, the loyalists were denying the 
rebellion any basis either in the law of God as handed down through 
religion, the Common Law of England which all held in deepest 
reverence, or in the laws of nature.
The loyalists made a conscious choice to remain loyal.15 That 
choice carried with it a transformation of identity which was in many 
cases publicly proclaimed through acts and words. The proclamation 
of a loyalist identity by either words or actions carried consequences. 
Like their rebel counterparts, the self-proclaimed loyalists were a 
minority at the start of hostilities. The vast majority of Americans 
were convinced of the righteousness of neither party, and merely 
wished to continue their lives along the path of security and 
prosperity. This study investigates the development of the loyalist 
identity on the personal and communal levels as it emerged in the 
context of the Revolution in New Hampshire. It examines the acts 
that loyalists used to identify themselves as loyalists publicly and 
privately. Once identified as such, loyalists were subject to physical, 
economic, and legal consequences. The rebel government found a 
number of coercive means useful. Mob action was employed early in 
the conflict as a method for sweeping loyalists out of the province
15Norton may be correct in her argument that loyalists remained loyal and 
that the rebel choice to seek independence was the greater break with the 
past, but that hardly obviates the enormity of the decision to follow such an 
unpopular and dangerous course. Norton, The British Americans, p. 7.
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and of intimidating those who remained. After the plan o f 
government of January 1776 "legitimized" the committees of safety, 
those committees and their armed bands constituted a dense local 
network of surveillance and repression. Suspected loyalists could be 
and were arrested at any hour of the day or night and put on trial by 
the committees themselves. In the course of these arrests, loyalists 
were physically manhandled and their property abused or 
destroyed. Intimidation and harassment drove most outspoken 
loyalists from the province by 1778.
Loyalists began to proclaim their position and thereby their 
identity in 1774. Several men, including Baxter and Holland, were 
active in returning British deserters to Boston which angered the 
rebel activists. Baxter also organized a group of like-minded men 
who kept the court open in Grafton County, angering the rebels there 
even further. John Fenton of Plymouth publicly proclaimed his 
position early in 1775 when he assumed his seat in the assembly 
amid a storm of criticism concerning the legality of the governor's 
extension of the vote in that and two other towns. But by then, in the 
spring of 1775, the rebellion had already begun in New Hampshire.
For our purposes, the rebellion began with the capture of Fort 
William and Mary by a rebel mob in December 1774. It became clear 
at that point that Governor Wentworth had lost control of the 
province. When word reached the governor that a mob planned to 
seize the stores of gunpowder and weapons at the fort, Wentworth 
called upon the militia to stop the mob. But that mob was no random
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mob at all.16 It was led by many of the most prominent men of the 
province and numbered in its ranks the very militia Wentworth 
sought as enforcers of the law. Without control of the militia, 
Wentworth was left with no coercive power whatsoever. His request 
for British troops was denied due to the equally tenuous situation in 
Boston. That denial probably saved lives on both sides in the 
province, and left New Hampshire in the unique position of having no 
British military presence on its soil throughout the war.
Wentworth was caught off guard by the loss of his coercive 
powers, and equally surprised by the loss of both the assembly and 
the media as means of expressing loyalist positions to the public. 
The assembly, which had once gladly supported the popular 
governor and his predecessor, Benning Wentworth, was by 1774 
firmly under rebel control. The legislature refused to cooperate with 
the governor's attempts at conciliation, and in the summer of 1775 
refused to seat the elected delegates Wentworth hoped would 
provide him a voice in that house. The assembly ignored the 
governor when he dissolved them by meeting on their own authority 
and illegally in a tavern in Exeter. The rebel leaders of the mob were
16See John Derhak, "The Portsmouth Uprising of 1774 and the Crowd Actions 
at Castle William and Mary: A Case Study of a Popular Uprising in Colonial 
British America." Master's Thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1991. Also 
of interest on the question of the mob involved in the raid on the fort are: 
Theodore Crackel and Martin Andresen, "Fort William and Mary: A Case Study 
in Crowd Behavior," Douglas H. Sweet, "New Hampshire on the Road to 
Revolution: Fort William and Mary, A Decisive Step," and Darryl I. Cathers, 
"Powder to the People: The Revolutionary Structure Behind the Attacks on 
Fort William and Mary, 1774," all in Historical New Hampshire, Vol. XXIX, No.
4, Winter 1974.
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also the rebel leaders of the assembly and many would hold 
responsible positions in the new government and the military.17
Before Wentworth and his circle were aware of the critical 
nature of the situation in New Hampshire, they had lost the means to 
respond. With the militia and the government under rebel control, 
the loyalist response could only have been to the court of public 
opinion. But that too was to be denied. Mobs patrolled the streets 
obviating the possibility that individuals could convince their fellow 
citizens to support the governor or the crown. At the same time the 
rebels controlled the only newspaper in the province, the New  
Hampshire Gazette of Portsmouth. The rebel leadership was 
cognizant of the power that a free press might hold, and acted to 
ensure their control of content to the extent they could. Daniel Fowle, 
the printer, was at one point called before the assembly and 
admonished for printing the continuing series of articles written by 
Daniel Leonard under the pen name of Massachusettensis in his 
pages.18 But Fowle's imagined objectivity was hardly an issue. The 
New Hampshire Gazette carried very few pieces even remotely
17The use of the term "mob" and the nature of the Portsmouth mob are 
discussed in Chapter Four. Unlike the mobs of Boston and the other major 
port cities, the Portsmouth mob does not seem to have had a long and 
illustrious history of engaging in "politics out of doors." The Portsmouth 
variation coalesced as a means of policing loyalist activity in the seaport 
town, and had a constant presence. See Chapter Six.
18Fowle also printed John Adams' Novanglus letters written in reply to 
Massachusettensis, though they began to run several weeks after 
Massachusettensis appeared, they occupied space just next to Leonard in all 
subsequent issues. Daniel Leonard, of Taunton, Massachusetts was a 
prominent loyalist, and became Chief Justice of the Bermudas after the 
rebellion. See Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches o f Loyalists o f the 
American Revolution, with an Historical Essay. 2 vol., Boston: 1864. vol. I, p. 
546. Hereinafter cited as Sabine, Sketches, p. 10-12.
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favorable to the loyalist cause. The rebel writers on the other hand 
flooded the paper with letters expressing the "whig" position, and 
Fowle reprinted dozens of articles from Boston, Philadelphia, and 
elsewhere, including occasional pieces from England by writers 
expressing their support for the American position.
The war of words carried on in the pages of the Gazette and its 
short-lived cousin in Exeter19 replaced the m ilitary  struggle which 
encompassed the other provinces of British North America. The 
battle for the support of the majority of the population of the 
province of New Hampshire was fought in print. That battle has in 
modem times been termed a "culture war." Both sides of the 
ideological struggle sought to convince the populace that its vision of 
the controversy with Great Britain was righteous. Unprepared for the 
fight, loyalist writers were nearly silenced, and the rebel writers 
were left relatively free to sway public opinion with countless 
articles.
As part of their strategy, the rebel writers created their own 
version of the loyalist identity. By 1778 the loyalists were portrayed 
by rebel writers as savages capable of terrible atrocities like the 
deliberate introduction of small pox into rebel-controlled cities such 
as Philadelphia. The loyalists were represented as the evil minions of 
a newly demonized King George in, to be feared even more than
19Robert Fowle, alleged counterfeiter and loyalist memorialist, printed the 
New Hampshire Gazette or, Exeter Morning Chronicle from July 1776 until 
his arrest and imprisonment in 1777. Fowle was the nephew of Daniel Fowle 
of Portsmouth and learned his trade at the newspaper there. Though counted 
a loyalist, Robert Fowle printed no articles favorable to the loyalist position 
while his paper was in publication.
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British regulars. The imagery called upon by rebel writers evoked 
long standing fears of Indian raids and compared loyalists to the 
uncivilized savages who had long ravaged rural settlements. Toward 
the end of the war a new and more sophisticated enemy was 
revealed, loyalists who pretended to be of the rebel party but who 
sought to subvert the new government by seeking election to town 
and provincial offices. After the defeat of British arms was in sight, 
the fear of the savage depredations of loyalist traitors was replaced 
by the new fear of loyalist subversion.
The culture war began with the emergence of the power of the 
rebel faction in 1774. Men who proclaimed their loyalist sympathies, 
and by extension, their loyalist identity, did so by their actions. 
Those actions were met with coercive force. Between December of 
1774 and January of 1776 most of that force was carried out by 
mobs. Loyalists who identified themselves publicly were set upon, 
often beaten, and frequently imprisoned. It was common for those 
arrested on suspicion of loyalism to be restricted to their homes or 
farms, or to be removed from the vicinity of the coast for fear that 
they would aid an anticipated invasion by British troops. Others 
fared far worse. Benjamin Hough, a magistrate in the New Hampshire 
Grants territory, was seized by a mob, beaten, and had all of his 
property taken. He was then tied to a tree, given 200 lashes, and 
banished.20
The rebels were aware even in the early stages of the rebellion 
of the power of words. Dissident preachers had to be silenced as well.
20Sabine, Sketches, vol. I, p. 544.
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The Presbyterian minister in Bedford, John Houston, found his church 
closed against him in 1775. Refusing to retire without a fight, 
Houston was seized by a mob and forced to ride a wooden rail for six 
miles with kitchen tongs tied around his neck. He fled to the New 
Hampshire Grants, but never found another parish.21
After January of 1776 mob action was replaced with the quasi- 
legal operations of the local committees of safety. Their watchfulness 
and coercive powers of arrest and imprisonment were deemed 
adequate by the rebel government. This became especially true after 
the Test Oath was circulated. Also referred to as the Association Test, 
the oath was recommended by the Continental Congress to all the 
provinces as a way of identifying dissidents and of binding the 
signers to the cause. Those who refused to sign the Oath were 
selected for special attention, watched and harassed by the 
committee men. The loyalists still residing in New Hampshire at that 
point tried to maintain a low profile whether from a desire to merely 
continue with their daily lives or to engage in quietly subversive 
activities. Stephen Holland, among others, worked to gather 
information and recruit loyalists for the British. He sent men to join 
the army in Boston and then in New York, and carried on secret 
communications with British prisoners being held in Reading, 
Massachusetts. When he was finally arrested in 1777, Holland was
21Sabine, Sketches, vol. I, p. 546. The significance of the kitchen tongs is 
another mystery. I would speculate that the tongs may have been symbolic 
of the passage in Isaiah which refers to the cleansing of the tongue with 
burning coals. Perhaps the mob was warning Houston of the fate which 
awaited him if he were to return to his church and attempt to preach an 
unpopular message.
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accused of being a leader in a major counterfeiting operation, the 
same group of which Robert Fowle was a part. Other loyalists chose 
to quietly accept what would come. Unlike Stephen Holland who 
signed the Test Oath, Reuben Kidder refused. Kidder, the richest man 
in New Ipswich, a magistrate and militia colonel, had been a  land 
agent for John Wentworth prior to the rebellion. But Kidder took no 
active part in resisting the rebel government and was left alone, his 
property intact. He died in New Ipswich in 1793.22
The victory over Burgoyne at Saratoga prompted a shift in the 
rebel strategy toward the loyalists still in their midst. With the 
spectre of invasion removed the rebel government in New 
Hampshire felt free to all but abandon its physical harassment of its 
domestic opponents and concentrate instead on more subtle and 
more profitable ways of dealing with dissenters. The obvious 
advantage of this shift toward a legal strategy was that it could be 
applied to those who had fled already as well as those who remained. 
The rebel government first enacted a series of laws concerning the 
definition of treason. Once they had defined their targets they passed 
two more laws in 1778 which provided for the banishment of any 
persons who "have left or shall leave this State...and have joined or 
shall join the Enemies thereof,...thereby not only basely deserting the 
Cause of Liberty,...but abetting the Cause of Tyranny."23 The Act of 
Proscription and Banishment was quickly followed by an Act of 
Confiscation, a law which allowed the state to seize the property of
22Sabine, Sketches, vol. I, p. 602.
23NHPP, vol. VH, p. 810-812. and p. 813-814.
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specifically named loyalists. The property so acquired by the 
government was to be sold at auction with the proceeds to be paid 
into the state treasury. It was however contended by the loyalist 
victims of these laws that a considerable amount of this confiscated 
property or the proceeds was diverted into the hands and pockets of 
certain individuals highly placed in the rebel faction. Among those 
mentioned by loyalist claimants were Matthew Thornton and John 
Langdon, two men remembered in modern times as patriots of 
standing.
The majority of active loyalists had departed the province by 
the time the new laws affecting their status and property were 
enacted. The peculiar circumstances prevailing in New Hampshire 
produced unusual results. New Hampshire loyalists did not carry on 
any guerilla resistance to the rebel government. Those who served in 
a military fashion did so in other provinces either as members of 
loyalist units (such as Wentworth's Volunteers) or in units of the 
regular British army or navy. Because their activities were thus so 
diffused, scholars have questioned the number of loyalists from New 
Hampshire and even more the depth of their commitment to the 
British cause.24 While this study does not purport to argue the 
quality or quantity of New Hampshire loyalism, it does contend that 
the loyalists of that province shared identifying characteristics with 
the loyalists of other provinces. Those shared characteristics were
24Robert M. Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781. New 
York: 1973. p. 294; and more vehemently, Wallace Brown, The King's Friends: 
the Composition and Motives o f the American Loyalist Claimants. Providence: 
1965. p. 7.
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borne out in the actions by which the loyalists proclaimed their 
individual identity as loyalists, and in the shared language which 
they used to express themselves publicly and privately during and 
after the war. That the New Hampshire loyalists did not foment an 
uprising can be explained by the absence of any serious British 
threat aimed at the province throughout the war. As other studies 
have shown, particularly Paul Smith in his Loyalists and Redcoats, 
most loyalists remained quiescent until a British military presence 
drew them out. The rebel governments with their networks of 
committees and their control of the militia in every province, were 
capable of swift and sure retaliation should loyalists have attempted 
any actions without the support of nearby British troops. As Smith 
points out, loyalist military activity was nearly always in concert 
with and predicated by British military activity or plans for such 
intervention. Poor timing on the part of British commanders, among 
other factors, conspired to slowly erode the confidence of activist 
loyalists in the efficacy of British strategy and the potential for a 
British victory. In the absence of any British support whatsoever, the 
loyalists of New Hampshire chose to go elsewhere as far as their 
military participation went. On the one occasion when a British 
operation brought troops into some proximity with the province, the 
loyalists responded by flocking to join Burgoyne on his trek toward 
New York. Among those was Simon Baxter who had the distinction of 
being the only provincial officer in Burgoyne's command who refused 
to sign an oath of allegiance to his captors after the Battle of 
Saratoga. Baxter alone was imprisoned with the British officers and 
after a while made his escape. Baxter had chosen not to identify
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himself any longer as a provincial, or as a New Hampshire man; he 
identified himself as a loyal British-American. There was, to him, no 
question of accepting the offered parole and returning to his old life.
This study demonstrates the emergence of a loyalist identity, 
separate from the identity the loyalists once shared with their 
neighbors. The loyalists retained their allegiance to the British 
Empire and thereby remained British Americans.25 The rebels chose 
to alter their own personal and communal identities as well, though 
the analysis of that identity transformation remains for another 
project. The loyalist identity was transformed on the personal level 
and was demonstrated through words and actions. It was also 
transformed on the community level. Two types of loyalist 
community emerged from the trauma of the revolutionary 
generation. One sort was the geographic community formed by 
aggregate settlements of loyalists in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, the 
Floridas, and the West Indies; other exile communities formed in 
London and Bristol, though these were temporary. The other was a 
community of the mind and spirit which encompassed all loyalists 
regardless of their physical location. All of the loyalist generation 
suffered similarly. Those who chose to remain quietly safe at home 
shared to a degree the experience of their more venturesome 
brethren. But the loyalists who left their communities either to flee 
or to take up arms shared an enormous sense of loss and dislocation
25A surprising number of loyalists referred to their former neighbors as "the 
Americans." By doing so, they were separating themselves from those of 
their neighbors who had rebelled. This distinction was true for native born 
loyalists more often than those who had emigrated to America. See for 
example Loyalist Claims, Elisha Laurence, vol. XV, p. 29-36.
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which altered their perception of who they were singly and in 
relation to each other. They could not as a group go back to the way 
things were as those who stayed behind eventually did. Though 
individuals sought repatriation after the war, far more chose to 
establish themselves in new places, where they could remember 
their past and build a new future conscious of who they were and 
the changes which had brought them this new identity.
H. Sources
This study relies first of all on an analytic reading of the 
Loyalist Claims as a central source for inquiry. The claims provide 
the largest extant body of loyalist writing collected into one archive 
and authored by over 5000 individuals. The claims are an important 
source and support the existence of a loyalist community, a self- 
conscious minority whose goals were articulated in a shared 
vocabulary. The shared language of the claims also supports the 
existence of a distinct loyalist identity.
The documents we now call the Loyalist Claims came into 
being as a result of an act of Parliament in 1783. That the claims 
even exist is evidence of the existence of a vocal minority community 
which formed in London during the war, and which agitated 
incessantly during and after the war for governmental assistance to 
those who had lost their living and property as a result of their 
loyalty.26 The majority of the claims were filed in London during the
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original term of the commission which ran for two years. Due to the 
overall quantity of claims, over five thousand all told, the term of the 
commission was extended by Parliament, and the work was not 
completed until 1790.27 In 1786 hearings were held in Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick to assist those who were unable to make the 
passage to England, but who yet had claims pending. An agent, 
British lawyer John Anstey, was sent to the United States to gather 
evidence.28
The original documents are now in the Public Record Office, 
Audit Office, in London, and consist of 146 bound volumes and 139 
bundles of loose papers. During the nineteenth century the papers 
were stored in a sort of basement in Somerset House where they 
suffered from dampness, and some time during their stay there, 
fourteen volumes went missing, and are presumed destroyed.29 In
26Norton, The British-Americans. For an examination of the exile community 
in England, this book has no rival.
27Gregory Palmer, ed., Revised Edition of Biographical Sketches o f Loyalists of 
the American Revolution by Lorenzo Sabine. Westport, CT: 1984. p. x. Palmer 
provides an excellent introduction to the revised edition of this 19th century 
classic, including a concise overview of the claims process. Referred to 
hereinafter as Palmer, Sketches.
28Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xi.
2 9 In his Introduction to the New Hampshire Claims, Stevens suggests that at 
the time the loss was discovered, Americans were suspected of stealing and 
destroying the missing papers, though he offers no reason why that might 
have happened. B.F. Stevens, ed., New Hampshire Loyalist Claims. Stevens 
transcribed all of the claims and correlated the papers in the bound volumes 
with those found in loose bundles. He then arranged the claims 
alphabetically by individual last name and by province of origin. If a 
claimant had property loss claimed in one province but was a resident of 
another, Stevens arranged the claimant by residence. Thus if a 
Massachusetts resident lost property in New Hampshire, his or her claim 
would probably be placed in the Massachusetts volumes. If the claimant was a 
resident of New Hampshire, and lost property in another province, his claim 
would be found in the New Hampshire claims. If the claimant had residence
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about 1904 B.F. Stevens undertook the transcription of the Claims, 
and it is those transcripts which we have the good fortune to use in 
this country.
Most claim "files" contain other documents such as wills, deeds, 
maps, depositions, letters, etc. in support of the individual's claim.30 
Many "files" also contain petitions submitted earlier in the war to the 
treasury for temporary support. The centerpiece of each claim was 
the "memorial" which consisted of one or more pages in which the 
claimant set forth the circumstances under which he was asking the 
British government for compensation of his (or her) losses. Length 
varied depending on the experiences of the writer as well as the 
complexity and amount of property claimed as lost.
The memorials themselves followed a pattern. Each began with 
a brief salutation to the Claims Commission which varied only 
slightly from one to the next. The second part identified the writer, 
sometimes including his profession and place of residence. It was at 
that point that prominent men listed the offices they held under the 
crown or provincial governments, and their annual value in salary or 
fees. Then came a recitation of the acts each memorialist performed 
which had identified him as a loyalist. The most commonly used 
phrase was "rendered him obnoxious to his neighbors" or some
in two states and lost property in both, it appears Stevens may have included 
him in both. One New Hampshire claimant listed considerable land in 
Massachusetts, and may indeed have lived there, but had also claimed losses 
in New Hampshire, so Stevens inserted a note that the extensive 
Massachusetts losses could be found in that claimant's papers relevant to that 
province.
S^For the sake of simplicity, I refer to the bundles of documents which 
comprise each claim as "files."
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variation of those words. Once the memorialist had established his 
identity as a loyalist, he recounted the consequences of his actions. 
This usually encompassed a recitation of the "sufferings" he 
underwent on behalf of government including being harassed by 
mobs, arrested, imprisoned, shot at, insulted, robbed, and so on. The 
stage thus set, the final portion of the memorial consisted of a list of 
property lost. Those lists ranged from a single paragraph to hundreds 
of pages supplemented by maps and deeds. Stephen Holland was 
able to acquire a copy of the inventory taken by rebel leaders when 
the contents of his house were sold. Robert Fowle appended a copy of 
his bill of sale dating to the time of acquisition of his printing 
equipment which provided a detailed list of the contents of his shop.
On the surface, the similarity from one memorial to another can 
be explained by the appearance of a manual written anonymously 
and published in 1783 which explained the law that established the 
Claims Commission and the claims process to those who might want 
to participate. But beyond a self-help manual, the consistency of the 
memorials is itself testimony to the existence of a self-conscious 
group, a community whose members cooperated with each other in 
the writing of their memorials and supported each other's stories 
with affidavits. Indeed Stephen Holland wrote several memorials on 
behalf of friends who were unable to do so themselves by virtue of 
distance or frailty.31
31The Nova Scotia claimants were often assisted in the preparation of their 
memorials by agents. The papers were conveyed to London and then a 
personal interview was conducted in St. John.
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Of the more than 5000 loyalists who attempted to receive 
compensation for their losses, New Hampshire loyalists filed forty- 
nine claims with the Claims Commissioners.32 One of the claims was 
filed on behalf of three brothers, James, John, and Patrick McMaster, 
though James was the only one of the three resident in the province 
of New Hampshire. Three claims were filed by women, Mary 
Achindoss, Joanna Dix, and Elizabeth Wentworth, though others were 
pursued by widows after the death of their claimant husbands.33
32I have focused primarily on New Hampshire and thus the forty-nine claims 
of the New Hampshire loyalists form the core of the evidence for my 
interpretations. However, I have also read and taken into consideration the 
claims of those from other provinces and have found nothing to contradict 
the conclusions of this study. To put that number into some perspective, the 
New Hampshire Claims constitute less than one percent of the claims filed by 
loyalists from all provinces. But the number of New Hampshire loyalists was 
small as well. Sabine could identify only another hundred or so who did not 
file claims. At the time of the signing of the Test Oath, in New Hampshire 
there were 8,972 adult males eligible to sign. Of those, 773 or 8.6% refused 
{NHPP vol. VIII, pp. 204-296). Refusal did not necessarily indicate that the 
individual was a loyalist, nor did signing preclude an eventual turn to the 
loyalist camp. All that these numbers can tell us for sure is that only 49 New 
Hampshire loyalists filed claims. Based on the number of adults in the 
province in 1776, we can speculate that: only a very small number remained 
committed loyalists throughout the conflict and survived it; or that not very 
many had lost enough property to make it worth the time, effort, and 
expense to file a claim; or that perhaps only a few New Hampshire loyalists 
heard about the opportunity afforded by the compensation process. However, 
if we look at the total number of claims filed, over 5000, and compare that to 
the number of loyalists estimated to have departed the provinces by the end 
of the war, between 80,000 and 100,000, we see that only 5% of those who left 
their homes behind filed claims. Why that was so is a mystery yet to be 
solved.
^N H  Claims, Thomas Cumings, vol. I, p. 361; John Fenton, vol. II, p. 533-4; 
Donald McAlpine, vol. Ill, p. 1140; George Meserve, vol. Ill, p. 1288; 
Bartholomew Stayers' claim was continued by his son, Vol. II, p. 1704; The 
petitions and claim of James Nevin was filed by his wife, Isabella, though in 
his name. He had been Collector of Customs in the Port of Piscataqua, and a 
member of the council. But he died in 1769. More on Nevin's claim below. The 
petition in the name of Benjamin Whiting was actually written by Stephen 
Holland on behalf of Whiting's son, Leonard, who lived in Merrimack, NH.
His father's estate had been confiscated and sold, but Whiting provided no 
proofs.
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The New Hampshire claims, taken as a group, provide an 
important source for examining the Revolution from the perspective 
of those who felt compelled to adhere to the crown and thereby 
suffered either personally or in terms of lost property. More often 
than not, most claimants had suffered in both respects. They also 
provide a window on the soul of a community, a group of individuals 
drawn together in a common effort to find redress for their losses, 
despite the fact that some of them never met. This community was 
drawn from all of the rebellious provinces, and though we will 
concentrate almost exclusively on the story of the New Hampshire 
loyalists, we can extend their views and their experiences to their 
brethren of whatever province.
The Claims are the largest single collection devoted to the 
writings of loyalists, and perhaps more important, the writings of 
ordinary loyalists. As such, they provide a unique perspective on the 
thoughts and ideas of ordinary men and women, a glimpse of their 
identity as individuals, the sum of which becomes the loyalist 
community.
The Claims represent the articulation of a self-conscious 
minority group attempting to establish an identity, a community 
seeking a place, seeking to establish its own worth within a new 
society because its old society had been ripped apart by war and 
because its members have suffered displacement and loss. Second, 
the claims provide an analytic framework within which we can 
reconstruct the story of the rebellion as experienced by the losers.
A second considerable body of evidence for the conclusions 
adduced herein lies in the records of the rebel government: Journals
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of the House and Council; correspondence among rebel leaders, and 
correspondence between the committees of the various towns and 
the government at Exeter. These can all be found in the published 
Provincial and State Papers. Volumes 7 and 8 cover the years under 
consideration. In addition the memoirs, letters, and other papers of 
various loyalists have also been consulted and are cited as necessary 
in the text. Among the most useful of printed collections was the 
series of Documents o f the American Revolution, 1770-1783. The 
twenty-one volumes in that series contain useful letters and official 
communications to and from the Colonial Office throughout the war, 
as well as numbers of documents acquired by correspondents and 
enclosed from one to another.
Newspapers of the time provided a wealth of information 
especially during the discussion of the culture war which fills 
Chapter Six. For our purposes I have analyzed the full run of the 
"loyalist" paper in Exeter, the New Hampshire Gazette or Exeter 
Morning Chronicle, as well as ten years of the New Hampshire 
Gazette of Portsmouth, the only paper which spanned the years from 
1774 to 1784.
This study is informed by a number of works on the American 
Revolution. The general state of affairs on the eve of the Revolution 
can be found in Jackson T. Main's The Social Structure o f 
Revolutionary America. More timely and useful is Robert A. Gross's 
The Minutemen and Their World.34 Among the studies concerning
34jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America. 
Princeton: 1965; Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and Their World. New York: 
1976.
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the causes of the Revolution were John C. Miller's The Origins o f the 
American Revolution, Edmund S. Morgan's The Stamp Act Crisis and 
Inventing the People, Gordon S. Wood's Creation o f the American 
Republic and The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, (which also 
contains a brilliant description of colonial society) and Bernard 
Bailyn's Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution. 35 Older, yet 
still of value, was Lawrence Henry Gipson's The Coming o f the 
Revolution.36 Several scholars have suggested economics played an 
important role in the causes of the Revolution. Among those are Marc 
Egnal's A Mighty Empire, Thomas Doerflinger's A Vigorous Spirit o f 
Enterprise, and Gary Nash's The Urban CrucibleA7 T.H. Breen argues 
persuasively that economics, particularly planter debt, did not weigh 
heavily in the decision of the planter aristocracy to rebel.38 Oliver 
Dickerson suggested that it was not the Navigation Acts themselves
3 3John C. Miller, The Origins o f the American Revolution. Boston: 1943; 
Edmund S. & Helen Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to 
Revolution.Chapel Hill, NC: 1953. Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People, 
Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. New York: 
1969 and Radicalism o f the American Revolution. Bernard Bailyn, The 
Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution. See also Edmund S. Morgan, 
The Birth of the Republic, 1763-1789. 3rd edition. Chicago: 1992.
38Lawrence Henry Gipson, The Coming of the Revolution, 1763-1775. New 
York: 1962.
37Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire, The Origins o f the American Revolution. 
Ithaca, NY: 1988. Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit o f Enterprise, 
Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia. New 
York: 1986. Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible, Social Change, Political 
Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA: 
1979.
38T. H. Breen, Tobacco Culture, The Mentality o f the Great Tidewater Planters 
on the Eve o f the Revolution. Princeton, NJ: 1985.
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which drove a wedge between Britain and her colonies as much as it 
was the conduct of the customs officers.39
Some works describe the social and cultural effects of the 
Revolution. One of the finest is Charles Royster's A Revolutionary 
People at War, but John Shy's A People Numerous and Armed is 
equally helpful.40 Don Higginbotham discussed the war in a larger 
context in his War and Society in Revolutionary America.41 Another 
look at the Revolution and its impact on America over time is 
Michael Kammen's A Season o f Youth.42
The war itself is well described in Robert Middlekauffs The 
Glorious Cause.43 From the British perspective, a fine account of the 
war in its political and military aspects can be found, first among 
others, in Piers Mackesy's The War for America, 1775-1783.44 
Another admirable study from that side of the Atlantic is Jeremy
39OIiver M. Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution. 
Philadelphia: 1951.
40Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Arm y and 
American Character, 1775-1783. Chapel Hill, NC: 1979. John Shy, A People 
Numerous and Armed, Reflections on the Military Struggle for American 
Independence. Revised Edition. Ann Arbor, MI: 1990.
41Don Higginbotham, War and Society in Revolutionary America: The Wider 
Dimensions o f Conflict Columbia, SC: 1988.
42Michael Kammen, A Season o f Youth: The American Revolution and the 
Historical Imagination. New York: 1978.
43Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763- 
1789. New York: 1982.
^Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783. Cambridge, MA: 1965. See
also Michael Pearson, Those Damned Rebels, The American Revolution 
Through British Eyes. New York: 1972.
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Black's War for America.45 Barbara Tuchman investigated the naval 
side of the Revolution as well as the Dutch connection in The First 
Salute.4(> Many more works too numerous to list consider the 
Revolution in general and from particular perspectives. Most were 
not consulted for this study, but are certainly worthy of 
consideration for the general study of the Revolution. Two newer 
works require mention here. Robert Leckie has penned an 
enormously detailed narrative of the Revolution centering around 
the undeniable importance of George Washington to its success as 
well as the reciprocal effect of the success of the war on the career of 
the commander-in-chief.47 We, however, are far more concerned 
with a more limited view of the war, that of the loyalists.
As mentioned previously, the definitive narrative of the 
loyalist in the American revolution is Robert M. Calhoon's The 
Loyalists in Revolutionary America. Before Calhoon only Claude H. 
Van Tyne48 had explored the loyalists in such depth, and no one has 
since. We have seen the emergence of loyalist studies of two kinds: 
the ideological exploration and the local study. First among the 
ideological studies was Nelson's The American Tory.4'3 Accepted as
45jeremy Black, War for America, The Fight for Independence 1775-1783. New 
York: 1991.
^Barbara W. Tuchman, The First Salute. New York: 1988.
47Robert Leckie, George Washington's War, The Saga o f the American 
Revolution. New York: 1992.
48Claude H. Van Tyne, The Loyalists in the American Revolution. Reprint. 
Gloucester, MA: 1959.
4^William H. Nelson, The American Tory. Oxford: 1961.
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the earliest and most respected of works concerned with the loyalist 
ideological position, Nelson errs in this slender volume by con tinu ing 
to perpetuate the stereotypes concerning loyalists without fully 
understanding the motivations behind the ideology he so faithfully 
documents. His use of the pejorative term "tory" is a prime example. 
As will be explored below, the loyalists eschewed the use of the term 
referring to themselves. A fine recent example of an ideological 
examination of the loyalists is Janice Potter's The Liberty We Seek, 
while Calhoon's collection of essays, The Loyahst Perception and 
Other Essays, is also extremely useful.50
Many valuable studies of loyalism at the provincial level have 
been published. Early works include Harold Hancock's pair of books 
on Delaware loyalists: The Loyalists o f Revolutionary Delaware and 
The Delaware Loyalists, 51 Robert DeMond's study of North Carolina 
Loyalists,52 Siebert's work on the Floridas and the Indies, and 
Pennsylvania.53 Recently, new monographs have appeared dealing 
with the role of the loyalists in the war at the provincial level. These
50Janice Potter, The Liberty We Seek, Loyalist Ideology in Colonial New York 
and Massachusetts. Cambridge, MA: 1983. Robert M. Calhoon,
51Harold Bell Hancock, The Delaware Loyalists. Reprint. Boston: 1972. and The 
Loyalists o f Revolutionary Delaware. Cranbury, NJ: 1977.
52Robert O. DeMond, The Loyalists in North Carolina During the Revolution. 
Hamden, CT: 1964.
53Wilbur H. Siebert, The Legacy of the American Revolution to the British West 
Indies and Bahamas: A Chapter out of the History of the Loyalists. Reprint. 
Boston: 1972; Loyalists in East Florida, 1774 to 1785; The Most Important 
Documents Pertaining Thereto, Edited with an Accompanying Narrative. 2 
vols. Reprint. Boston: 1972; The Loyalists o f Pennsylvania. Columbus, OH:
1920.
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include Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia, by Adele Hast, and 
Philip Ranlet's The New York Loyalists. 54  Hast demonstrates the 
connection between the presence of British m ilitary  activity and the 
level of loyalist commitment in the two proximal areas of Virginia. 
Ranlet's study seemed unusually concerned with denying the 
assumed intensity of loyalist commitment in the province of New 
York. Previous studies have asserted that the number of loyalists 
was extremely high in New York, as it may have been in the 
Carolinas and Georgia. Ranlet argued that the numbers of loyalists 
were artificially high due to the British occupation of New York for 
most of the war, and that the majority of New Yorkers were indeed 
rebels or at the least neutral. Robert Lambert has ably described the 
role of the loyalists in the province of South Carolina in his South 
Carolina Loyahsts in the American Revolution. 55 Those works and a 
collection of article-length community studies of loyalist activity 
collected by Robert Calhoon and others56 have demonstrated the
54Adele Hast, Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia, The Norfolk Area and the 
Eastern Shore. Ann Arbor, MI: 1979; Philip Ranlet, The New York Loyalists. 
Knoxville, TN: 1986. See also Robert O. DeMond, The Loyalists in North 
Carolina During the Revolution. Reprint. Hamden CT: 1964.; Adele Hast, 
Loyalism in Revolutionary Virginia The Norfolk Area and the Eastern Shore. 
Ann Arbor, MI: 1979. Though separated by nearly forty years in their 
writing, the two studies here exemplify the type of localized work being done 
on loyalist activities. Both attempt an analysis of loyalist activities before and 
during the rebellion, DeMond in a rather straightforward way characteristic 
of his generation, provides a comprehensive narrative of the activities of 
loyalists in specific contexts. Hast brings to bear the sophisticated tools of the 
more recent prosopographic school, analyzing every possible quantifiable 
variable to achieve much the same result, an exploration of the actions of a 
minority in a specific area over a certain span of time.
55Robert Stansbury Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists in the American 
Revolution. Columbia, SC: 1987.
56Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and Community.
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need for further inquiry on the local and provincial level into the 
loyalist experience, while at the same time setting the standard for 
innovative scholarship such inquiries demand. These studies raise as 
many questions as they answer. Jean Hankins, in an examination of 
Sandemanian pacifists in Connecticut reminds us of the work yet to 
be done on the relationship of religious principle to loyalism in other 
areas, particularly the relationship between rebel activity and the 
Quakers who were singled out for persecution by the Continental 
Congress.57 Rebecca Starr pointed out the ephemeral nature of the 
loyalist persuasion in a study of loyalists on Daufuskie Island, South 
Carolina. Though adamant during the war, the population of that tiny 
island reverted to their provincial American allegiance at the 
Revolution's conclusion.58 In the same collection David Maas and 
Joseph Tiedemann examine the conflict and problems incumbent 
upon communities as they strive to reconcile themselves to the 
presence of neighbors who were once characterized as b itte r  
enemies. Maas studied the problem of amnesty for returning 
loyalists in Massachusetts, while Tiedemann considered the means of 
conflict resolution in post-war New York.59
57Jean F. Hankins, "Connecticut's Sandemanians: Loyalism as a Religious Test," 
in Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and Community, pp. 31-44.
58Rebecca Starr, '"Little Bermuda': Loyalism on Daufuskie Island, South 
Carolina, 1775-1783" in Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and Community, pp. 55- 
64.
59David E Maas, "The Massachusetts Loyalists and the Problem of Amnesty, 
1775-1790," and Joseph S. Tiedemann, "Patriots, Loyalists, and Conflict 
Resolution in New York, 1783-1787," in Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and 
Community, pp. 65-74 and pp. 75-90.
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There remains a great deal to be done. Provincial studies of 
Georgia and New Jersey are lacking, as are modem monographs on 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Massachusetts. More could be done with 
North Carolina, and none of the provinces has been exhausted. There 
is no modern treatment of loyalism in New Hampshire. Otis G. 
Hammond published a brief treatment of the loyalists of New 
Hampshire in 1917,60 and nothing more was done on the provincial 
level until Robert Brown's dissertation in 1983. Brown's thorough 
and informative study concentrated on a narrative of the loyalist 
experience in New Hampshire, and related that experience to the 
political context of the province.61 The only other work remotely 
relevant is Paul Wilderson's excellent biography of John 
Wentworth.62
The dissertation does not follow a narrative form. Instead, each 
chapter explores certain themes which thread their way through the 
history of loyalism in New Hampshire. Chapter Two discusses the 
proclamation of individual loyalist identities through words and, 
more demonstratively, by actions. The shared language of the Claims 
as weH as other written sources supply much of the evidence. The
660tis G. Hammond, Tories o f  New Hampshire in the War of the Revolution. 
Concord, NH: 1917.
61Robert M. Brown, "Revolutionary New Hampshire and the Loyalist 
Experience: 'Surely We Have Deserved a Better Fate.'" Dissertation,
University of New Hampshire, 1983. While Brown provides a valuable 
introduction to the loyalist experience, this study diverges from his 
excellent narrative to concentrate on the process of identity transformation 
and the formation of the new ideational loyalist community.
62Paul W. Wilderson, Governor John Wentworth & the American Revolution 
The English Connection. Hanover, NH: 1994.
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actions of various loyalists are of special interest as expressions of 
deeply held beliefs which translate into the physical expression of 
personal identity. Beginning with a brief treatment of what might be 
described as the "original identity," the chapter explores the evidence 
of the expression of the loyalist identity. This expression corresponds 
to the second form of identity described previously, that which is 
publicly proclaimed by words and actions.
Chapter Three describes the experiences or "sufferings" 
recounted by the loyalists as a result of the rebel response to their 
proclamation of identity. The rebel government at all levels spent a 
great deal of effort in trying to identify those they feared to be 
potential or real enemies and even more effort in the attempt to 
either drive those so identified from the community or maintain 
strict control over their persons. Once observers perceived the new 
identity proclaimed by some of their neighbors, sanctions were 
imposed including community pressures and the official responses of 
the rebel government. The public proclamation of the loyalist 
identity produced an "other" against which the norms of community 
behavior might be set. Though not deliberately chronological, 
Chapters Two and Three concentrate on the early stages of the 
rebellion. Most loyalists proclaimed their choice in the period 
between the taking of Fort William and Mary in December of 1775 
and the summer of 1777 when a number of New Hampshire loyalists 
joined Burgoyne as he marched southward. The response of the rebel 
authorities during that period was repressive, relying on a strategy 
of physical coercion by means of mobs and later by the committees 
and their bands of militiamen. While Chapter Two considers the
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"who" the loyalists projected themselves to be through their words 
and actions, Chapter Three analyzes the responses of the observers 
of those projected identities and attempts to construct the perception 
of the loyalist identity upon which the rebels based their responses.
Chapter Four considers the shift in rebel strategy away from 
physical reprisals on the absent or remaining loyalists. The rebel 
government constructed a legal identity for the loyalist enemies and 
used that device to augment the dwindling state treasury. Based on 
their perceptions of the loyalist identity, the rebel government 
projected their own definition of those individuals whose actions 
failed to conform with community standards. The assembly created a 
new definition of treason based on the actions which the loyalists 
had already taken including leaving the province and taking up arms 
with the British army. By identifying individual loyalists as traitors, 
the rebel government was then able to condemn large numbers of 
suspected loyalists without due process and subsequently confiscate 
large amounts of personal and real property. The chapter combines 
the uses of the "who" the loyalists were perceived to be by their 
opponents and the "who" the rebel government constructed the 
loyalists to be for the purposes of its own political agenda.
Chapter Five explores yet another way in which the rebels 
created and imposed an identity on their opponents. This chapter 
argues that the rebellion was in fact a culture war in addition to the 
political and military struggles. In the course of that cultural battle, 
the rebels engaged in a form of discourse in which they created a 
new and highly negative identity for their ideological opponents, an 
act of political myth-making so powerful that it has withstood the
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passage of years and been accepted as fact by generations that 
followed.
Chapter Six details the emergence of the loyalist identity on the 
community level. Through an analytic reading of the Loyalist Claims, 
I argue that a loyalist community existed, though not necessarily 
corresponding to geographic boundaries. This ideational community 
is demonstrated through shared language, experiences, and goals. 
The memorials and their supporting documents are the last 
expressions uttered by large numbers of the losing side in both the 
rebellion and the culture war. Loyalist historians would attempt to 
reconstruct the events of 1774 to 1783 for the reading public, but 
their efforts were lost to the vast majority of the populace in the new 
republic in America. Only a disinterested British audience would see 
the fruits of their labor. The claimants did not write for the public. 
Their stories were told in the hope that the government which had 
failed so miserably to protect their homes and fortunes by force 
might compensate them for their losses in some fashion. They wrote 
also to counter the myth created by the rebel writers and 
promulgated in print to the world. They wrote to dispel the stories of 
cowardice and savagery which tainted their self image and to set 
right the tale of the loss of America which had taken place one farm, 
one shop, one home at a time.




Loyalist Acts as Profession of Personal Identity.
Though I have no mistrust but that all and much more 
than I have wrote is strictly true, yet if your Excellency 
should happen to mention anything above related among 
your friends, be pleased to conceal my name, who have 
no inclination to expose my person to the resentment of 
these Sons of Violence.1
This chapter is concerned with the actions of New Hampshire 
loyalists, primarily those who petitioned for redress of their losses to 
the British government during and after the war. The memorialists 
provide a cross-section of the loyalist generation. All levels of society 
were represented among the claimants, from the governor of the 
province, John Wentworth, to the post rider, Bartholomew Stavers, 
who had served the Boston to Portsmouth route. Those who had once 
achieved wealth were represented among the claimants. Benning 
Wentworth, the governor's nephew, owned many thousands of acres 
of land in the interior of the province despite the fact that he had not 
yet come of age at the outset of the rebellion.2 On the other hand,
1 Reverend Henry Caner to Governor John Wentworth, November 8, 1773, from 
Caner's letterbook, quoted in Catherine S. Crary, ed., The Price o f Loyalty,
Tory Writings from the Revolutionary Era. New York: 1973.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
Levi Warner of Claremont asked compensation for losses amounting 
to £70 sterling. He had lost everything, house, livestock, and the loom 
on which he had earned his living as a weaver.3 A common thread 
binds them all, their desire to be regarded as loyalists, to embrace 
that identity not only as a means to an end, the reimbursement of 
their losses, but as a way of putting a label to the experience they 
had undergone, a way of again becoming a part of a group expressed 
as "we" or "us" denied them by the fact that they had been shunned 
by their neighbors, excluded from their communities, and exiled 
from their homes.
Asked to identify himself in 1773, the average resident of New 
Hampshire would probably have given his name and then defined 
himself in terms of the town in which he lived and by his occupation. 
Josiah Pomeroy, "of Keene," and "Physician," would be the public 
identity of one man who very shortly would redefine himself in a 
very different way. The lives of individuals were closely 
circumscribed by life at the local level. Few members of interior 
communities had any ties with provincial society or politics, and 
fewer still had any contact at all with the trans-atlantic network of 
imperial politics and trade. Provincials thought locally just as they 
lived locally, and their self-defining characteristics were primarily 
local. There is little evidence to suggest that any change came about 
due to the outbreak of rebellion in 1774, at least for the vast 
majority of the residents of the province. Only a small percentage of
2NH Claims. Benning Wentworth, vol. IV, p. 1878-1881.
3NH Claims, Levi Warner, vol. IV, p. 1868.
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the people of New Hampshire made a difficult choice in the months 
following the sacking of Fort William and Mary, a choice between the 
easy path of acquiescence to rebellion, or the far more difficult one of 
loyalty to the constitution and crown of Great Britain.
The acts committed by the loyalists varied widely in kind and 
took place over a period of years. Whatever their nature, the acts of 
loyalists had effects on two levels. The first level was that of 
immediate consequences. When an individual acted in such a way as 
to be identified as a loyalist, he usually suffered some consequence. 
The immediate consequences of loyalist actions can be divided into 
physical consequences and legal consequences, each of which will be 
treated fully in the next two chapters. We are concerned for now 
with the second level of consequence derived from loyalist acts, the 
definition of self as loyalist on the one hand and the identification by 
others, the rebel faction, of loyalists as enemies. With the commission 
of a loyalist act, the loyalist affirmed his own identity to himself and 
to the community at large. In so doing, he allowed others to form 
judgments of their own as to who he was. When a loyalist committed 
a loyalist act, he was defining self in a certain way, defining self as 
equivalent to loyalist at the very time the act occurred. On the other 
hand those outside the act might not identify the actor as a loyalist 
immediately depending on the length of time it took to perceive that 
the act had occurred or indeed that it had occurred at all. Any 
number of loyalist acts probably occurred and yet remained 
undetected, lost to the knowledge of both sides forever. We however
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are concerned with acts known at least to the actors, and in most 
cases to the community as a whole.4
New Hampshire in the period from around 1773 until 1779 
was a community in a state of flux. Like a region about to be struck 
by an earthquake, tremors forewarned of the troubles to come. The 
minor disturbances occasioned by the Stamp Act crisis of 1765-6 
went for the most part unheeded. By the early 1770s the economy of 
New Hampshire was strong and growing,5 and but for the 
disagreement with the mother country over taxation, things could 
not have looked brighter. The royal governor, John Wentworth, was 
well liked and diligent, and understood well the concerns of the 
inhabitants of his native province. He had a long range plan to 
enhance the productivity, prosperity, and growth of his province.6 
But two factors conspired to change all of that. First, Wentworth's 
connections in London, especially his distant kinsman Rockingham, 
were no longer right in the center of power. The absence of powerful 
friends at court deprived Wentworth of influence on the one hand 
and defenders on the other. Instead of being able to have his
4These acts committed by loyalists fall into the type III category of the self­
definition process as postulated in Roy F. Baumeister, Identity, Cultural 
Change and the Struggle for Self. New York: 1986. Throughout our lives we 
make choices in what we will or will not do, choices which are informed by 
who we are, or at least who we perceive ourselves to be, and the results of 
those choices, actions, are thus guided by our self concept or identity, and 
subsequently reinforce that identity in our own minds and in the eyes of 
observers. See also David J. De Levita, M.D., The Concept o f Identity. Paris: 
1965.
5Speech of Governor John Wentworth to the New Hampshire Assembly, April 
8, 1774. NHPP, vol VII, p. 361
6Wilderson, Governor John Wentworth, infra.
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concerns and those of his citizens heard, his close ties to government 
were nearly severed. On the other hand he was forced to adhere 
much more strictly to his instructions, thus alienating himself from 
those at home who disagreed most with government's policies.
And those who disagreed most were not a m in o r ity  in the 
province. Because of long and deep connections7 between many in 
New Hampshire and many more in the neighboring province of 
Massachusetts, the radicalism of the patriot faction in Boston was 
quickly and easily transmitted to the less urbane but equally 
excitable faction in New Hampshire. Thus an explosive tremor such 
as the Boston Tea Party on December 16, 1773, was felt with only a 
little less force in the streets of Portsmouth six months later. The 
arrival of a consignment of East India Company tea to the hands and 
warehouse of Edward Parry did not go unmarked, and the brewing 
crowd forced the luckless agent to forward the odious tea on to 
Halifax. In September as well, Parry was forced to send on the tea 
destined for New Hampshire's cups at the behest of Portsmouth's 
vigilant crowd. The further narrative of the events of 1774 and 1775 
are fairly well known and far better told elsewhere.8 Yet some 
background will help to fully understand the situation.
7See for example Robert Zemsky, Merchants, Farmers, and River Gods, An 
Essay on Eighteenth-Century American Politics. Boston: 1971. and David E 
Van Deventer, The Emergence of Provincial New Hampshire, 1623-1741. 
Baltimore: 1976. also J.L Walsh, '"For the Setteling and Establishing of Order 
in the Administration of Justice There:' Law and Society on the Piscataqua, 
1640-1679." MA Thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1989.
8For an in depth account of the days leading up to war in New Hampshire see 
Jere R. Daniell, Experiment in Republicanism, New Hampshire Politics and 
the American Revolution, 1741-1794. Cambridge, MA: 1970 and Wilderson, 
Governor John Wentworth. For a complete examination of American culture
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The action by Parliament in passing the Boston Port Act in 
response to the destruction of the tea in Boston was an incendiary 
event. Because of the close ties alluded to previously, the radical 
leaders of New Hampshire's Assembly warmed to the cause of their 
southern neighbors and formed an ad hoc committee o f  
correspondence in January 1774. That action came about as a direct 
result of a letter from the Speaker of the House in Massachusetts 
addressed to the Speaker in New Hampshire. Within a few weeks 
Governor Wentworth dissolved the Assembly.9 When the new 
Assembly met in May another committee was appointed, this one to 
stand ready to "correspond as the occasion may require."10 That 
occurrence on Saturday May 28, prompted Wentworth to begin a 
series of adjournments calculated to remind the House that the 
Governor still had the right to control their deliberations. Failing to 
obtain the acquiescence of the Assembly, Wentworth dissolved the 
legislature on June 8th, calling its activities "inconsistent with his 
Majesty's service and the good of this government."11
Wentworth had some idea what was going on, though he did 
not fully comprehend the extent of his predicament. His agents had 
informed him of the presence of letters in town suggesting the 
summoning of a "Congress of the Colonies," and the governor thought 
that by first annoying the members with the short adjournments and
prior to and during the Revolution see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the
American Revolution.
VNHPP, vol VII, p. 352
10NHPP, vol VII, p. 366.
llNHPP, vol VII, p. 369.
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then dissolving the Assembly altogether, he could persuade them to 
ignore the attempts by other colonies to draw New Hampshire into 
some sort of alliance.12 But Wentworth had underestimated the 
strength of the radical faction he had himself helped to create. By 
extending the reach of government in the creation of counties, 
Wentworth had fostered the emergence of more local leadership than 
had previously been possible and diluted the control of the 
Portsmouth elite on the hinterlands. By creating a prosperous new 
underclass of minor officeholders desiring to replace their 
entrenched predecessors in the political arena, Wentworth had  
created fertile ground for the insemination and incubation of radical 
notions. The insurgent faction at home, combined with the 
intransigence and blundering policy of Parliament, created a difficult 
situation for Wentworth. Within a few days of the dissolution of the 
Assembly in Portsmouth, a provincial convention was called in 
Exeter. The participants had first attempted to meet in the house 
meeting room in Portsmouth, but the governor entered the room 
with the Sheriff and proclaimed their meeting illegal.13 The purpose 
of the convention was the choice of delegates to the "American 
Congress" called for September in Philadelphia, and the procuring of 
funds to underwrite the expenses of those chosen.
In October Governor Wentworth committed an act which in 
retrospect destroyed what little influence he yet retained and
12John Wentworth to the Earl of Dartmouth, June 8, 1774, in NHPP, vol VII, p. 
369.
13John Wentworth to Lord Dartmouth, July 6,1774, in NHPP, vol VII, p. 410.
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forever marked him as an opponent to the rebellious faction.. The 
situation in Boston had deteriorated to the point that General Gage, 
the military governor of Massachusetts, could not find carpenters to 
build barracks for his men. Gage then requested aid from his fellow 
royal governor and John Wentworth complied, sending a party of 
artisans from the Wolfeborough area to Boston. When the radicals 
discovered what Wentworth had done, they published the story in 
the newspaper, stirring a mob against the home and person of 
Nicholas Austin of Middletown who had had the misfortune of being 
Wentworth's agent in the recruiting of the carpenters. More about 
Austin's fate later. The modem reader can scarce credit the violent 
outrage occasioned by the mere act of supplying workmen to the 
government in Boston. Obviously Wentworth erred in misjudging the 
depth of feeling in New Hampshire, the strength of the connection, 
the sympathy felt between the radical faction in the northern colony 
and their southern neighbors. If he had not, and if he had rashly 
relied on the act remaining a secret, he would be remembered as a 
man of extreme stupidity. He was instead pilloried in print as an 
enemy to liberty.
With the colony in an ever-increasing state of agitation, an 
urgent dispatch arrived from Boston. Carried by Paul Revere, the 
letter from the Boston Sons of Liberty arrived in Portsmouth on 
December 13, 1774. It contained a warning that as a result of an 
order by the King in Council bearing the date of October 19, 1774, all 
arms and armaments were prohibited from being exported to 
America. An arms embargo would quickly put the patriotic faction at 
a severe disadvantage, increasing the coercive power of the troops
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now in Boston but perhaps soon to walk the streets of Portsmouth. 
Moreover, it was feared that all powder and other munitions now in 
America might be subject to confiscation.
The next day the sound of a drum summoned a mob at noon. 
At Wentworth's request, Chief Justice Theodore Atkinson went out to 
the mob and reproved them. However the mob was unimpressed and 
at around three in the afternoon, their numbers swollen by the 
arrival of a contingent from New Castle and Rye, the mob surged into 
position outside Fort William and Mary. The Fort's commander, John 
Cochran, faced the mob with only five men. Despite firing off four 
cannon and all their small arms, the tiny garrison was overwhelmed 
from all sides, restrained, and the powder magazine stripped of 100 
barrels of powder. No one was killed in the fracas. The following 
night the fort was overwhelmed again by a party from Durham and 
surrounding towns led by Major John Sullivan. The marauders 
carried off several cannon and sixty muskets, leaving only a number 
of heavy guns behind.14 Royal authority was effectively non-existent 
from that point. The militia refused to heed Wentworth's summons, 
and the leaders of the popular faction defied all demands for the 
surrender of the stolen munitions or the ringleaders of the mob. On 
December 26, 1774, Wentworth issued what amounted to a 
proclamation of rebellion.
The new year brought no good for Wentworth and the other 
loyalists. Warships had arrived in Portsmouth harbor, H.M.S. 
Canceaux on December 17th and H.M.S. Scarborough on the 19th.
^NHPP, vol VII, p. 423.
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Their presence did nothing to lessen the tension, nor did the 
departure of the Canceaux. Scarborough  remained and h e r  
commander, Captain Barclay, would further exacerbate the situation.
Wentworth, however, would not surrender to despairing of a 
peaceful solution to the crisis. Despite the sitting of a second 
provincial convention at Exeter on January 25, 1775, Wentworth 
issued writs on the 28 th, calling for the election of a new Assembly. 
Wentworth hoped that a new Assembly could be controlled well 
enough to undo some of the actions already undertaken by the 
radicals. In order to control the house, however, Wentworth needed 
more votes than he could expect as things stood at the end of the 
session of the previous year. So the governor sent election writs to 
three towns in Grafton county, an area not represented in the house 
previously, but sure, he thought, to return representatives friendly 
to the governor's interests. Once the election results were known, the 
governor was disappointed. He decided to postpone the sitting of the 
assembly until May.
In the meantime tensions waxed and waned between the 
radicals and the governor, generally predicated by the actions of 
Captain Barclay and the Scarborough. Barclay occasionally seized a 
ship or prevented fishermen from earning a living, and each occasion 
prompted retaliation from the townspeople.15 By the time the
15The details of these few months' occurrences may be had from the excellent 
works in note 4. It is interesting to note how the actions of minor actors 
could so impact the course of nations. Had Barclay been a bit more diplomatic, 
would tensions have escalated to the point that Wentworth was driven from 
town? Or is it possible that the continued presence of the royal governor 
might have exercised some restraint on the radicals preventing the full 
participation of New Hampshire in the revolution?
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Assembly sat in May and requested an adjournment until June, it 
would seem that no hope for peaceful settlement remained. The main 
shock had occurred with its epicenter in the Massachusetts towns of 
Lexington and Concord. When the House gathered on May 5 th a 
thousand New Hampshire men were under arms and surrounding 
Boston. When they reconvened on June 12, a mob had ransacked the 
town of Portsmouth on May 31 because of yet another provocation 
by Captain Barclay. On the 13 th the New Hampshire House refused 
again to seat the members from the three new towns and refused to 
further consider Lord North's conciliatory proposal.
Wentworth adjourned the House until July 11 and asked them 
again to consider the proposal. Unfortunately Wentworth chose his 
friend John Fenton to be the agent of that proposal. Fenton was 
damned on two counts with the radicals. First, he was a British 
officer living in retirement and a close friend of the governor. A 
beneficiary of Wentworth's land distribution policy, Fenton was quite 
wealthy. He was also outspoken in his support of royal authority, 
having gone so far as to write an open letter to the people of Grafton 
County and the province in general immediately after the skirmish at 
Lexington. In the letter Fenton had cautioned his readers to stay on 
their land and work their crops, as he feared a certain lack of 
provisions soon if the situation did not improve. He further argued 
that to leave the northern reaches under-populated would increase 
the threat of Indian and Canadian invasion.16 This act of Fenton's
16NHPP, vol VII, p. 480. The letter is, on its surface, hardly inflammatory. It is, 
however, a thinly disguised threat and an obvious attempt to intimidate those
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destroyed what little credibility he might have carried when he 
subsequently acted on Wentworth's request and repeated the 
resolution in the Assembly, to consider the conciliatory proposal. 
Fenton had so aroused the ill feelings of the radicals that no sooner 
had he departed the House meeting room and gone to visit 
Wentworth, that a mob gathered outside the governor's house, calling 
for his surrender. The Wentworths and their guest ignored the mob 
until shortly a cannon was brought up and aimed at the front door. 
Fenton surrendered himself and was hustled away to Exeter under 
guard. The Governor, probably fearing for the safety of his wife and 
infant son more than his own, retired to Fort William and Mary 
where he remained.17 More or less trapped in the fort, Wentworth 
realized he had lost all control. At best he was able to exert some 
influence and moderate the tensions between the radicals and the 
warship in the harbor, bur even that little ended on August 13.
It was no tragic incident which caused the end of tac it 
cooperation between the people of Portsmouth and the enemy ship 
in their harbor. Instead, it was the letter of someone styling himself 
"A. Traveller.” Dated from Watertown on August 7th, the letter 
expresses outrage at the arrangement by which the townspeople of 
Portsmouth had agreed to supply fresh beef to the Scarborough 
while the ship promised to leave fishermen unmolested. A. Traveller 
must have been a true radical to find it so unimaginable that 
civilized communication could still be carried on between the
who would support the rebel cause. As a result of the letter, Fenton was
obliged to take up residence on the Scarborough.
17Wentworth to Gage, June 15, 1775, in NHPP, vol VII, p. 381.
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inhabitants of a town in British North America and a ship of war 
belonging to the Royal Navy. A. Traveller must have been under the 
impression that a state of war existed, or that little or no chance 
remained for the continuation of the political connection between 
Great Britain and her colonies.
That assumption had not yet been reached by the majority of 
the people of New Hampshire. The journals of the Provincial Congress 
contain numerous petitions and other official documents expressing 
the cautious feeling of many towns concerning the ultimate act, the 
seeking after independence, most of which do not favor severing ties 
even after the Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia. That 
moment was yet nearly a year away as A.Traveller penned his 
vicious attack on mutual coexistence.18
Because of the public outcry following the letter, supplies were 
cut off to the Scarborough on August 13. Barclay was faced quickly 
with the choice of staying on station and watching his crew starve, or 
retiring to Boston.19 Once the Scarborough was gone, Wentworth 
would have been left nearly alone in a hostile country. Few remained 
in Portsmouth by this time who would or could venture to physically 
stand with the governor in his need, and of course he had his family
18The letter from A. Traveller is printed in NHPP, vol VII, p. 388. The journals 
of the Provincial Congress can be found as an extension of the journals of 
the House of Representatives beginning in NHPP volume VII and continuing 
into volume VIII.
19Of course someone might well ask why the Scarborough could not have been 
resupplied by other ships from Boston or other friendly ports. One can only 
suppose that the cost of keeping Barclay's men provisioned would have been 
prohibitively expensive and may have required the services of a vessel that 
Gage could ill afford to give up the use of, as he himself was at the time fairly 
besieged in Boston and needed supplies of his own.
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to consider. Thus on August 23rd 1775 John Wentworth boarded 
H.M.S. Scarborough and left Portsmouth for the last time.20 Though 
he would not miss the quarters of Fort William and Mary, the 
accommodations he would soon find in Boston were not much better.
It was after the taking of Fort William and Mary in December 
of 1774 that loyalists began to reveal themselves. It was not an overt 
act of "here I am, come and get me" at all. The actions which resulted 
in the label of loyalist being applied to an individual were probably 
not consciously conceived in that way at first if at all. Each loyalist 
acted in a situation as he or she felt the circumstances warranted at 
the time. Few if any consciously thought about how to act in a way 
that would proclaim their loyalty to the world. Instead, the loyalists 
acted in such a way as to express their beliefs indirectly.
Wentworth was not alone in his attempt to stem the tide of 
popular frenzy, though at least one memorialist left before the real 
trouble began. Bartholomew Stavers of Portsmouth, the postrider 
between Portsmouth and Boston, went to England in 1774 because 
"for his loyalty and expressing his zeal and attachment to his 
Majesty's person and government he gave so much offence to the 
Rebels in New Hampshire that he became thereby extremely
20Just under a month later on September 21, 1775 John Wentworth entered 
New Hampshire one last time. Wentworth landed at Gosport, Star Island in 
the Isles of Shoals in order to officially prorogue the Assembly, a last futile 
act by a man who was and is regarded as one of the most capable and 
effective royal governors of the colonial period. Wentworth did not at the 
time despair of returning to his province in happier times, and did not leave 
America for England for two more years. Wentworth was back in America in 
1783 as Surveyor General of His Majesty's Woods in North America, and soon 
was appointed governor of Nova Scotia, cf. Daniell, Experiment, pp. 89-92.
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obnoxious."21 Stavers1 main crime in the eyes of his neighbors was 
the maintaining of a public room in his house where the King's health 
was drank on occasion. At the time, Stavers thought little of what 
was said and done in his house, though years later after experiencing 
the results he related those circumstances as though they were a 
defining moment in his life.
Benjamin Whiting revealed himself to his neighbors when he 
"exerted his utmost influence to prevent the people joining in the 
violences then pervading the continent."22 John Holland, of Amherst, 
was arrested carrying dispatches for Governor Wentworth from 
General Gage. His act of identification was more overt and specific. 
Holland was in consequence confined until 1778 when he escaped 
and joined Sir Robert Pigott in Rhode Island.23 John Cochran, the 
former commander of Fort William & Mary, identified himself when 
he left with Wentworth in 1775 and served on active duty through 
October 1784.24
Thomas MacDonogh of Portsmouth came from the position of 
Deputy Collector of Customs in Charlestowne, South Carolina in late 
1771 and became private secretary to Governor John Wentworth.25
21N. H. Claims, Bartholomew Stavers, vol. IV p. 1704.
22N. H. Claims,, Benjamin Whiting, vol. V, p. 2539.
23N. H. Claims,, John Holland, vol. II p. 771.
24N. H. Claims,, John Cochran, vol. I p. 319. Cochran was quite vague about 
where he served, but he did not appear on McDonogh's muster roll from 
Wentworth's Volunteers. See Appendix 1.
25N. H. Claims, Thomas MacDonogh, vol. Ill p. 1160.
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MacDonogh's acts of identification were more extensive. He claimed 
to have "exerted himself to prevent such acts of violence" referring 
to the incident of the tea shipment, mentioned above, consigned to 
Edward Parry in Portsmouth destined to be exchanged for a ship­
load of masts. The mob found out about it and sought to destroy it.26 
He further claimed to have "safeguarded the Rev. Mr Peters" and 
shepherded a "load of blankets destined for troops in Boston with the 
most imminent danger to his personal safety."27 MacDonogh held 
several rather lucrative offices, Deputy Surveyor of the Woods at 
£200 per year, Deputy Auditor at £50 per year, Receiver General of 
the Qjiitrents at £100 per year, and Deputy Secretary of the Province 
for which he listed no income amount.28 While his interest certainly 
lay with the preservation of royal authority, it is unlikely that he 
could have anticipated any real success in stemming the flow toward 
rebellion by the actions he took. MacDonogh accompanied the 
governor to Boston aboard the Scarborough and became a member of 
Wentworth's Volunteers, in proof of which he provided a muster roll 
dated October 16, 1777 29
But the isolated acts of the few were not enough to stem the 
tide of a radical takeover in the capital. The small circle centered
2&N. H. Claims, Thomas MacDonogh, vol. Ill p. 1161. Wentworth, through 
McDonogh, was able to prevent any violence reulting from the tea 
shipments. See Daniell, Experiment, p. 80 and Wilderson, Governor John 
Wentworth, pp. 230-239.
27N. H. Claims, Thomas MacDonogh, vol. Ill p. 1163.
28N. H. Claims, Thomas MacDonogh, vol. Ill p. 1172-73.
29N. H. Claims, Thomas MacDonogh, vol. Ill p. 1177-80.
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around Wentworth had lost all influence with the active majority of 
the town's citizens, and had no effective means of either defending 
themselves or of coercing the compliance of the populace. Futile as 
they were in the long run, their acts served as a means of self- 
assertion and self-affirmation. Neither Wentworth or his supporters 
consciously sought to set themselves apart, only to offer their 
example as a definition of proper conduct. They did not yet embrace 
the title loyalist, but merely sought to remain constant to their 
offices or deeply held belief that the proper and reasonable course of 
action was to remain steadfast in support of royal authority.
Thus during these critical months, William Torrey of 
Portsmouth "undertook to execute the office of Justice of the Peace" 
and "in consequence....he became obnoxious to his countrymen"30 In 
his attempt to comply with the proclamation of rebellion issued by 
the governor, Torrey acquired the hatred of the radicals. He was 
especially detested because he also owned a "valuable sugar house & 
stores" with his partner George Meserve.
Meserve was a prominent member of the Portsmouth elite. He 
had obtained a grant of 5000 acres for his father's service as an 
officer in the late war. The elder Meserve was killed in action at 
Louisbourg in 1758.31 George Meserve had also been distributor of 
stamps in 1765 and he was roundly despised for his acceptance of 
the appointment as stamp distributor even though he never carried 
out any duty of that office. He was forced to resign the position
3°N. H. Claims, William Torrey, vol. IV p. 1780.
31N. H. Claims, George Meserve, vol. Ill p. 1288.
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under pressure almost instantly.32 George Meserve became collector 
of customs around 1770 and held that post "until the late Rebellion 
took place."33
The sugar house was, according to Torrey, the only sugar works 
in New Hampshire at the time. It cost £1500 to build and yielded an 
annual profit of £400.34 But the works were "plundered and 
destroyed by the populace in their rage. At the time your 
memorialist was carried from Portsmouth to Exeter under guard to 
be tried for treason against the state."35 Of course he was not 
arrested and tried merely for owning the sugar house, nor even for 
being in partnership with Meserve. Late in 1774 Torrey and 
Meserve cooked up a deal with Thomas McDonogh to lease the sugar 
works and store houses as barracks for the troops that were then 
expected from Boston. When the radicals discovered this the mob 
destroyed the buildings "and rendered it entirely useless,"36 thus 
preventing its use as a billeting space for troops that would never 
come.
Not all loyalists opposed the radicals or faced their wrath in 
Portsmouth. Zaccheus Cutler of Amherst was a prominent 
merchant.37 In March of 1775 a number of soldiers deserted from
32N. H. Claims, George Meserve, vol. Ill p. 1288
33JV. H. Claims, George Meserve, vol. Ill p. 1289
34N. H. Claims, William Torrey, vol. IV p. 1781.
35N. H. Claims, William Torrey, vol. IV p. 1780.
36N. H. Claims, William Torrey, vol. IV p. 1808.
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"His Majesty's troops stationed in Boston" and General Gage asked 
Governor Wentworth for his aid in returning those suspected of 
having fled to New Hampshire. Wentworth directed Cutler, and all 
justices of the peace and other magistrates to assist in the 
apprehension of such. "Actuated by his own zeal for Government 
[Cutler] exerted himself for that purpose and actually carried one of 
the said deserters to headquarters at Boston by which means he 
rendered himself so obnoxious to his countrymen that it was utterly 
unsafe for him to return home or even go out of the town of 
Boston."38 Benjamin Whiting of Hollis, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, 
was "firmly attached"39 to the interest of government. He spent the 
months before independence "exerting his utmost influence to 
prevent the people joining in the violences then pervading the 
continent"40
But Portsmouth was the center of radical activity during 1774 
and 1775, primarily because of the rapidity of communications 
between that town and Boston. It was there that John Fenton, 
"having exerted himself to the utmost of his power to support 
government in opposition to a Faction as a magistrate,"41 found 
himself trapped in a most uncomfortable role.
37N. H. Claims,, Zaccheus Cutler, vol. I p. 405-6.
38N. H. Claims,, Zaccheus Cutler, vol. I p. 406.
39N. H. Claims, Benjamin Whiting, vol. V p. 2537.
40N. H. Claims, Benjamin Whiting, vol. V p. 2537.
41N. H. Claims,, John Fenton, vol. II p. 529.
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Fenton became commander of Fort William & Mary in June of 
1775. He was elected to the Assembly in 1775 from Plymouth as one 
of Wentworth's new delegates, one assured of su p p o rtin g  
government. But he "was, on moving in the House Lord North's 
Conciliatory Bill, expelled"42 and then, as stated above, carted off to 
jail in Exeter. Eventually Fenton acquired a position in the Customs 
House in Dublin, though when he went to England to pursue his claim 
he contracted a palsy and died.
Another official, John Fisher, resided in Salem, but as a multiple 
office-holder had interests in New Hampshire, as well as having 
married a woman well connected in the province. He was "collector of 
the customs for the port of Salem & Marblehead, "as well as "Naval 
Officer for the Province of New Hampshire" and "Deputy Naval Officer 
for the Ports of Newbury and York."43 He "left Salem unable to 
continue there to exert on behalf of government,"44 but found 
himself in a like situation in New Hampshire. In October of 1775 he 
was warned that all remaining officers of government were to be 
seized and he fled to New York and then proceeded to England, 
arriving in January of 1776.45 For Fisher, as for Fenton, merely 
continuing to function in the appointments previously held was
42N. H. Claims,, John Fenton, vol. II p. 515-16.
43N. H. Claims,, John Fisher, vol. II p. 549.
44N. H. Claims,, John Fisher, vol. II p. 549-50.
45N. H. Claims,, John Fisher, vol. II p. 549-56. Fisher was given a stipend of 
£ 160 per year soon after his arrival and was appointed Under-Secretary of 
State in October, 1781. Fisher's career was government. By 1788 he held the 
post of Secretary of the Excise which paid £603.11.06 and Distributor of 
Stamps which added £284.13.04.
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enough to be defined as an enemy. But could they have done 
otherwise? Part of a person's identity is shaped by the work he does. 
Offices were a means of identification, just as the other variables of 
life serve to differentiate one from another.46
As occupation provides one indicator of personal identity, so 
too do values. The loyalists acted to affirm traditional values, to 
support duly constituted government, to preserve the system as it 
was, though they recognized the same flaws as the radicals. Simon 
Baxter of Alsted fought to preserve traditional authority. In Cheshire 
County Baxter "opposed the measures of the Rebels, raised men to go 
and protect the Courts in 1774"47 Already in 1774 the radicals were 
attempting to undermine the traditional forms of authority, forms 
they would soon abandon for a time.48
Many provincials were shocked and dismayed by the news of 
the "battle" at Lexington. William Vance of Londonderry was vocal in 
his beliefs and found himself confined to his farm after April 19, 
17 7 5.49 Vance was arrested again in May 1777 and held in Exeter 
jail until January 1778. He was then confined to his farm yet again 
until he escaped in May 1779. Vance joined the British army in 
Rhode Island and "was employed on Secret Services for government" 
until the end of the war.50
46Baumeister, Identity, pp. 18-25.
47N. H. Claims,, Simon Baxter, vol. I p. 134.
48As will be seen in Chapter Four, the rebels closed all of the courts for an 
extended period in order to consolidate their hold on the populace.
49 N. H. Claims, William Vance, vol. IV p. 1864.
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Not all of the acts attributed to the loyalists were acts of 
commission. In some cases the failure to meet com m unity 
expectations was an equally powerful means for the identification of 
a loyalist. Edward Goldstone Lutwyche of Merrimack, commander of 
a regiment of militia, refused the summons to march his regiment "to 
the assistance of the Rebels on the evening of the 19th [of] April, 
1775, the day on which the affair a t Lexington took place."51 
Lutwyche was "obliged immediately after his refusal to escape by 
night & took refuge in the Town of Portsmouth where at that time 
the disaffection was not so general as in the country."52 Robert Lewis 
Fowle, the maligned printer of the New Hampshire Gazette and 
Exeter Morning Chronicle, was persecuted for "refusing a company in 
the Rebel service."53 Simon Baxter was guilty of yet another act of 
omission "because he would not join in their Measures against the 
King and Parliament of Great Britain.54 Fowle and Baxter withstood 
the persecution in their respective communities until they joined 
Burgoyne.
John, James, and Patrick McMaster were merchant brothers 
from Scotland who came out in the mid to late 1760's, first to Boston 
but then opened an office in Portsmouth where one of the brothers, 
James, resided. "Bound by their allegiance they constantly rejected
SON. H. Claims, William Vance, vol. IV p. 1865.
51N. H. Claims, Edward Goldstone Lutwyche, vol. Ill p. 1047.
52N. H. Claims, Edward Goldstone Lutwyche, vol. Ill p. 1048.
53N. H. Claims, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol II, p. 657.
54N. H. Claims,, Simon Baxter, vol. I p. 134.
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and opposed by every means and arguments in their power the 
insidious attempts of the disaffected."55 Their refusal to sign the 
nonimportation agreement or "the Test" "drew upon them the 
indignation of the adverse party."56
Refusing to participate in a community ritual was an act of 
omission which carried enormous social consequences. When the Test 
Oath was administered, even the Quakers were pressed to sign, and 
questioned rigorously when they explained their reasons for 
refusing. George Glen was no Quaker, however, and "he having 
refused to take a Test Oath"57 found himself the victim of "the 
animosity of the inhabitants."58 His neighbors refused to work for 
him or with him. Glen describes himself as having acted with "zeal 
and attachment"59 to government. Early in 1777 Glen refused a 
commission as major in the continental army and "became more and 
more suspicious in consequence thereof."60 He felt forced to flee as it 
had become "unsafe and impracticable for him to stay in that 
country."
Much has been made in previous studies of the Test Oath or 
Association Test circulated among the towns in April of 1776. It
55N. H. Claims, James McMaster, et al, vol. Ill p. 1230-31.
56N. H. Claims, James McMaster, et al, vol. Ill p. 1232.
57N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706.
58N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706.
59N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706.
60N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706.
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would seem that when historians are confronted with something as 
interesting as a list of names, we immediately set about to draw a 
number of inferences from those names. We further complicate 
things by going back and attaching as much information to each of 
the names that we can, things like occupation and religion, in hopes 
of better understanding why the names are there or why other 
names are not. Such has been the case with the Association Test 
lists.61 We may have, in our attempts to make order from chaos and 
read information from lists, forgotten the ritual significance of the 
oath, the importance of the act of belonging, and the cold reality of 
the consequences to those who boldly refused to sign and stood their 
ground for honor's sake. The proponents of the Association Test 
recognized the fact that they must identify those who would not 
stand with them. There was of course the New Testament passage 
wherein Christ is quoted as saying that he who is not with us is 
against us, and only through a public test could the radicals whose 
grasp was still unsure on the reigns of power be assured of who was 
who.
Yet the analysis of a list, like the Test Oath, contains its own 
pitfalls. We might, like the rebel leaders, assume that anyone who 
refused to sign the oath was at least someone worthy of suspicion, if 
not an openly proclaimed enemy. Yet in New Hampshire, the non­
signers numbered many who were easily identifiable as Quakers. The 
act of omitting to sign the oath did not label these men as loyalist,
61Robert Munro Brown, "Revolutionary New Hampshire and the Loyalist 
Experience," p. 77-84.
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though the Continental Congress and several other states would make 
such a presumption and order careful attention paid to the 
Quakers.62 New Hampshire's Quakers had been prominent and 
important in the community since the 1660s, and no rebel leader 
suggested that they be persecuted for their religion. In the case of 
Quakers, one determinant of identity, Quakerism, superseded the 
possibility of another imputation based on the refusal to sign.
On the other hand, it was presumed by the rebel authorities 
that anyone who did sign the oath was a friend, a potential fellow 
rebel. Non-signers were considered potential enemies but signers 
could be trusted. But not in every case, it would seem, since one of 
the most ardent loyalists of New Hampshire signed the Association 
Test in Londonderry where his position may indeed have preserved 
his influence regardless. Stephen Holland, whom John Langdon would 
one day curse, signed the oath 63 Yet Stephen Holland was the 
quintessential loyalist.
Holland was not related, or particularly beholden, to John 
Wentworth. Though Irish by birth, he had resided in the province for 
a long time. Holland served seven years, in the "war that ended in 
1762"64 before settling himself and his family in the young but fast
620n the other hand a number of Quakers in New Jersey refused to sign the 
Test Oath there and soon after joined the British army, some in non- 
combatant roles, and at least one who "carried arms in a company...of the 
New Jersey Volunteers." Loyalist Claims, Joseph Williams, vol. XVI., p. 497- 
504. Se also Loyalist Claims, Samuel Smith, vol. XVI, p. 31-42. Smith was also a 
quaker and served in the British army as a spy and guide. Loyalist Claims, 
Samuel Moore, vol. XVI, p. 125-130; and Robert Fitzrandolph, vol. XVI, p. 113- 
124.
63NHPP, Vol. VIII, p. 250. The Association return was dated June 24, 1776.
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growing community of Londonderry. Holland "held several lucrative 
and important offices" including "Colonel of a regiment of Militia" 
"Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas" "Clerk of the Peace for the 
County of Hillsborough" and "for many years a Member of the 
General Assembly, and also a Justice of the Peace of the quorum 
throughout the province."65 He took his responsibilities seriously. 
When the call went out in 1774 Holland "apprehended several 
deserters from Boston, these he secured and sent to their 
regim ents."66 Like his fellow magistrate Zaccheus Cutler, "in 
consequence thereof [Holland] became very obnoxious67 to what was 
at the time called the Whig Party, who threatened to set fire to his 
house and bum him and his family to death."68 But Stephen Holland 
was neither intimidated nor persuaded to renounce his affiliation. As 
the crisis progressed he used his enormous popularity and influence
64N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 777.
65N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 777-78.
66N. H. Claims,, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
945.
67The word obnoxious appears three times in this narration of Holland's alone. 
It also occurs in nearly every narration of a moderately prominent loyalist. 
It must have been an enormously popular word at the time and was a 
peculiarly apt choice of words. The Oxford English Dictionary supplies at 
least two distinctive and appropriate meanings, both of which were in use at 
the time. First, one who became obnoxious was "an object of aversion or 
dislike; offensive, objectionable, odious, highly disagreeable" This would also 
be the primary modem meaning of the word. In addition "obnoxious" meant 
"exposed to (actual or possible) harm; subject or liable to injury or evil of 
any kind." The loyalist who used this word was clear enough. Not only was 
he odious in the eyes of his opponents and or neighbors, but he was also 
definitely in harm's way.
68N. H. Claims,, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
946.
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to "actually prevent the raising of minute men or the choosing of a 
delegate in the said Township of Londonderry to attend the 
Provincial Congress at Exeter, threatening to commit the people who 
were assembled for that purpose if they did not disperse which they 
did."69 Even after Wentworth's departure in the summer of 1775, 
Holland "supported the interest of his Sovereign upon all occasions to 
the utmost of his power"and "exerted himself in uniform opposition 
to the measures of their [the radical government in Exeter] usurped 
authority."70
Colonel Holland probably felt that his prominence accorded him 
some degree of immunity, especially from the attentions of his social 
inferiors. Certainly he considered the Exeter government to be 
unlawful. According to the deposition of William Vance Esq. of 
Londonderry, HoUand held his offices until April 19, 1775 when he 
resigned them all. He was asked to resume them by the "Provincial 
Congress" and "declined." He was also asked to command a battalion 
with the rank of Brigadier General but refused that as well: "to which 
offers he turned up his nose in contempt to them and went off 
without so much as returning them thanks."71 Nevertheless Holland 
remained in New Hampshire, active and free to do much as he 
pleased.
69N. H. Claims,, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
946.
7°N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 778.
71N. H. Claims,, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 
945.
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One thing it pleased him to do brought him further under the 
suspicion of the rebel authorities. Colonel Archibald Campbell72 was 
taken prisoner early on and held in Reading, Massachusetts. 
According to Campbell, Holland visited him frequently while he was 
a prisoner in Reading though it was dangerous for Holland to even be 
seen with a British prisoner, especially for someone who was already 
suspected of loyalist leanings. Holland offered Campbell monetary 
assistance and proposed to find a trustworthy courier to take letters 
or intelligence to New York. Holland visited Campbell for the last 
time in February 1777, saying that his life was in danger and that he 
would soon "join the King's Standard and take with him a 
considerable number of men who had agreed to accompany him in 
the enterprise."73 It is fairly certain that he "engaged a party of men 
to join the King's army, but could not accomplish it."74 Apparently 
when last he saw Campbell, Holland was aware that his days of 
freedom were numbered. He had been harassed before, as were most 
of the remaining loyalists who made no secret of their beliefs. "By 
being thus zealous and active in the cause of His Majesty's 
government and for offering assistance to Colonel Campbell, now 
Governor of Jamaica, when he was a prisoner in New England, he not
72CampbeIl was captured very early in the war and held for a year at Reading. 
He would eventually achieve the rank of Major General and become 
governor of the colony of Jamaica.
73N. H. Claims, Certificate of Maj. General Archibald Campbell, Stephen 
Holland, vol. II p. 968-69.
74N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 778.
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only became obnoxious in the country but was repeatedly seized 
upon "75
When he was arrested the last time, it was obvious th a t 
Holland had "rendered himself obnoxious to the Usurped 
government...by his exertions to support the interest of his 
sovereign...[and the] constant refusal to take the Oaths of Allegiance 
and Abjuration"76 Of Holland's treatment by the rebel government, 
we will hear much more in the next chapter. However, William Vance 
saw Holland brought into the Exeter jail loaded with chains and 
asked what horrible thing Holland had done and the jailer told Vance 
that Holland had recruited 100 men the day after Bunker Hill and 
had had them take an oath of allegiance and an oath to General 
Gage.77 Of course many more charges were laid against him, not least 
of which was that he was the head of a sprawling counterfeiting 
network.78
75N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 778.
76N. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 940. Apparently Holland could 
stretch the truth on both sides. As mentioned above, Holland did sign the 
Association Test. See , note 58.
77N. H. Claims, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
948. That charge alone would have seen Holland executed elsewhere. In New 
Jersey Andrew Pickens, among others, reported two of his associates who had 
been engaged in recruiting "hanged for it." Pickens himself would also have 
been executed if he had not escaped. Loyalist Claims, vol. XVI, p. 339-344.
78Robert Munro Brown, "Revolutionary New Hampshire and the Loyalist 
Experience" p. 174-178. Brown's assumption that Holland was a counterfeiter 
based on charges levied against him by the rebel government seems a bit too 
credulous. Robert Fowle was also charged with counterfeiting as were a 
number of others who later filed memorials for assistance from the British 
government, yet none admit in their testimony to having dared so great a 
crime to aid the British cause. Fowle went so far as too offer to testify against 
other counterfeiters to protect himself but he never admitted the act itself,
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Colonel Langdon was overheard by Vance to say of Holland, 
"Damn him, let him lay there, I hope to see him hanged he has done 
us more damage than ten thousand men could have done."79 What 
did Langdon mean? He was not referring to any of Holland's future 
war activities but rather to his acts of omission: his refusal to support 
the rebel cause was a strong example to the people of Londonderry, 
the county and the province as a whole. Holland's very existence 
threatened the continued success of a government the prisoner 
considered unlawful. Holland's prestige was such that after the point
in time in which Langdon said these things, 133 inhabitants of
*
Londonderry petitioned the General Court on Holland's behalf asking 
for his relief and pledging their fuU estates as his security. The 
petition was rejected and the names of the petitioners were 
published in the newspaper "as enemies to their country."80 Holland 
was tried for treason and convicted, and awaited execution. Somehow 
he escaped in April of 1778 and made his way to the British army. 
Holland became a "town major at Rhode Island,"81 and while there
and it does not appear that he was instrumental in the arrest of any other 
loyalists.
79N. H. Claims, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p.
949.
80N. H. Claims, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 
949-50. It is difficult to imagine accepting the Test Oath as a determining 
factor in identifying rebels from loyalists. In the case of Londonderry, 375 
men signed the oath and 15 refused. Yet within a year, 133 were willing to 
pledge their estates to protect Holland. It might be that the third of the 
population that Adams suggested remained loyal also signed the oath only to 
preserve their personal peace, or that the third which remained 
unconvinced believed that Holland was truly innocent of the charges 
brought against him. However the question worked out, at least a third of the 
men of Londonderry, signers or not, sought to protect Stephen Holland from 
the rebel government bent on his destruction.
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was "frequently employed in obtaining intelligence of the enemy and 
in secret services that required the most unlimited confidence."82
Holland was the archetypal loyalist. From what we know of 
New Hampshire loyalists, most were landed and many were, like 
Holland, prominent in their communities. While the Portsmouth elite 
departed with or soon after Wentworth, minor office holders or 
professionals remained for some months or years, using their 
influence to stem the tide of revolution where they could and passing 
on what information they obtained in whatever manner was 
practicable. Stephen Little, Portsmouth physician and surgeon,83 
"kept up a constant correspondence with the King's friends within 
the British lines and furnished them with every possible proceedings 
without."84
Doctor Josiah Pomeroy of Keene was "in the business of 
surgeon, physician, and apothecary" as well as a judge in the county 
court, "and did employ his best endeavours to keep the county in due 
obedience to the King and constitution till 1777 when his loyalty 
rendered him obnoxious to the Rebels whose severity compelled him 
to secrete himself in Connecticut from whence he was obliged to flee 
to New York."85
81W. H. Claims,, Stephen Holland, vol. II p. 779.
82N. H. Claims, Certificate of Lt. General Richard Prescott, Stephen Holland, 
vol. II p. 949.
83N. H. Claims, Stephen little, vol. Ill p. 1015.
84N. H. Claims, Stephen Little, vol. Ill p. 1016.
85N. H. Claims, Josiah Pomeroy, vol. IV p. 1522.
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Elijah Williams, also of Keene, and a prominent attorney, 
"always took an open and active part in opposition to the measures 
which brought on the late unhappy American War, and thereby 
rendered himself so obnoxious to the enemies of the British 
Government"86 that he was forced to flee to New York in June 1777. 
There, like many other New Hampshire men he joined Wentworth's 
Volunteers.
Printer Robert Fowle was accused of "assisting the British 
government in the exercise of his profession as a printer," by "among 
other things his printing and dispensing the proclamations of General 
Howe and General Burgoyne."87 Fowle was eager "to promote the 
cause of his Majesty's government until at length he became so 
obnoxious to the Usurpers that he was obliged to fly for his life after 
being some time confined in prison."88
George Glen of Wolfeborough was a relatively recent Scottish 
immigrant, and farm er;8  ^ he was "offered a commission as major in 
the continental army, which he however obnoxious he might become
86N. H. Claims, Elijah Williams, vol. V p. 2556.
87N. H. Claims,,' Affidavit of John Wentworth, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol. II p. 
679.
88N. H. Claims,, Fowle to Lord North, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol. II p. 677-78. 
Fowle does not mention that much of what caused his imprisonment was the 
suspicion of counterfeiting. It would seem that if indeed he was asking for 
assistance from the British government he would couch his request in the 
best possible light. Therefore if he had materially aided the cause of the 
British by damaging the rebel economy through counterfeiting, it seems 
only logical that he would mention the fact. He was not shy of mentioning 
that he had printed Gage's and Burgoyne's proclamations, a useful service 
but not quite as damaging to the enemy as flooding their economy with 
bogus bills.
89N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 705.
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thereby, absolutely refused to accept, he became more and more 
suspicious in consequence thereof. This event took place early in the 
year 1777."99
Holland and the others like him demonstrated that there was at 
least one further level of loyalist after the royal officeholders and 
Wentworth relatives who left in 1775. Their stories counter 
dramatically the experience of a man like Daniel Rindge of 
Portsmouth. Rindge was a member of the Council and "not only a 
near relation of the Governor's, but his peculiar and confidential 
friend."91 Rindge managed to avoid incarceration, though not insult, 
until January of 1776, when he fled the province. Unlike Rindge, the 
majority of known loyalists who remained into the perilous years of 
1776 and 1777 actually acted in response to their beliefs.
The most common act of loyalty was joining a military unit and 
serving the King in some capacity. John Wentworth, by his "active 
adherence to his duty to his King [found himself] rendered ... 
obnoxious."92 Upon departing the province Wentworth began the 
recruiting of an unpaid corps of loyalist soldiers which served under 
the name of Wentworth's Volunteers. Benning Wentworth, the
90N. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706.
91iV. H. Claims, Daniel Rindge, vol. IV p. 1570. Despite his close affiliation with 
John Wentworth, he claimed no overt acts of loyalty in his memorial nor 
could he produce any others to support his claim. Rather he assumed that his 
pronouncement of loyalty would be enough to earn him his claim. But the 
Claims Commission was unimpressed with his record. After fleeing to 
England in January 1776 he returned to New York in June of 1777 and then 
returned to Portsmouth in April of 1778. There he lived out his life amid his 
ideological enemies. His claim was summarily dismissed.
92N. H. Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V p. 1977.
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governor's nephew and former Secretary of the Province, found that 
"his attachment and duty to the King's service and g o v e r n m e n t 
subjected him to the violence of the people." He went with the 
governor to Boston and he too served in Wentworth's Volunteers 
until November 1777. He was in England by April 1778, and 
subsequently took a commission in a regular regiment.93 After his 
escape from the clutches of the rebel government, Robert Fowle "took 
refuge with General Burgoyne's army, with which he was captured 
...”94 Dissembling, Fowle gave a parole to earn his freedom and fled 
immediately to New York. There, Fowle "served in a corps of 
Gentlemen known by the appellation of Governor Wentworth's 
Volunteers until the 14th of December 1781."95 Breed Batcheller of 
Packersfield joined Burgoyne in 1777 and "immediately recruited a 
company of Loyal Americans."96
Many others were able to resist the persecution of their 
neighbors until 1777. Then they too saw the opportunity to serve as 
Burgoyne prepared to move south from Canada. Levi Warner of 
Claremont, a weaver, joined Burgoyne in 1777, and served until the 
end of the war.97 Simon Baxter of Alsted "joined Burgoyne at 
Skeensborough in July 1777."93
93N. H. Claims, Benning Wentworth, vol. IV p. 1878.
94N. H. Claims,, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol. II p. 657.
95N. H. Claims,, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol. II p. 658.
96N. H. Claims,, Breed Batcheller, vol. I, p. 119.
97N. H. Claims, Levi Warner, vol. IV p. 1868-69.
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A significant number of New Hampshire loyalists, in addition to 
those already mentioned, had served prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities, or were at the time on active duty in the British military. 
George Sproule was a soldier, "surveyor general of lands for the 
province of New Hampshire." He had intended to retire just prior to 
the beginning of hostilities and rejoined the army in Boston leaving 
all of his newly acquired property behind." Henry Mowat of the 
Royal Navy was in Portsmouth in 1773 commanding HMS Canceaux 
and "employed in the General Survey of Lands for the Northern 
District of North America." Mowat petitioned Governor Wentworth 
for a  grant of land under the proclamation of 1763, apparently 
desiring to retire to New Hampshire. Mowat was granted 4470 acres, 
but was never able to take possession due to the outbreak of the 
war.100
Like Mowat, who was still on active duty, many New 
Hampshire men found themselves serving in the regular service or in 
units primarily recruited from different provinces. Michael Jose of 
Portsmouth was master of a merchant ship and joined the Navy at 
the outset of what he called both an "un-natural rebellion" and the 
"unhappy Rebellion." He served on six different ships rising from 
Mate to Master in the course of the war.ioi Donald McAlpine, a 
resident of Exeter, was another demobilized veteran of the Seven
"N . H. Claims,, Simon Baxter, vol. Ip. 131.
" N . H. Claims, George Sproule, vol. IV p. 1588.
lOON. H. Claims, Henry Mowat, vol. Ill p. 1436.
H. Claims, Michael Jose, vol. II p. 991.
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Years War. After serving under Colonel Symon Fraser in the 78th 
Highlanders, he had settled in New Hampshire and married Elizabeth 
Beard the only child of John Beard. McAlpine served as a Captain in 
the South Carolina Rangers.102 Eleazer Sanger of Keene left his 
property in April of 1777 and joined under Colonel Ludlow in 
DeLancy's 2nd Battalion.103 Peter Young, of Bennington, a small 
farmer, joined Burgoyne and was captured. Young escaped and 
subsequently served in "Sir John's 2nd Battalion"104
Of many other memorialists' services, little is known. John 
Stark joined the battalion raised and commanded by his father, 
William Stark.105 Enos Stevens, a farmer from Charlestown joined the 
royal army in 1777,100 as did Benjamin Whiting of Hollis, formerly 
Sheriff of Hillsborough County. Whiting died in Long Island in 
November 1779.107 Thomas Cumings of Hollis, the undersheriff of 
Hillsborough County and a lawyer108 was "with the Royal Army for
102N. H. Claims, Donald McAlpine, vol. Ill p. 1140-50.
103N. H. Claims, Eleazer Sanger, vol. IV p. 1582.
104N. H. Claims, Peter Young, vol. V p. 2614. The area Young resided in before 
the outbreak of hostilities was in dispute between New Hampshire and New 
York, and even during the Revolution remained a sore spot between the two 
as well as the emerging "state" of Vermont. Stevens chose to include Young 
in the NH claims as do I.
105N. H. Claims, John Stark, vol. IV p. 1632-39.
100N. H. Claims, Enos Stevens, vol. IV p. 1736.
107N. H. Claims, Benjamin Whiting, vol. V p. 2536.
108N. H. Claims,, Thomas Cumings, vol. I p. 363.
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more than eight years."109 Thomas Crane simply "joined His Majesty's 
troops." Simple words written by a simple farmer from Richmond.110
Not all of New Hampshire's men found such glorious service. 
Many as we have already seen served primarily as spies. A John 
Stinson of Dunbarton, the nephew of the Rebel General Stark, became 
a spy in Rhode Island and accomplished twenty-eight such 
missions.111 Perhaps spying was a better occupation than the service 
Samuel Mallows found. Mallows of Portsmouth was apparently  
involved in the teamster trade. Having fled to New York in 1776, he 
became a waggoner in General Howe's baggage train. He must not 
have been a very good teamster, as he was dismissed. He then 
served with Major Ward in New Jersey, though in what capacity is 
unknown.112 At least one New Hampshire loyalist served as a horse 
thief. George Glen fled the province in 1778 with his wife and three 
children and joined the British in Rhode Island. There he became a 
forager, "bringing off a number of the continental horse."113
Most of the loyalists who served and survived received grants 
of land in Nova Scotia at the close of the war, regardless of whether
109N. H. Claims,, Thomas Cumings, vol. I p. 361.
110N. H. Claims,, Thomas Crane, vol. I p. 353
111N. H. Claims, John Stinson (#1816), vol. IV p. 1744.
1121V. H. Claims, Samuel Mallows, vol. Ill p. 1278.
1131V. H. Claims,, George Glen, vol. II p. 706. Forager was the polite term for 
those colonial units used to pillage the produce of local farms and 
storekeepers. The British disdained to dirty their hands with the task of 
victualling an army of occupation and often left that to their loyalist troops, 
thereby increasing the degree of hatred between loyal and rebel 
countrymen.
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or not they filed claims under the Parliamentary Act of 1783. But 
some despite their attachment to the King, finally despaired at 
leaving their homes forever. The other John Stinson of Dunbarton 
joined the King's army in New York, raised troops for several 
commanders, was captured and imprisoned, released, and served 
until the end of the war. Like all who took up arms in support of 
royal authority, Stinson was banished from New Hampshire, his 
property confiscated. After the war ended, Stinson returned in 
defiance of his proscription, in an attempt to regain his property. He 
was captured and imprisoned. Stinson's memorial was written on his 
behalf by Stephen Holland, as he was at the time of its writing in 
prison in New Hampshire under a sentence of death.114
As mentioned previously, Stephen Holland, even more than 
John Wentworth, typifies the loyalist of New Hampshire. His career 
provides us with a useful synopsis of the acts which together or 
separately categorize or define a loyalist. Holland used his personal 
influence to persuade others. Certainly all the influential loyalists did 
the same on one level, as other men might have done on a personal 
one. Beyond the passive acts of example and persuasion, Holland 
acted overtly by aiding an enemy prisoner, passing information to 
the British, and perhaps counterfeiting. Besides acts of commission, 
he steadfastly refused to serve the usurping powers or to swear
114N. H. Claims, John Stinson (#2160), vol. IV p. 1752-53. I call him the 
"other" John Stinson because there were two men of the same name asking 
for compensation. Both had come from Dunbarton, and they may have been 
related, though neither mentions the other in his claim. In the 
transcriptions there is confusion and ambiguity over which is which, 
though finally one discovers that they have separate claim numbers 
assigned by the Claims Commission.
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allegiance to those he considered to be rebels. By these acts of 
omission he clearly denied the lawful and natural authority of the 
new provincial government and refused to share in their initiation 
ritual. Finally, when driven to an extreme position of danger, Holland 
departed the province and like so many of his loyalist countrymen, 
served in a military fashion.
Holland and his fellow loyalists acted in these ways with the 
full knowledge that there must be consequences for their actions. 
The physical penalties as well as the legal problems encountered by 
the loyalists of New Hampshire are the subjects of subsequent 
chapters. It is with another kind of consequence which we must now 
be concerned. Each and every act perpetrated by a loyalist was at 
once an act of self-definition and an act of identification with others 
of like persuasion. Each time Stephen Holland visited Archibald 
Campbell in his prison in Reading, Holland was identifying himself as 
what he conceived of as a Loyalist. Each act of commission or 
omission further identified each participant as a loyalist in their own 
minds. Further, each public act of either kind performed two 
functions in the home community. First the act publicly proclaimed 
the identity of the performer. Second, the act formed and reformed a 
definition in the minds of those witnesses for the community of what 
a loyalist was. The community at that point of course was still the 
rebel dominated province of New Hampshire, where to be defined as 
Loyalist was to be "obnoxious" in both senses. Eventually, as the new 
loyalist community formed over a vast geographic area during and 
after the war, public acts viewed cumulatively provided a basis by 
which each loyalist could judge him or herself as a loyalist. Acts
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could also identify the others of like inclination as members of the 
new group. The definition of the loyalists as a group set them apart 
from the communities to which they once belonged. Previously they 
had been members of local communities, and whether they ever 
acknowledged the fact or not, they had also been members of a 
larger community at the provincial level. That membership in turn 
had made them a part of the Atlantic community and one that 
encompassed the entire British Empire. On the levels most important 
on a daily basis, their relationships with the local community and 
provincial one, had been reshaped. The definition of a personal 
loyalist identity had forced each loyalist to become "other" than what 
he was before. Taken as a whole, the loyalists became the "other" 
against which the rebel community was measured.
To the casual observer the acts of one loyalist might be 
mistaken as aberrant behaviour. To the average member of a local 
community in the midst of a rebellion such acts became a means for 
determining who was a friend to the cause and who was an enemy. 
Thus an act that a loyalist might describe as supporting government 
would to a rebel be considered inimical to the country. An act which 
was for a loyalist a positive effort toward self-identification to a 
cause and a community, was to a rebel a negative action, a denial of 
community standards, and a rejection of the accepted norms of 
behaviour.
Must an act have been observed by the enemy to be an act of 
definition by a loyalist? The case of Robert Calder might serve as an 
example. According to his deposition sworn on June 18 1785, Calder 
was a former chief servant to Governor John Wentworth. Calder had
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left Wentworth's service after the mansion in Wolfeborough was 
built. John Wentworth gave Calder a piece of land about two miles 
distant from the estate. Calder saw the governor at Fort William and 
Mary while Wentworth was living there in a modified exile and just 
before his departure for Boston. According to Calder, Wentworth 
asked him (Calder) to go to the Wolfeborough house, and there to 
find a certain trunk. Calder was to carry it off before the rebels could 
find it. Then he was to hide the trunk against Wentworth's need for 
it. Calder did as he was asked in secret, and buried the trunk 
beneath a huge oak tree on his land.
In 1777 or 1778, James Cochran came to Calder and told him 
that John Wentworth desired him to retrieve the trunk and destroy 
it and its contents. Acting immediately, in the dead of winter, Calder 
went out and dug the trunk up going to "much trouble and labour to 
thaw the ground." He pretended to be cutting the tree, "as it was a 
time of general suspicion of all persons who had been usually about 
the governor."115 The trunk was destroyed, and no witness beyond 
James Cochran knew of the incident until Calder's deposition was 
sworn to in 1785. Was Calder a loyalist? Which of his acts defined 
him as such? In all likelihood, Robert Calder grew old and died on his
115N. H. Claims, Deposition of Robert Calder, John Wentworth vol. V, p. 2160- 
63. James Cochran, mentioned by Calder as the messenger from John 
Wentworth was residing in St John, New Brunswick in 1785. Calder 
apparently was unclear 7-8 years later on the question of which year 
Cochran came to him with instructions to destroy the trunk. Wentworth went 
to England in 1777. It seems more likely that he would have ordered the 
trunk's destruction before he left the continent. Also unclear is the question 
of Cochran's identity. He may have been, or been related to, the John 
Cochran who had been commander of Fort William and Mary until August of 
1775 when he departed the castle with Wentworth for Boston.
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farm not far from his former employer's estate. Had he been 
apprehended in the act of taking the trunk, or burying it, or in 
digging up and destroying it, he would have been accused of an act 
inimical to the country. In such a time of division, even the simple 
act of obeying the request of an old employer was suspect. Calder 
knew what he was doing. By obeying Wentworth's instructions he 
might have become a loyalist or proven to be a loyal friend. Only 
Robert Calder knew the significance of the acts he performed. Only 
his intention defined his identity in the situation. Had he been 
observed, others might have imposed upon him an identity he did 
not seek, an identity he might not have recognized. Actions, as a 
criterion for the fashioning of identity, speak louder and clearer to 
observers than to the actor's themselves. Because of that, the actions 
of loyalists brought about far more dire consequences than mere 
words ever could.




Physical Repercussions to Self-proclaimed Loyalists
A spirit of violent resentment was excited against all who 
were suspected of a disposition inimical to the American 
cause. Some persons were taken up on suspicion and 
imprisoned; some fled to Nova-Scotia, or to England, or
joined the British army in Boston The passions of
jealousy, hatred and revenge were freely indulged, and 
the tongue of slander was under no restraint. Wise and 
good men secretly lamented these excesses but no 
effectual remedy could be administered.1
This chapter deals with the physical penalties exacted upon 
those who remained steadfast in support of British rule in America. 
The physical consequences of loyalism became a large part of the 
trauma experienced by the loyalists of New Hampshire, in effect 
helping to mold them into a conscious group, a new community apart 
from their former neighbors. Endurance and survival of the physical 
trauma, or even the threat of physical violence, reaffirmed the 
loyalist identity. Violence or the threat of violence became one of the 
marks of honor memorialists displayed before the Parliamentary 
commissioners as a means of identifying themselves as "loyalist 
sufferers." This was not only an important device of identification for 
the purpose of securing redress for lost property; it was a new way
Jeremy Belknap, History of New Hampshire. 2 vol. Dover, NH: 1813. vol 2. p 
302
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of viewing their own identity as distinct from their former 
identification with a land and people now so terribly transfigured by 
rebellion.2
The degree of harshness or the physical dangers experienced 
by loyalists in New Hampshire was directly related to the near total 
absence of military activity in the province. Had there been a British 
presence, had there been skirmishes or battles pitting once neighbors 
and friends against each other in direct combat in or near their 
homes as was the case in New York, New Jersey, and most of the 
southern provinces, the abuse of both sides might have been far 
worse. At times when the British threat seemed nearer to reality, the 
attempt to root out loyalists increased. After 1777, the rebel 
government of New Hampshire relaxed its pursuit of loyalists, secure 
in the success of Saratoga. However, as we shall see later, the focus of 
the rebel government shifted to a new arena, the construction of a 
new mythology. In Massachusetts where some fighting took place 
early in the rebellion, the toll on the bodies of loyalists was 
somewhat harsher, as the Boston mob practiced some tar and 
feathering in addition to simple mobbing.3
An examination of the memorials of the New Hampshire 
loyalists, as well as other sources, reveals that those most likely to
2This is the sort of experience Strauss referred to: "certain critical incidents 
that occur to force a person to recognize that 'I am not the same as I was, as I 
used to be.' These critical incidents constitute turning points in the onward 
movement of personal careers." Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 95.
3See for instance the case of Edward Stow of Boston who claimed to "have been 
mobbed and libeled ever since the stamp act." Stow claimed his house had 
been repeatedly "bedaubed with excrement and feathers." Loyalist Claims, 
Edward Stow, vol. XIV, p. 209-222.
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encounter physical danger were those whose pre-war status made 
them community leaders. None of the claimants who might not be 
considered prominent were the victims of physical abuse. Indeed 
only men of wealth or men connected to the military found 
themselves or their families threatened.4 Most physical abuse took 
place in the east, nearer the coast, and early in the period of the 
rebellion. With the exception of the handling of Simon Baxter by his 
neighbors (see below) all of the abuse suffered by loyalists in New 
Hampshire took place in or near Exeter or Portsmouth, and all of it 
took place before the end of 1778.
The reasons why most violence against loyalists came before 
1778 are fairly straightforward. The revolutionary government 
solidified its position between 1775 and 1778. By the end of 1778 it 
was clear there was no longer any realistic British military threat to 
northern New England, and too, many of the loyalists had left to join 
Burgoyne or fled to the British lines in New York or Rhode Island. As 
the revolutionary government became stronger and more deeply 
entrenched, more accepted by the general populace, it was no longer 
necessary to demonstrate its strength and righteousness with public 
displays such as the mob actions which had threatened prominent
4This was not the case elsewhere. In other provinces covered in the Loyalists 
Claims, many men of modest circumstances were assailed and even more had 
had their families threatened. This was particularly true in New Jersey. 
There a considerable number of modest farmers and competent artisans left 
their farms and shops to join the British army in 1776. The army was moving 
through the province at the time and it attracted a crowd of adherents. Many 
reported harassment by their neighbors prior to joining and many more 
reported the eviction of their families under threat of force soon after their 
departure. See for instance, Loyalist Claims, Benjamin Millekin, vol. XIV, p. 
377-388; Samuel Moore, vol. XV, p.125-130.
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loyalists in 1775 and 1776. With their targets generally removed to 
safety, and a network of local committees of safety to ensure 
doctrinal orthodoxy, New Hampshire's rebels settled into a period of 
consolidation and the slow division of the spoils.
There were three levels of physical action perpetrated on the 
loyalists by their rebel neighbors: mob action, housebreaking, and 
physical assault and/or imprisonment. These levels often overlapped 
or became somewhat obscured by their very nature. Thus what 
might have begun as a mob action may eventually have led to official 
arrest and commitment to jail as in the case of James McMaster.5 
Arrest and imprisonment was not by any means a safe or reasonable 
condition for the loyalist. As will be seen below in the case of 
Stephen Holland, imprisonment could be interpreted in more 
enlightened times as a form of torture. Though Holland did not report 
any overt physical abuse, such as beatings or inflicted torture at the 
hands of his captors, Simon Baxter told of being "very ill-used." 
Precisely what that might have meant is not clear though it may be 
fair to infer that he was beaten by the Boston authorities who 
arrested and jailed him in 1778. Housebreaking was essentially a 
form of mob action, though with a different meaning to its 
practitioners and victims than the usual mere mobbing.6
SNH Claims, James McMaster, vol. Ill, p. 1269.
6For our purposes, the words "mob" and "crowd" are used interchangeably. The 
term crowd generally refers to any large public gathering, and might be 
also interchanged with audience. However it seems that a gathering which 
takes action, that is, becomes mobilized fro some reason and by some means, 
then becomes a mob. The word mob is derived from the latin, mobile vulgus, 
which appeared in England in 1600. The term was shortened to mobile in 
1676, and simplified to mob in 1688. See Tim Harris, London Crowds in the
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At the outbreak of revolution, the rebels exhibited their might 
symbolically as well as physically through the use of the mob.7 Even 
before the withdrawal of Wentworth from Portsmouth, royal 
government had effectively collapsed as the militia refused its call 
and became instead the mob. Wielded with near surgical precision, 
the Portsmouth mob became the means by which the rebels toppled 
civil government, seized the military supplies at Fort William and 
Mary,8 and terrorized and drove out the prominent men and officials 
of the crown. For many New Hampshire notables, mobbing was a 
sufficient incentive to pack what they could and flee.9
But the mob did not appear mysteriously, borne on angel's 
wings to do the will of a few members of the rebel faction. The mob
Reign o f  Charles II Propaganda and Politics from the Restoration until the 
Exclusion Crisis. Cambridge: 1987. p. 3, note 16.
7There is a considerable body of work in the area of mobs and crowds which 
informs the following discussion. The basic works of modem scholarship 
include George Rude, The Crowd in the French Revolution. Oxford: 1959; EJ. 
Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms o f Social Movement in 
the 19th and 20th Centuries. New York: 1965; and EP. Thompson, The Making 
of the English Working Class. New York: 1963. The number of studies which 
rely on these groundbreaking works and apply the principles therein to 
18 th century crowd action and particularly to the American Revolutionary 
period is too large to list here, however a full and able discussion of them and 
indeed a pivotal study in itself is Dirk Hoerder, Crowd Action in 
Revolutionary Massachusetts, 1765-1780. New York: 1977.
8That particular mob or crowd has been ably analyzed in John Derhak, "The 
Portsmouth Uprising." Also of interest on the question of the mob involved 
in the raid on the fort are: Theodore Crackel and Martin Andresen, "Fort 
William and Mary: A Case Study in Crowd Behavior," Douglas H. Sweet, "New 
Hampshire on the Road to Revolution: Fort William and Mary, A Decisive 
Step," and Darryl I. Cathers, "Powder to the People: The Revolutionary 
Structure Behind the Attacks on Fort William and Mary, 1774," all in 
Historical New Hampshire, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Winter 1974.
9The same was true for prominent men in other provinces. See for example 
Loyalist Claims, Thomas Gumersall, vol. XVI, p. 299-332; and Nicholas Bickle, 
vol. XVI. p. 332-338.
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consisted of men and perhaps women who saw the faction as the 
leading edge of a movement to preserve their own rights and 
property. "Nothing so converts an improved condition into a 
'traditional right' as continued access to it; few things outrage a 
people so much as a decline in what they can expect - particularly if 
those expectations attach to a cherished tradition."10 The mob and 
those who manipulated it saw those cherished traditions as a sort of 
home rule. The people of New Hampshire, indeed all of New England, 
had experienced a considerable measure of independence for the 
better part of their existence. This was particularly true in New 
Hampshire and especially so during the long and prosperous tenure 
of Governor Benning Wentworth. The previous governor had been a 
master of treading the precarious balance line between maintaining a 
contented majority at home while at the same time satisfying at least 
the perceptions of those in government in England that all was as 
they expected it should be. Local participation in the process of 
government, the formulation of policy and its execution, were the 
expected norm. The very forms of government in the province, the 
town government by meeting were expressions of perhaps the most 
liberally democratic and inclusive means of social interaction in the 
history of the western world.
But in 1765 and after, it seemed to some that the Ministry and 
Parliament were threatening the very existence of those cherished 
forms. It was clear to at least one loyalist where the problem lay: 
"the people of those provinces seeing and feeling their connection
10Cynthia A. Bouton, The Flour War Gender, Class and Community in Late 
Ancien Regime French Society. University Park, PA: 1993 p. xviii.
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with their own provincial legislatures must from their habits and 
prejudices be attached to them. They saw and felt the energy and 
spirit of the laws arising from their own consent, given in their own 
local Assemblies while the laws of Parliament acted partially, were 
feebly executed, and were not at all perceived and felt by the great 
body of the people."11
Crowd action resulted from the inability of the royal 
government to acquiesce to the demands of the radical faction, to 
defy instructions from England and support the continual escalation 
of protests against British policy. Whether based on a popular 
majority or on the outspoken energy of the radicals, traditional 
means of expression and channels of political action were unavailable 
to the populace. Thus the mob formed and carried out the agenda of 
the rebel faction.
The idea of mob action was not unknown. "Past experiences 
and strategies - many dating from the Middle Ages - accumulated in 
the collective memory, were then transmitted via oral traditions and 
networks of sociability and thus served as a fund or 'mobilizing 
myth' from which the common people could draw and adapt to
11M / Claims,, Samuel Hale, vol. II, p. 733. Hale, a Portsmouth lawyer, came 
across in his memorial as a self-serving weasel. But his judgment of the 
situation was probably as close to the minds of his neighbors as we can 
expect to get. Men like Hale certainly understood the goals of their 
contemporaries. After all, they had shared for the most part in the protest 
against British policy from 1765 to the point where they diverged over the 
question of the proper course of resistance in 1775. Of course the 
Parliamentary Commissioners might not have liked to hear this diagnosis of 
the failure of British policy from a provincial at that, but the measure of 
their feelings was unrevealed as Hale died in May 1787, before his claim was 
decided.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107
respond to present crises."12 The mob in Portsmouth and throughout 
the province had ample precedent upon which to draw. Within 
recent memory, crowd action had prevented the execution of the 
Stamp Act in 1765, and the experience of the Boston mob was 
familiar in the near northern port. Indeed the earliest expression of 
the New Hampshire mob took place in the infancy of the settlement 
as armed crowds clashed over the appointment of a minister in 
Dover, then Northam, in 1645.13
In its earliest form, in terms of time, the New Hampshire mob 
was a protest group. It gathered in 1765 and forced George Meserve 
to relinquish the lucrative but extremely unpopular office of Stamp 
Collector even before he could begin his duties. By 1774 however, 
the crowd had become an arm of political action. A mob attempted to 
disrupt the county court in Grafton County as mentioned previously 
and was dispersed by Simon Baxter. The mob in Portsmouth in 1775 
and 1776 was not so easily dispensed with. By that time the radicals 
had seized control of the Assembly, and their number must have 
included the leadership of the militia. In effect the mob had become 
the enforcement arm of the increasingly powerful Committee of 
Correspondence and Safety. The roles of both sides in the 
controversy were clearly defined either as constituents of the mob or 
its victims.
12Bouton, Flour War, p. 3. The quoted words "mobilizing myth" were borrowed 
by Bouton from Terence Ranger, "Peasant Consciousness: Culture and 
Conflict in Zimbabwe," in T. Shanin, ed., Peasants and Peasant Societies: 
Selected Readings, 2nd ed., (Oxford, 1987) p. 313.
13Walsh, "Law and Society on the Piscataqua."
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What we know about the makeup of the mobs of New 
Hampshire is incomplete. We do not know what part was played by 
women, or the proportions of property owners as opposed to the 
numbers of laborers and sailors for example, who provided a 
significant part of the mobs in larger cities such as Boston, New York, 
and Philadelphia.14 Yet it is safe to generalize from the sources that 
a considerable number of the middling sort participated in crowd 
actions in Portsmouth and Exeter. "The changes underway in the late 
eighteenth century had strengthened some traditional groups, 
weakened others, and fertilized embryonic clusters whose primacy 
lay yet in the future."15 The Portsmouth mob in particular must have 
consisted of men who should have turned out when the governor 
called upon the militia in December of 1774 or mid-1775. The crowd 
consisted of large numbers (for the area) but numbers not so large 
that many faces would not go unrecognized. And that indeed may 
have contributed to its efficacy. It would be difficult if not impossible 
to stand firm in the face of crowd pressure, knowing the members of 
the crowd as neighbors, knowing that from that source one would 
face daily condemnation and opposition if one chose to rem ain 
steadfast to the unpopular stance of a loyalist. The choice mob rule 
offered was clear: convert or flee.
14For a discussion of the urban seaport crowds see Nash, The Urban Crucible. 
Nash argued that the growth of urban crowd action was in some ways a 
catalyst for the coming of the revolution, but that line of reasoning may not 
hold true for the less sophisticated port of Portsmouth. Mob action in New 
Hampshire was on a considerably smaller scale, and not nearly as 
anonymous as the acts of mobs in the larger seaports to southward.
l s Bouton, Flour War, p. xxii.
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The mob became an arm of political action in New Hampshire 
at the same time royal government effectively ceased to exist. With 
the rise of mob action in Portsmouth, the governor and his core of 
supporters had no means of carrying out the day to day tasks of 
government, let alone attempt to suppress the mob. Edward G. 
Lutwyche of Merrimack was obliged to flee to Portsmouth in April of 
1775 when he refused to lead his regiment to Massachusetts after 
Lexington. Lutwyche chose Portsmouth as his destination because of 
his belief that "at that time the disaffection was not so general as in 
the c o u n t r y . " Y e t  the mob had ended governmental control in 
Portsmouth in December of 1774 with the storming of Fort William 
and Mary. The failure of the militia to answer the Governor's 
summons at that time implies at the least that the leaders of the 
militia were the leaders of the mob. Lutwyche was probably correct 
that his safety was more assured in Portsmouth. The rebel leadership 
was efficient. The mob was controlled and for the most part 
quiescent until June and the taking of John Fenton. Indeed the only 
mindless act the mob seemed to have taken was the destruction of 
the sugar house, an installation that might have proven economically 
useful to the province.
The mob was controlled and moved through a variety of 
means. On one hand it was summoned simply by the sounding of the 
drum which would normally have called forth the militia. On the 
other we are left with the question of how people knew how to 
respond to that drum, what secret significance was attached to the
16N.H. Claims, Edward Goldstone Lutwyche, vol. Ill, p. 1048.
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drumming and how the members of what at first glimpse may have 
resembled a spontaneous eruption of popular discontent knew that 
the summons was indeed for them. Tim Harris suggested "how 
people become informed about the political controversies of their 
age, whether through exposure to propaganda deliberately aimed at 
politicizing the masses, or through everyday religious, social, and 
economic experiences."17 The mobs of New Hampshire were certa in ly  
subject to considerable political propaganda in  their own 
newspapers, as well as those of Boston, and they were not outside 
the circulation area of the vast numbers of political pamphlets then 
in circulation. Too, they would have been subjected to the frequent 
sermons of the clergy, the large part of which in New Hampshire 
supported the rebel faction. The fact that the militia and the mob 
were in all probability quite similar in identity,18 the likelihood is 
that training day meetings had provided a perfect opportunity for 
the rebel leadership to lay plans for the eventual use of popular 
protest as a political weapon. "The crowd was not the 'rabble' or 
society's dregs, but was comprised of respectable (if often lowly) 
types, who were informed, disciplined, and in possession of broad 
notions of the necessity and legitimacy of their actions."19 Yet we are 
reminded of the danger of using the mob as evidence of public
17Tim Harris, London Crowds, p. 6.
18Hoerder, Crowd Action, p. 43. Though he is here discussing Massachusetts, 
the concept of a self-organized militia either following the direction of its 
rebel officers or ignoring the commands of loyalist officers is certainly 
transferrable to the situation in Portsmouth.
19Harris, London Crowds, p. 7.
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opinion in general. Thus the actions of the Portsmouth or Exeter 
mobs might not correspond to the will or beliefs of the populace in 
general.20 The loyalists identified those who mobbed them as tools of 
"the faction," as an "armed banditti," but never accorded them the 
distinction of being named. The crowds of revolutionary America 
were representative of a large popular movement, though no t 
necessarily of the will and belief of the majority. As Samuel Hale 
pointed out in his memorial to the Commissioners, "nearly one third 
of the inhabitants for a long time retained their loyalty."21 
Nevertheless, the mob represented what was the real political power 
in New Hampshire after December of 1774.
The exact activities of the mob from day to day can no longer 
be reconstructed with any degree of surety. But by extracting 
information from memorialist testimony we can suggest a few 
generalizations. The mob clearly acted as a sort of roving militia, or 
perhaps in modem terms, a police force.22 Men formed ad hoc groups 
analogous to a posse to perform specific tasks such as the arrest of 
specific loyalists, bringing the suspects before local committees of 
safety for trial and disposition. At least in Portsmouth, a group 
remained in some semblance of assembly almost constantly.23 Larger 
groups assembled quickly to terrorize known loyalists on the street, 
often resulting in the detention of the victim, and once again carrying
20Harris, London Crowds, p. 9
21M / Claims,, Samuel Hale, vol. II, p. 749.
22For more on goal-oriented crowds see Hoerder, Crowd Action, p. 40-42.
23New Hampshire Gazette, December 30, 1774.
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him before one of the committees. These actions were not carried 
out randomly, but were designed for a specific purpose, the 
intimidation of individuals known to be or suspected of being 
loyalists. The mob and those by whom they were controlled had two 
direct aims, either to force ideological conformity on their targets or 
to isolate them from the community as a whole, with the inevitable 
outcome of driving them from the community altogether. In essence 
the New Hampshire mob was performing the age-old task of 
waming-out the unwanted elements of society.24
Crowd action based upon the experience of festive gatherings 
provided a way in which the lower sorts were able to express 
themselves when the traditional channels of authority were blocked 
to them. Having experienced in a small way the power of their 
betters during such commemorative events as Pope’s Day, the crowd 
found mob action an accessible and acceptable means toward an end. 
And many ends were found. Crowds took to the streets to protest 
food prices, to prevent engrossing during times of shortage and to 
express their fears during a variety of controversies from the small 
pox vaccination battle to the Land Bank dispute. Though these 
actions all took place in Boston, they could not help but be known 
and remembered in the streets of Portsmouth as well.
When simple mobbing failed to drive the unwanted members 
of the enemy away, housebreaking was the next level of terror
24Mob action was consistent elsewhere. In May of 1775 at Savannah, GA, a 
"mob met and chose a committee who immediately resolved that a number of 
persons well known for their loyalty and attachment to government should 
leave the province in six days or abide the consequences." Loyalist Claims, 
Thomas Gumersall, vol. XVI, p. 299-332.
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employed. As Dirk Hoerder pointed out, "If the person against whose 
property the riot was directed was so obnoxious to the rioters or to 
the whole community that they were unwilling to tolerate his 
presence in the town, his house would be pulled down. These 
methods were also adapted to partisan politics during the 
revolutionary period."25 It was bad enough to experience the rough 
hands and insults of the mob alone on the streets of town, or in the 
company of fellow victims, but to have one's house attacked and to 
have one's wife and children threatened was much worse. Daniel 
Rindge related a harrowing tale: Taken by a crowd with two other 
loyalists around September of 1775, Rindge had his arm broken as 
he blocked the stroke of a large stick. He was imprisoned and then 
examined by the town committee. After his release he was "from this 
time subjected to new and continual insults from my enemies and 
shunned and deserted by some of my former friends."26 Rindge's 
choice of words is interesting. The community often acted in concert 
to show its disapproval of a member's actions, and one of the oldest 
traditional forms of communal disapproval was shunning, the turning 
away of the communal face to the alleged malefactor.27
But the community was not satisfied simply with shunning 
Daniel Rindge, and at least some of the community's members 
disposed to armed assembly carried the attack on Rindge a step
25Hoerder, Crowd Action, p. 69.
^N H  Claims, Daniel Rindge, vol. IV, p. 1571.
27Cases such as the following were not uncommon. Loyalist Claims, Amos 
Botsford, vol. XII, p. 77-90. Botsford, an attorney in Hartford, CT, refused to 
sign an oath and was "secluded from professional practice."
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further. "Soon after this a large body of men from the country, 
searching for powder, with pieces loaded, surrounded my house. A 
loaded gun levelled at my wife was turned aside by a friend to 
humanity, and to me, pleading for the defenseless sex."28 Rindge 
elaborated further, saying that he had just returned from a friend 
and neighbor's house where he had helped to defend the "women 
and children" from a similar attack. Rindge discriminated in his 
account by calling the mob which assailed his house "men from the 
country." The first impression might be that these were neighbors 
from nearby, that "from the country" was not a distinction of country 
versus town in nature. But further on as he continues the story of the 
attack on his family and house, Rindge enlarges upon that distinction. 
The mob was apparently there to search Rindge's house for powder 
and weapons. He had already been ordered disarmed, so this 
instance may have been a direct consequence to that administrative 
action. But fearing for his family, Rindge attempted to obstruct the 
entry of the strangers, and then attempted to limit their access with 
conditions. A quarrel erupted between the parties and violence 
seemed unavoidable until the arrival of "some humane and moderate 
townsmen" who somehow exerted control over the situation and the 
search was completed without further violence. Rindge's choice of 
words and their meaning was significant. Rindge was a close 
associate of the governor and related to Wentworth by marriage. He 
was wealthy and influential, and his choice of words reveal that he 
resented the effrontery of the country rabble which attempted to
28NH Claims, Daniel Rindge, vol. IV, p. 1571-72.
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enter his domicile. He was unsure that his prominence would be any 
protection to him or his family, and that uncertainty probably 
produced stubborn anger which could have led to a more serious 
confrontation. Thanks to the arrival of the "townsmen" he suffered 
little more than a fright and an inconvenience at that point, though 
he would feel the need to flee the country altogether in November 
1775.
Real differences may well have existed between the seacoast 
towns and those of the interior. Jack P. Greene contended that the 
development of provinces on the periphery of the empire was 
dramatically affected by the conscious emulation of the metropolis, 
London, or more generally, England.29 Greene's theory of the mimetic 
relationship between province and metropolis, if correct, could 
account for differences in the formulation of communal identity on 
the provincial level. It could be said that sub-communities formed 
their own identities as well, especially in areas isolated from the 
central core of the colony. Thus just as the provinces of the periphery 
formed identities distinct from but in emulation of the metropolis, so 
too would interior communities have evolved distinctly from the 
longer established seaboard towns. This would help to explain the 
political differences which often arose between western settlements 
and the seaboard.
29Jack P. Greene, "Search for Identity: An Interpretation of the Meaning of 
Selected Patterns of Social Response in Eighteenth-Century America" in 
Imperatives, Behaviors, and Identities: Essays in Early American Cultural 
History. Charlottesville, VA: 1992. infra.
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Bartholomew Stavers did not share the immunity of station 
with Daniel Rindge. Stavers was a stage driver and innkeeper who 
ran a public house "under the sign of the Earl of H a lifa x ."30 His 
loyalism was so pronounced and so obnoxious to his neighbors that 
he felt himself threatened to the extent that he fled the province in 
November of 1774 carrying a case of dispatches from Governor 
Wentworth and the customs collectors to England. But leaving was 
not enough to preserve Stavers' property from the wrath of the mob. 
Shortly after his departure "a mob or body of licentious people went 
to his house and threatened destruction of the same if his wife 
allowed the friends of government to meet there as usual."31 Martha, 
his wife, apparently did just that, because a short while later Stavers 
received word "of a mob's assembling at Portsmouth who entered his 
house by force and destroyed his furniture and did him other 
damages to a considerable amount, giving for a reason that the 
owner of the goods was a tory, and his house was a tory house, 
because he kept a house of entertainment for the King's officers and 
the friends to government at which they used to meet."32
Once again the mob was not content that the primary object of 
their disapproval had already departed. John Cochran, commander of 
Fort William and Mary, had departed Portsmouth bound for Boston 
with John Wentworth. But two months later, his wife Sarah "was
30Sabine, Sketches, vol. II, p. 327.
31NH Claims, Bartholomew Stavers, Certificate of Robert Traill, vol. IV, p. 
1713.
32NH Claims, Bartholomew Stavers, vol. IV, p. 1712.
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ordered to quit the premises which she did and was moving her 
goods on which a mob rose and took away everything she had, 
calling them the goods of a tory."33
In some cases, at least, the mind of the mob was bifurcated. It 
was at once a political creature, bent on persecuting its enemies, 
determined to root out those who by their allegiance had violated 
communal norms, and at the same time its greed drove it to take the 
spoils of a vanquished enemy, stooping to loot the possessions of an 
evicted woman whose husband was long out of their reach. The 
message was clear. Property was seen as a sign of wealth and status. 
The mob determined to reduce the hated "tory" to the lowest 
possible social level by taking or destroying his or her property, and 
driving them from the community by destroying the safety and 
sanctity of the home.34
The victims of mobbing and housebreaking were generally 
prominent or at least connected to government. All legal authority 
had collapsed, the last session of the assembly was a sham as the 
rebels consolidated their control over the masses they pretended to 
answer the call of the governor. Thus by the summer of 1775 New 
Hampshire was as much in rebellion as Massachusetts. Traditional 
civil authority was replaced by the rebel leaders meeting in Exeter as 
a committee of safety, and soon augmented by an assembly elected 
illegally and without the king's writ. Following Wentworth's
33NH Claims, John Cochran, vol. I, p. 328.
34The rebel tactics were consistent throughout the provinces. See Loyalist 
Claims, Northurp Marple, vol. XVI, p. 481-488; Elias Homes, vol. XVI, p. 547-550; 
Samuel Moore, vol. XVI, p. 125-130;
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departure in August and that of most of his core of support, a 
struggle began for the hearts and minds of the majority of the people 
of the province.
The records of the assembly themselves demonstrate the 
precarious nature of the rebellion in 1775 and even into 1776. The 
rebel legislature and the Committee of Safety wherein lay the true 
power could not reach far into the interior until a network of local 
committees of safety was instituted. Thereafter it was possible to 
snatch potential loyalists from their homes and force them to recant 
their false faith. Even before the Committees of Safety began their 
work, the Committees of Correspondence had set the precedent for 
intimidation and public humiliation. In October of 1774 Governor 
Wentworth began the chain of events which would lead to the fall of 
his government. He hired Nicholas Austin as agent for the 
procurement of carpenters for General Gage's barracks in Boston. 
When the Committees got wind of his actions, the Rochester group 
swept down on the unfortunate Austin, and forced him to make a 
public confession of his guilt on his knees. Then they forced him to 
swear an oath stating that "I do affirm, that for the future, I never 
will be aiding or assisting in anywise whatever, in act or deed, 
contrary to the Constitution of the country...."35
The obviously religious nature of these forced confessions or 
professions of faith cannot be disguised or disregarded. Mere tacit 
acquiescence to the state of affairs was not enough. In a place and
35Richard Francis Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, An Account of the 
Social and Political Forces Underlying the Transition from Royal Province to 
American Commonwealth. Reprint. New York: 1971
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time when a whispered charge to the right ear could have a man 
hauled in front of a tribunal of his neighbors in the middle of the 
night and accused of treason, suspicion and fear become the 
overshadowing emotions of the average citizen. The only way to 
prevent the wrath of the rebel inquisition from descending like an 
avenging angel, was to profess publicly one's faith in the rebellion.
In retrospect we might marvel at the stubbornness of those 
who refused to sign the test oath, at the arrogance or conservatism of 
those who remained loyal to king and country, but perhaps we 
should marvel equally at the temerity of those who threw away a 
lifetime of allegiance, who turned their backs on the country which 
spawned them or their ancestors, who rejected the people from 
whom they learned their language, their religion and their political 
thought.36 Few probably considered the decision in those terms. A 
year after Lexington, and a month after the British evacuation of 
Boston, the position of the rebels in New Hampshire was fairly 
secure. Though there was a considerable threat looming across the 
wilderness in Canada, one which played a major part in the lives of 
many in New Hampshire, the feared invasion of Portsmouth seemed 
far less imminent. Certainly the idea of declaring independence from 
Great Britain was prevalent. But the support of all of the people of 
the province could not be assured. Indeed many towns sent petitions 
to the assembly complaining of the method by which it was elected, 
and repeatedly denying the need for a declaration of independence.
36For a brief though effective discussion of this new way of perceiving the 
controversy see Norton, The British-Americans. p. 3-9.
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Yet it might seem that a certain wave of excitement, a fever of 
change, had swept through the province. Perhaps the withdrawal of 
the enemy from Boston provided a boost of confidence in the cause, 
or perhaps it was merely the coming of spring which lifted spirits 
and prompted men to cleave to the new cause of supposed liberty.
Not everyone supported the rebellion with life and property 
and no care for the outcome. The assembly received numerous 
complaints from officers trying to enlist regiments, decrying the lack 
of funds and supplies without which men refused to enlist. Men from 
outside the province as highly placed as George Washington 
wondered in letters at the slowness of New Hampshire men to 
answer the call to arms, while the assembly hurried to appropriate 
money to pay the enlistees in advance. The rebel leaders may well 
have wondered just how many of their countrymen were willing to 
support an armed rebellion and how far they might be willing to go 
in their support. Some means of determining rebel strength and the 
identity of malcontents was needed, and the means was supplied by 
the resolution in the Continental Congress dated March 14, 1776 in 
which all provincial authorities were directed "immediately to cause 
all persons to be disarmed, within their respective colonies, who are 
notoriously disaffected to the cause of America, or who have not 
associated, and refuse to associate, to defend by arms, the United 
Colonies, against the hostile attempts of the British fleets and 
armies."37 The "notoriously disaffected" had to be identified and 
dealt with. At that point in time, however, it was difficult to tell a
37NHPP Vol. 8, p. 204.
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staunch loyalist from a wavering citizen. Though royal government 
had been removed seven months previously, it was not yet clear 
what form the new government would or ought to take, nor was it 
entirely clear on what authority it could rest. Four months remained 
until Thomas Jefferson would rationalize the basis of a civil 
government based upon natural rights, not a concept unknown, but 
nevertheless not one which had been articulated as yet. Instead the 
rebels relied on the negative basis of resisting aggression and still 
cited the English constitution as the basis for the legality of their 
acts.38 Whatever the compulsion or inspiration, over 90% of New 
Hampshire's men signed the test oath between April and September 
of 1776. Of those who refused, a considerable number apparently did 
so because of religious objections, since many were Quakers.
The months between the flight of John Wentworth in August 
1775 and the establishment of a temporary government in Exeter in 
January of 1776 saw the departure of most of New Hampshire's 
prominent loyalists. Older men like Mark Hunking Wentworth, the 
governor's father, and Theodore Atkinson, the former Chief Justice, 
remained, and were for the most part left unmolested. The pattern of 
deference died hard in Portsmouth, and men of such wealth and 
standing within the community were fairly immune to attack while 
they exhibited no threat. Farther inland men like Stephen Holland 
and Simon Baxter retained a considerable amount of authority and 
support in their communities. Thus they were able to work
38M/PP Vol. 8, p. 182.
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continuously on behalf of British authority, quietly or not so quietly 
resisting the rebel government until 1777.
The most outspoken loyalists were harassed as long as they 
remained in the province. Simon Baxter, among others, told of being 
"frequently taken up and carried before their committees....thirteen 
different times, [and] finally put in jail in Charlestown No. 4."39 We 
can only imagine the feeling of insecurity experienced by those 
whose lives were constantly overthrown by such tactics. At any hour 
a man could be taken from his home, carried forcibly to an 
unforeseen location, and there be examined by a tribunal of men. 
These former neighbors, perhaps well-known to the accused, or 
perhaps formerly social inferiors, held the prisoner's fate in their 
hands. How long Baxter endured this is not certain, nor is the length 
of time he stayed in jail. Baxter escaped from his imprisonment in 
July of 1777 and joined Burgoyne's army at Skeensborough. But 
Baxter's physical peril was far from over.
The surrender at Saratoga left Baxter a prisoner of war. The 
American officers serving with Burgoyne were offered their freedom 
in return for their oath of allegiance to the new government, or at 
least their parole that they would not in the future take up arms 
against the American government. All but Baxter agreed and were 
released. Baxter was imprisoned at Rutland Barracks with the British 
officers of Burgoyne's command.40 After some time he was given a
39NH Claims, Simon Baxter, vol. I, p. 134.
40MT Claims, Simon Baxter, Letter of Francis Fraser, vol. I, p. 158. Fraser was a 
captain in the King's Rangers and a fellow prisoner of war with Baxter at 
Rutland. The letter was in support of Baxter’s claim to loyalism.
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pass to return home and visit his family. After only two days a t 
home, Baxter's former neighbors got word of his presence and a mob 
formed. Taken forcibly from his house, "his old neighbors gathered 
round him tied him to a tree [and] gave him several prick[s] with 
bayonets in the breast and whipped him 'til they left his back worse 
than I ever saw a soldier's back."41
The mob took Baxter's pass and threw him into the jail at 
Keene. He was released by the High Sheriff there and made his way 
to Vermont. According to his story he was there given protection by 
Governor Whittington, but nevertheless a party came from New 
Hampshire and took him by force back to Rutland Barracks. There a 
court of three officers ordered Baxter removed to Worcester Jail. 
Why precisely this was done is unclear. Baxter gave us no clue, but 
perhaps Francis Fraser did. Fraser was a British officer captured with 
Baxter at Saratoga. It may be that the sight of the mistreatment of 
their loyalist fellow had incensed the British prisoners still held at 
Rutland and caused some concern to the authorities there. They may 
have desired to remove the potential cause of unrest from the prison 
camp, precluding any further discontent or ill-feeling Baxter's 
treatment might have engendered. At any rate the move proved 
auspicious for Baxter. During the process of his transfer, Baxter was 
able to escape from his guards and journey to Penobscot. From there
41JVff Claims, Simon Baxter, Letter of Francis Fraser, vol. I, p. 158. This must 
have been a severe whipping indeed. Fraser reports that he saw Baxter's 
back when he returned to Rutland Barracks after this incident. For an 
officer in the British army, Fraser must have seen some quite severe 
whippings administered, as that was the primary form of routine 
punishment for most offenses.
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he made his way to England.42 Baxter endured the worst physical 
abuse of any New Hampshire loyalist we know of, though by no 
means the worst suffered by loyalists in general. As near as Boston 
the art of tarring and feathering was practiced, a form of 
punishment thought to have ben brought back to Europe by the 
Crusaders and usually reserved for the most heinous of offenders 
against community norms. In America before and during the 
rebellion, that punishment was allotted to Crown officials and 
loyalists alike. Such an abuse could easily lead to the death of the 
victim from suffocation or bums.
Stephen Holland asserted his position from the beginning by 
apprehending British deserters in 1774 and sending them back to 
Boston to their regiment.43 On April 19, 1775 Holland resigned from 
all of his civil offices as well as from his militia post. He was offered a 
commission by the new rebel government as a Brigadier General but 
"turned up his nose in contempt to them and went off without so 
much as returning them thanks."44 According to Vance, Holland was
42 NH Claims, Simon Baxter, vol. I, p. 135.
43NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. n, Deposition of William Vance, Esq. p. 945.
44NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Deposition of William Vance, Esq. p. 945. 
According to Sabine, Holland asserted bis support for the cause of his 
country's liberty at a town meeting in Londonderry in 1775. See Sabine, 
Sketches, p. 536. Such an assertion is not unlikely as it might have allowed 
Holland another two years to act surreptitiously on behalf of the Crown in 
his home town. However Sabine devotes only a brief paragraph to Holland. 
Sabine's sources were obviously incomplete and based primarily on 
American documents. He ignored Holland's earlier military service in the 
Royal Army as a captain in the Prince of Wales' American Volunteers, and 
his subsequent career in New York. It might be fair to say that much of 
Sabine's information was based on sketchy public records such as lists of 
those proscribed and or banished, as well as the sort of antiquarian lore from 
which many fine stories might be made but which resist the scrupulous
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
harassed continually during the latter half of 1775 and all of 1776. 
Holland and some friends were forced to mount a continual guard at 
his home, and had on occasion to fend off concerted attacks by bands 
of rebels. Nevertheless Holland had the freedom and prominence to 
carry on a relationship with Colonel Archibald Campbell who was a 
prisoner of the rebel authorities held at Reading, Massachusetts. 
Holland was able to visit Campbell frequently, arranged a courier to 
carry letters secretly to the British army in New York, and assisted 
Campbell monetarily.45
By February of 1777 Holland knew that his days of free action 
were numbered. Holland advised Campbell on the occasion of his last 
visit that he would be leaving the area and taking a contingent to 
join the army in New York.46 Shortly after that visit Holland was 
arrested and taken to Exeter jail charged with treason. He was able to 
escape at that time and fled southward as far as Boston.
An eyewitness described Holland's treatm ent by rebel 
authorities in Boston. Between June 6th and June 10th Holland was 
brought into the jail as a prisoner. He was "put in irons and confined 
four nights and three days in a dark dungeon scarce six feet long and 
four wide, [and] he had neither straw, bread or water allowed him."47
scrutiny of modem researchers who prefer sources that are verifiable in 
some way.
45Prisoners were required to support themselves while confined. This held 
true for loyalists as well as British POWs. See NHPP vol VII & VIII. See also 
NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Certificate of Archibald Campbell, Maj. 
Gen., p. 968-970.
46NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Certificate of Archibald Campbell, Maj. 
Gen., p. 968-970.
47NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Deposition of John Hill, p. 960.
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Other prisoners there gave Holland water through a pipe or "he must 
have perished." When Holland emerged "he was so weak and low 
that two men were required to support him." Holland was put in 
another room for a few more days and then taken out to be 
transported back to New Hampshire "under a strong guard with hand 
cuffs on, and a chain under the horse's belly from leg to leg to 
prevent him making his escape."
There is little doubt that Holland was considered a dangerous 
and important prisoner. No report remains to allege that he was 
beaten during this time, though Hill added that he overheard 
conversations between the jail officials and members of the Council 
to the effect that "it was their intention to starve the said Stephen 
Holland to death."48
William Vance was a prisoner in Exeter jail when Holland was 
brought in on June 20, 1777. Vance told of Holland's arrival "loaded 
with irons, that he appeared very unwell and the irons were so 
heavy that he [Holland] could not move froward without the 
assistance of two men to support him. Holland was placed in a room 
Vance described as a dungeon with a guard at the door. The jailer 
told Vance that he was going to the General Court for permission to 
chain Holland to the floor. The jailer further told Vance that there 
were many who would not be satisfied until Holland was hanged for 
treason. Around six days later Holland became ill and asked for a 
doctor. The jailers refused his request but prisoners who had the 
liberty of the jailyard approached a Colonel Ward who ordered
48NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Deposition of John Hill. p. 961.
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another prisoner, Doctor Gove, to be allowed in  to see to Holland. 
Gove reported to Vance that after three days with Holland he "had 
never suffered so much before as he did while he was in the 
dungeon...on account of the stench" and that "Holland had begged him 
to go out of it as it could be of no service to him to stay and die with 
him."49
Neither Holland nor any of his supporting deponents gave 
further details of his captivity except to say that when news reached 
Exeter that Burgoyne had captured Ticonderoga, the chains were 
removed from the prisoner. Holland was incarcerated for about nine 
months during which time he was tried and convicted of treason and 
sentenced to death. Before the sentence could be carried out he 
managed to escape to Rhode Island where he joined the British.
Stephen Holland was mistreated due to the magnitude of his 
crimes. Vance was told by a jailer that the primary offense Holland 
was accused of was the recruitment of a hundred men to join the 
British just after the battle of Bunker Hill. But if that were the case, 
why allow him so much freedom between May of 1775 and his 
arrest in early 1777? The rebel authority had not solidified in 1775 
or indeed in 1776. Despite the pretensions of the Provincial Congress 
in Exeter, solid support did not obtain throughout the province either 
for their rule or for the cause of independence. As mentioned above, 
frequent petitions from numbers of towns testify to the fact that 
support for the rebel government was neither universal nor 
altogether firm. Many yet questioned the wisdom of armed rebellion
49NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, Deposition of William Vance, Esq., p. 949.
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even though they agreed in principle to the idea of resisting British 
authority.
A minority were ideologically sanguine. The rebel leadership 
had close ties to the patriot faction of Massachusetts, as did many 
others in the province. Many of the events of 1775 could be 
attributed to a  sort of mimicry of the events that took place in the 
neighboring province. The acts of the rebel government in 1776 were 
closely tied to the example and advice of their southern confederates, 
as well as to the directives of the Continental Congress. Yet some 
ambivalence remained in the towns. That ambivalence was 
reinforced by a sense of insecurity.
There existed throughout 1775 and 1776 an air of fear, a 
feeling of impending doom predicated on the supposition that an 
impending invasion of New England from Canada would most likely 
come through New Hampshire. Added to that was an equally 
pervasive concern that a seaborne invasion could materialize off the 
coast of Portsmouth at any time. That fear would fuel the suspicion 
aimed at Asa Porter, a case to be taken up in a subsequent chapter, 
as well as informing the general state of insecurity felt elsewhere, 
but especially by the leaders of the rebellion as they carried on 
activities in Exeter which would be adduced as treasonous should the 
rebellion fail.
Either because the feared invasion failed to materialize by 
early 1777, or because it was learned that it soon would, it was felt 
that it was time to pursue the notorious Londonderry leader, and 
thus came the arrest of Holland. That Holland still commanded a 
great deal of influence was attested to by the petition of 133
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residents of Londonderry who pledged their estates as surety for 
Holland's release. Their offer was rejected and they were all held up 
to public scorn for their support of so odious a character. But despite 
a certain relaxation of the climate of fear, the rebel authorities were 
reluctant to carry out their eventual goal, the death of Stephen 
Holland.
The authorities in Exeter must have desired Holland's demise. 
They tried the prisoner for treason and sentenced him to be hanged, 
yet it was some months later that he escaped. The successes of 
Burgoyne's invasion spared Holland for a time. The rebel government 
feared to kill him outright, not only because of the consequences to 
them should the British prevail, but also because they feared to 
create a martyr as a rallying point for the loyalists who rem aine d  in 
the province and who they feared would rally to Burgoyne. As many 
memorials prove, a considerable number of quiet loyalists did join 
Burgoyne's advancing army, but what prevented the victorious and 
reassured rebels from executing Holland after the debacle of 
Saratoga in October of 1777?
Holland's survival can probably be attributed to the very 
nature of the rebellion in New Hampshire. As will be discussed 
below, the rebellion in New Hampshire never really reached the level 
of ferocity that was attained by New Yorkers or those combatants in 
many of the southern provinces. Aside from the aberrant atrocities 
surrounding the Battle of Bennington and a few isolated frontier 
episodes, the rebellion in New Hampshire was rather bloodless. 
Lacking any true desire to kill their neighbors, even the leaders of 
the rebel government lacked the ruthlessness to execute Stephen
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Holland. Indeed it may be that Holland's life was preserved by the 
cupidity of his captors. It was only shortly after his escape that die 
rebel government found the courage to seize all loyalist property in 
the province. Though the suggestion had come from the Continental 
Congress as a means of raising revenue, it is likely that once again 
the capture of Burgoyne's army had catalyzed that action. Had 
Holland died, his considerable estate would have passed to his widow 
and children who could not be dispossessed of the estate based on 
the husband's crimes.
After the war Holland went to England where he became a 
leader in the New Hampshire loyalist community. More than any 
single expatriate from that province, Holland became the spokesman 
for his countrymen. While indeed John Wentworth wrote brief notes 
on behalf of a privileged few, Holland deposed on behalf of many 
ordinary men and wrote memorials for several absentees, including 
the heirs of others who perished during the conflict.50 As advisor, 
contributor, and author, Stephen Holland influenced the exposition of 
the loyalist perspective. It is in the memorials that we find the 
effects of Holland's cruel treatment reflected in the words of his 
countrymen.
Pervasive throughout is the notion of suffering loyalists. 
Holland described himself as "a lame invalid" as a result of his
50Among others, Holland authored a memorial on behalf of John Stinson of 
Dunbarton who was at the time of writing (March 1784) imprisoned in New 
Hampshire. Stinson had been apprehended while seeking to secure some of 
his property and was being tried for returning to the state despite his 
banishment. NH Claims, John Stinson, Memorial of Stephen Holland on 
Behalf of John Stinson, vol. IV, p. 1752-1779.
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sufferings. Robert Fowle, allegedly Holland's accomplice in a 
counterfeiting scheme, found himself and others in a "wretched 
situation."51 Other memorialists echoed similar sentiments. They saw 
themselves as victims of circumstance. The loss of the conflict had 
left the majority of them in difficult financial straits. Only a few had 
professions or prospects. Most relied on pensions for their survival. 
Significantly, most of the New Hampshire petitioners had gone to 
England. Of New Hampshire's loyalists, many those who petitioned 
for redress of their losses did not migrate to Canada and claim the 
awards of land given freely to the thousands who did. But both 
groups of loyalists suffered the losses of property and community 
equally. Both the thousands who eventually found a new land in 
Canada and became the self-styled United Empire Loyalists, and the 
significantly fewer who migrated to England and elsewhere, wore the 
sobriquet "loyalist" for the remainder of their lives. By doing so they 
identified themselves as distinct from their former countrymen and 
as members of a new community.52
51 NH Claims, Robert Fowle, vol. II, p 690.
52It is extremely significant that a considerable number of claimants from 
other provinces, though notably none from New Hampshire, referred to 
their former neighbors as "the Americans." That usage was especially 
noticeable in New Jersey and New York claimants' language. The cause of 
such a radical shift of identification is unclear, but may be attributed to the 
intensity of the struggle in those provinces. Those who wrote o f their 
opponents as "Americans" were choosing to differentiate themselves from 
their former habitation. The first conclusion might be that those who used 
that term in that way were immigrants lately arrived just prior to the 
rebellion, yet an examination of the claims reveals that few if any of those 
referring to the rebels as "the Americans" were in fact recent immigrants to 
the colonies. Most were native bom Americans themselves. See for example 
Loyalist Claims, Thomas Barclay, vol. XVII, p. 25-42; John Francis Ryerson, 
vol. XVI p. 131-146; Elisha Laurence, vol. XV, p. 29-36.
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Physical trauma, mobbing, housebreaking, and imprisonment 
among them, had a significant role in shaping the loyalist community 
identity, and the personal identities of individual loyalists. The 
memorialists referred to themselves repeatedly as "loyalist 
sufferers" and all those who underwent physical trials felt that their 
duty to King and country had been fulfilled.
Equally important was the role of physical trauma in the 
formation of a loyalist identity in the minds of their enemies. The 
proponents of the rebel faction used physical sanctions against the 
loyalists as a means of warning out those whom they had identified 
as enemies of the country. Failing to warn out such violators of the 
community norm, some rebel crowds turned to housebreaking as a 
more final way of driving the loyalist outcasts from their midst. At 
the last, reluctant misfits such as Stephen Holland were confined, 
mistreated, and condemned to die. There are no records of loyalists 
executed in New Hampshire, though several were convicted of 
treason.53
Whether they actually suffered physically or not, the loyalist 
memorialists carried the identity of a suffering minority with them 
to their new places in exile. And those who went to England and
53Loyalists were, however, executed elsewhere. Loyalist Claims, Alpheus 
Palmer, vol. XVTII, p. 129-144. Writing on behalf of his father, Palmer stated 
that his eldest brother "was in the year 1777 executed by the King's enemies 
for his loyalty to his Sovereign." A New Jersey man from Middletown told of 
how his father had been at sea on behalf of the British and when he came 
home for a visit in September of 1779, "a scouting party laid in wait for him 
and shot him." George Mount, vol. XVI, p. 171-182. Emotions ran deeper in the 
other provinces where the war was a reality, not merely a newspaper 
account.
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eventually hoped to find redress for their losses found themselves 
again suffering in other ways, especially from the neglect of the 
government they had sacrificed everything to support.
The loyalists created their own identities first by choosing to 
act as loyalists. As a result of those acts, the rebel faction at both the 
provincial and town community levels responded with sanctions. The 
primary response came in the form of physical harassment by mobs, 
housebreaking, and in some cases imprisonment. In addition, 
loyalists were shunned by their neighbors, confined to their homes 
or farms, or removed to other towns far removed from the coastal 
areas considered by the rebels to be in danger of invasion. Nearly all 
of these developments took place in the early part of the rebellion, 
from 1774 through 1777 after the defeat of the British at Saratoga, 
an event personally witnessed and endured by many New 
Hampshire loyalists who had left their homes to join the King's 
standard as it moved southward.
Following that debacle, the majority of overt loyalists departed 
the province and began the odyssey to some future home. The rebel 
faction, triumphantly ensconced as the de facto power in Exeter and 
unchallenged in the province, altered its strategy and began to 
employ legal weapons in earnest against present and absent loyalists 
alike. Legal weapons had been deployed to some extent from the 
beginning of 1776, but only after the assurance of Saratoga were 
those the primary weapons of choice in dealing with the remnants of 
those whose allegiance lay still with the crown and country of their 
fathers. The legal battles of the revolution depended heavily on 
identity, both self-conceptions of personal and communal identity,
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and perhaps even more, the identity of individuals and community 
as created for them by others. To those legal battles we turn in the 
next chapter.




The Imposition of Identity Through Law.
....the Absentees were proceeded against as civiliter mortuos, 
without the form of a complaint or information by the attorney
general1
Part of our inheritance from England has been and continues to 
be a reverence for "the Law," as well as a certain proclivity for using 
it, sometimes beyond the bounds of sense. We were, and remain a 
most litigious people. To a degree, law and the interpretation of the 
British constitution were at the center of the controversy which led 
to the American Rebellion. It should come as no surprise then that 
law and its use or misuse holds a central place in a discussion of 
loyalism during the period from 1774 through 1784. This chapter 
examines the effects of law on the loyalist community: how law was 
used by the rebels to impose an identity on the loyalists from the 
outside, and how law was used to deprive them of their rights and 
property. We have already seen how the loyalists created their own 
identity as demonstrated in the language shared among them in their 
memorials to the Parliamentary Commission. The loyalists created for 
themselves the identity of suffering friends of government, steadfast
1NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 100. From, John Anstey, "On the Subject 
of Confiscation" a report to the Parliamentary Commission on Loyalist Claims.
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and active in the service of the mother country. They demonstrated 
this constructed identity with passive and active behaviors, the 
commission of which defined them publicly as well as personally as 
loyalists. They also saw themselves as victims of oppression and 
persecution, by mobs at first, and then by the armed might of the 
rebel faction. Once the tumultuous situation of 1774 and 1775 
subsided and the rebels seemed securely entrenched, their technique 
in dealing with the loyalist remnant changed. They began to rely on 
law or the semblance of law to identify their enemies. Both sides in 
this conflict were deeply influenced by the Glorious Revolution of 
1689. Few if any seriously retained the idea of the divine right of 
kings. The constitutional monarchy which replaced James n  had 
altered the fundamental locus of authority, the fountainhead of 
sovereignty, from the concept of divinely decreed kingship to the 
’’modem" idea of sovereignty derived from the consent of the 
governed, or at least from their representatives in parliament.2 For 
loyalists, the law emanated from the government appointed by the 
King and legislated by Parliament. For the rebel faction, it became 
necessary to obfuscate the source of legitimate law and create a new 
basis for sovereignty. The success of the leaders of the American 
rebellion lay in large part in their ability to shift the locus of 
sovereignty away from that of government based on the traditional 
sovereignty of the "King in Parliament" and transferring it wholesale
2Morgan, Inventing the People:.
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into the idea of the "sovereignty of the people." That accomplishment 
was perhaps the greatest feat of political legerdemain of all time.3
Of course the theoretical underpinnings of government 
according to a contemporary source, were of little concern to the 
average resident of the province of New Hampshire before, during, or 
after the rebellion.4 The real concerns of most men and women 
revolved around their prosperity and security, not only their own, 
but that of the community in which they lived. Whatever 
government provided for their security from criminals and intruders 
was sufficient. Questions of sovereignty and the philosophical origins 
of law were as foreign to them at the time, as quantum physics is to 
most modern Americans. Thus our concern here lies not with the 
evolution of the theory of government and law, but with the utility 
of law in the struggle for the minds of the people.
The utility of law is based primarily upon its acceptance by the 
community which it purports to protect. The loyalists contended that 
the rebel government had no legitimate right to govern. The question 
of legitimacy was raised repeatedly by some of the loyalist 
memorialists, especially those who had held responsible positions in 
the royal government. One of the central arguments they employed 
in resisting the rebel takeover of the assembly in 1775 was the 
legitimacy of royal authority. Based soundly on constitutional and
3 For a lucid and quite inspirational discussion of the transition of the locus of 
sovereignty and its transcendent importance, see Wood, The Creation o f the 
American Republic, esp. pp. 344-389.
4James Moody, Lieutenant James Moody’s Narrative o f His Exertions and 
Sufferings in the Cause of Government, Since the Year 1776. London: 1783. 
Reprint. New York: 1968. p. 5.
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statute law, the governor's authority to prorogue the assembly, or 
call it using the King's Writ, was central to the stable nature of 
provincial government. Therefore, argued the loyalists such as 
Thomas McDonough, the acts of an assembly meeting without the 
aegis of the crown or the King's representative, the royal governor, 
could not have the legitimacy of real law. This was especially true of 
the so-called "committees of correspondence" or "committees of 
safety." Rebel government was usurped, un-natural, and, the loyalists 
hoped, temporary.5
The loyalists were not alone in their concerns about the 
legitimacy of the rebel government. Petitions from various towns to 
the assembly show a concern on the part of a considerable number of 
inhabitants. On January 5, 1776, the Assembly at Exeter voted to 
create a new civil government, and by January 10 a protest petition 
was entered and read to the assembly. The document, signed by 
residents of twelve towns, was written by men who had represented 
their towns in the congress sitting at Exeter the previous month. The 
nine reasons they set forth for their protest range from the sublime 
to the ludicrous. Point seven acknowledged the troubling idea that 
the Congress, meaning that which met in Exeter in December 1775, 
and which they had attended as delegates, was in itself adequate to 
act as a provisional government, and that it had no legitimate basis 
for acting to enlarge its own power.6 At the same time point five
5 NH Claims, Thomas McDonough, vol. HI, pp. 1165-1166. McDonough was not 
the only loyalist to question the legitimacy of the rebel government. For 
more on this see Chapter One.
^NHPP Vol. 8, p. 14.
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offered that New Hampshire was too small and insignificant to lead 
where other colonies had failed to set a like example as yet. Perhaps 
closer to the real problem were articles eight and nine, wherein the 
protestors complained that a new government would cost too much, 
and seemed frighteningly close to "setting up an Independency on 
the Mother Country."7
Eleven additional petitions were received by the new 
government prior to the 18th of January. On that day the petitions 
were read before both houses, and "fully argued by Mr. John 
Pickering, counsel for the petitioners." The house then adjourned 
without comment. The following morning the house voted to create a 
committee to confer with a committee of the council about the idea of 
referring the question of what form the provincial government 
ought to take to the Continental Congress.
The January petitions had no effect on the course of the 
rebellion. The feeling both in Exeter and in Philadelphia was that the 
petitions were the feeble attempts of loyalists or fence-sitters to slow 
or stop the consolidation of the rebel government, and that anyone 
who questioned the propriety of the actions of the new governments 
must be an enemy of the country.
Of much greater concern to rebels and loyalists alike, as well as 
to those who had yet to adhere to one side or the other, was the fact 
that the civil courts had been closed. From the beginnings of the 
settlement of the province, the courts had provided social stability 
through the adjudication of offenses and the arbitration of disputes.
7NHPP Vol. 8, p. 15.
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Without functioning courts a sense of insecurity and concern added 
to the tension of the times. As early as 1774, rebels had attempted to 
close the court in Grafton County, and only the intercession of Simon 
Baxter and some of his supporters had kept the session open. By May 
of 1775 the courts were no longer functioning. We know this from 
the records of the Assembly and more particularly from the 
memorial of John Durand.
Durand held a contract from the Royal Navy to provide timber 
and masts. He had engaged one Edward Parry as his agent to secure 
the quantities of timber called for in his contract. In a letter dated 
May 17, 1775, John Wentworth informed Durand of the seizure of his 
cargo and the imprisonment of Edward Parry. Wentworth's letter 
reflected the situation in the province at that time. Wentworth 
assured Durand that he would do all he could to secure Parry’s 
release (and that of John Bernard, the eldest son of Sir Francis 
Bernard, former governor of Massachusetts) and the safety of the 
goods taken, but he was unsure of how long it would take, "all 
communication by land being entirely cut off or at least restrained to 
committees of the people."8 It was impossible for Wentworth to do 
anything himself "as the country is in the most deplorable state of 
disorder without law or govemment....at present you are sensible all 
power is wrested from magistrates, that little hope can be had from 
law until Great Britain restores its efficacy on this continent"9
8NH Claims, John Durand, John Wentworth to John Durand, 5 /17/75 . vol. I, p.
461.
9Mf Claims, John Durand, John Wentworth to John Durand, 5 /17 /75 . vol. I, p.
462.
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Parry was held in Sturbridge until June of 1776 when he was 
paroled to Portsmouth in the care of the Committee of Safety there. 
He had yet to have any sort of trial other than an examination by a 
committee, probably in Kennebec where the timber was seized. In 
August of 1776, Parry filed suit in a Maritime Court in Portsmouth, 
perhaps the only one in operation, and that only to lend an air of 
legitimacy to the seizure of English ships by privateers commissioned 
by the Provincial Assembly. With Joshua Brackett presiding, the 
maritime court rendered judgement against the plaintiff and 
awarded the ship, the Bochacheco, and its cargo to the state to be 
sold at public auction.10
Durand later contended that according to the government 
contract he held "the value thereof is to be refunded when captured 
or destroyed by the enemy....this business was undertaken and 
carried on and finally would have been effected if government could 
have kept the said territories in subjugation."11
The civil courts meanwhile remained closed throughout 1775 
and into 1776. The reasons, though nowhere boldly stated, seem 
obvious. First, justices of the peace could not function under the 
provisional government. The commission of a justice of the peace was 
a royal one, and magistrates whose right to hear cases rested on 
royal authority were of little use to a rebel government. But the 
rebels had a darker reason for closing and keeping the courts closed.
10M / Claims, John Durand, vol. I, pp. 463-473.
11NH Claims, John Durand, vol. I, p. 420. Durand was eventually awarded £2700 
on his claim of £3802. p. 491-92.
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The success of the rebellion required the efficacy of the committees 
of safety and of correspondence, especially their powers of arrest, 
detention, and judgement without trial. When it was possible for 
committeemen or their friends to arrest a man or woman on the 
mere suspicion of uttering a  phrase on behalf of the King, it was 
possible to subjugate the populace, or at least intimidate the majority 
into inaction. With the courts closed the only recourse the accused 
had was to petition the rebel-controlled assembly for a hearing. 
Through 1774, 1775, and well into 1776, the rebel faction was a 
minority in the province. Their hold on power remained precarious 
as long as the vast majority of the people had not chosen sides and 
the loyalists remained in the midst of the colony. The departure of 
Governor Wentworth in August 1775 removed one impediment to 
their success, but the resumption of normal legal procedures was 
unthinkable. To allow the courts to reopen, even with members of 
the rebel faction in the magistracy, was impossible without some 
credible basis for the power of the court to rest upon. That was 
clearly absent. The rebels recognized that for courts to operate they 
must be grounded in the legitimate government of the polity. No 
such government yet existed.
The government created by the "constitution" of January 1776, 
however, found its own claim to legitimacy based on the idea that it 
was a popular government existing only during the current crisis of 
war. Its language rife with references to impending invasion, the 
new rebel government, when not concerned with the nuts and bolts 
affairs of mounting a rebellion, took the time to install its own list of 
magistrates for all the levels of the ante bellum judiciary just days
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after assuming control of the province.12 The list languished in limbo 
though until March when a committee was formed to recommend the 
actions the legislature ought to undertake as soon as possible. One of 
the committee's recommendations, reported on March 7, 1776, was 
the immediate restoration of the law courts.13 Complaints had been 
received, and the tenuous nature of the government with its narrow 
base of popular support required action of some sort. On the 11th of 
March the House voted to form yet another committee to find "some 
method respecting opening the civil courts and what restrictions they 
shall be laid under.14
The committee's report, though missing from the journal of the 
House, apparently formed the basis for a t least part of a 
proclamation issued on Tuesday, March 19. The pertinent passage 
read: "the council and assembly have chosen and appointed the 
proper officers for the administration of justice in the several 
counties, who are to be sworn to the faithful discharge of their 
several trusts."15 The proclamation then revealed the concern of the 
rebels, that their network of ultra-legal committees continue to have 
free rein: "this proclamation is intended not to interfere with the 
power of the necessary committees of safety chosen in the several 
towns through the colony."16 A brief note under March 23rd refers to
12NHPP Vol. 8, pp. 61-64.
13NHPP Vol. 8, p. 81.
14NHPP Vol. 8, p. 83.
15NHPP Vol. 8, p. 103.
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the opening of the courts "to try criminal cases and trespasses 
only."17 Thus the rebel government acted to assuage the fear of the 
general population that criminals and trespassers were going 
unpunished, while maintaining their system of political drumhead 
courts to insure the acquiescence of the populace. At the same time, 
the absence of civil courts precluded citizens from filing suits in cases 
of defamation or false arrest, harassment or property loss, when 
confronted by the sometimes armed operatives of the committees of 
safety.
On Friday the 22nd of March the rebel government took one 
final step to secure its newly won control of the province. On that 
day the house and council voted to form a Committee of Safety to 
exercise executive powers while the legislature was in adjournment. 
Men like Meshech Weare and Nathaniel Folsom, men of prominence 
and wealth, would act as an executive committee, as a governor 
might act had the new government possessed one.18
The inhabitants of the entire colony were not yet pleased with 
the actions of the faction now in control of the assembly. As late as 
November of 1776 petitions continued to arrive in Exeter protesting 
the "unconstitutional formation and procedures of the present 
Assembly of this State."19
ItNHPP Vol. 8, p. 103.
17NHPP Vol. 8, p. 112.
18NHPP Vol. 8, pp. 111-112.
19NHPP Vol. 8, pp. 421-426.
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The rebel government realized that the success of the rebellion 
rested on a firm control of the countryside. During the recess, the 
Committee of Safety devised a means of rooting out opposition and 
committing the mass of men to their cause. In April of 1776 the 
Association Test was sent out to each of the various towns. There the 
local committees of safety were to require every male over the age 
of 21 (except "lunatics, idiots, and Negroes") to sign the statement. 
The text read: "We the subscribers, do hereby solemnly engage, and 
promise, that we will, to the utmost of our power, at the risk of our 
lives and fortunes, with arms, oppose the hostile proceedings of the 
British fleets and armies against the United American C o l o n i e s ."20 
While die association test (administered in all the rebellious colonies) 
was designed to expose those who opposed the revolution and make 
them known to the committees of safety, thereby making it easier to 
keep an eye on their activities, the test also served what was an even 
more important function; it bound the populace to the rebellious 
government in an oath of solemn importance. The effect was to put 
all those who signed such a declaration clearly in rebellion against 
British authority. There could be no mistake. The Association Test 
demanded of every adult male his complete obedience and 
complicity in an armed rebellion against duly constituted authority, 
it was in essence a declaration not only of independence but one of 
treason as well. Should the rebellion fail, each and every signer 
would be as guilty of treason as the leaders in Exeter. Rituals, such as 
the Association Test oath signings, were the means for the rebel
20NHPP Vol. 8, p. 205.
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communities to identify themselves.21 The public signing and 
making of oaths not only identified for persecution the luke-warm 
and the potential subversive, they identified those whose own 
identity had evolved away from that of British-American, and 
become simply American, at least in the political sense. The 
identifying nature of the ritual thus had a dual sense, forcing 
members on both sides of those bi-polar communities around the 
province to view themselves and each other in an "us and them" 
manner, as insiders and outsiders, as good and e v il.22
By the beginning of June, 1776 the returns of the Association 
Test began to arrive in Exeter, while at the same time the assembly 
reconvened for a new session. Those results were heartening to the 
rebels. Only seven hundred seventy-three refused to sign, while 
8,199 men signed the oath. Of the former number, a portion were 
Quakers. Those men generally refused to sign out of pacifist 
sympathies and not because they did not support the aims of the 
rebellion, only the means.23
At that point, the loyalists of New Hampshire ceased to be a 
real threat to the rebel government. Their numbers were never 
large, and the traditional leaders, the governor and his coterie of
21 Daniel de Coppet, ed. Understanding Rituals. London: 1992. "Rituals are at the 
core of the social identity of any community."
22For another discussion of ritual in society especially as part of the political 
process of dissent and rebellion see EJ. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, Studies 
in Archaic Forms o f Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries. New 
York: 1963. pp. 150-153.
23NHPP vol. 8, pp. 204-296. See also Brown, "Revolutionary New Hampshire 
and the Loyalist Experience." pp. 77-84 for an interesting analysis of the 
returns.
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associates, had departed some time ago. Isolated resisters remained, 
but the loyalist threat was really an imaginary one from June of 
1776. Yet the idea of a loyalist threat performed a function still. By 
continuing to ferret out so-called loyalists, the rebel government 
kept the attention of the average citizen focused on the business at 
hand. The rebels, through the constant vigilance of the local 
committees of safety, maintained an iron grip on the speech and 
assemblies of men in the countryside. The committees watched and 
listened and acted on the whispered innuendos of anyone whose 
grievance might or might not have been personally motivated.
Endemic from colony to colony and throughout the years of the 
revolution, shortages of money affected all the rebel governments. 
The rebels in New Hampshire spent an enormous amount of time in 
their assembly deciding how much money to spend, how to spend it, 
and who would keep track of the spending.24 Somewhat less time 
was spent trying to figure out how to raise the money. The usual 
means was an emission of paper bills based on the credit of the 
government. But a government could only emit so much money 
before public confidence would be shaken.
Added to the difficulties implicit in the issuance of a paper 
currency at a time when there was little public faith in the very idea 
of paper money, was the problem of counterfeiting. Before the era of 
engraved printing plates with detailed etchings difficult to 
reproduce, nearly any printer could replicate the currency of the
240pen volume eight of the NHPP series at almost any page concerned with 
the Journal of the House and one or more examples will be immediately 
apparent.
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time with relative ease. Added to that was the fact that much of 
what appeared on the face of printed currency was hand written. 
Well-worn bills could be altered by hand and passed, sometimes 
more than once. With hard money in short supply and expenses 
running very high for the recruitment and equipage of several 
regiments requested by the Continental Congress, the rebel 
government had every reason to fear and loathe counterfeiters. 
Counterfeiting accusations were at the center of the trials of Robert 
Fowle and Stephen Holland as well. Counterfeiting was an attack on 
the entire society, was construed as treasonous, and was roundly and 
publicly condemned as an act inimical to the people of a free colony. 
By definition, most crimes became crimes not against particular 
people, but against society.25 They were acts of an implacable enemy; 
they were acts of loyalists.
But counterfeiting, like most other crimes against property, 
could be quite lucrative, even on a small scale. It is more than likely 
that most crimes attributed to loyalists, especially in the case of 
counterfeiting, were actually the crimes of venal men attempting to 
profit from the upheaval of the times. That was certainly true, as the 
committee of safety of Hanover discovered, in the convoluted case of 
Bezaleel Phelps. In March of 1776, Phelps was arrested on a warrant 
issued by the committee on a charge of holding a bill altered from 3
25NHPP, vol. 8, p. 117. "persons not disposed to good order taking advantage of 
our broken State, have already begun to commit outrages on the property of 
others" Letter of the Committee of Safety of Hanover to the Assembly in 
Exeter, asking for guidance as to their powers and bounds in the treatment of 
criminal matters.
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shillings to 40 shillings. Someone must have reported that he had 
such a note in his possession, and when asked for it, Phelps refused 
to produce it. When brought in to trial before the committee, Phelps 
pleaded not guilty.
After "a full hearing of evidences in said case, said Phelps 
confessed." But Phelps confessed only to burning the note, not to 
altering it or even attempting to pass it himself. Phelps threw 
himself on the mercy of the "court," and offered to name the author 
of the altered note and tell where more could be found. Smelling a 
conspiracy, the committee agreed to excuse Phelps from any penalty 
except the payment of costs incurred to that point which came to 40 
shillings.
Phelps asked that Lemuel Paine of Hanover, who was 
apparently present at the hearing, produce a note which Paine had 
obtained from Andrew Wheatley of Lebanon, another 40 shilling 
note, which after examination turned out to have been altered also. 
Paine swore he had received the note in good faith from Wheatley 
the week before. On that note, the committee adjourned for the night
Before the committee could resume its examination of the 
affair of the previous day, Charles Hill, an innkeeper from Lebanon, 
was brought in, charged with passing an altered note in the amount 
of 40 shillings. His accuser, Solomon Cushman of Norwich, alleged 
that Hill had given him the note in payment for a silk handkerchief. 
The committee determined that the bill had indeed been altered, but 
Hill swore he knew nothing of the alteration and could not remember 
from whom he had acquired the note himself. The committee decided
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that he was telling the truth, but ordered him to pay Cushman the 
value of the bill, 40 shillings, and his costs.
Hill was then sworn as a witness in the previous d ay 's  
investigation, and under oath testified that he had seen Andrew 
Wheatley receive a  bill from one Joseph Skinner, a soldier in Colonel 
Bedel's regiment Both had been at Hill's inn on the night of the 15 th, 
and Skinner had asked Wheatley for change in return for the 40 
shilling note.
Bezaleel Phelps then resumed his story under oath and offered 
that he had seen Andrew Wheatley give a 40 shilling bill to Lemuel 
Paine, again to be changed. Phelps must have been acquainted with 
Skinner, as he then added that he and Skinner then proceeded that 
night to Dr Eager's, and that on the way Skinner told him (Phelps) 
that the note which Wheatley had paid to Paine was his (Skinner's) 
and that he "made it myself, and I have altered a good many bills
from three shillings to forty shillings and a person may make his
fortune by it in a little time."
Phelps added details such as the fact that Skinner used a 
certain book to cut pieces from to make the alterations and used 
paste to secure them. He also testified that both he and Dr. Eager had 
seen Skinner perform an alteration just that past Sunday.26
At that point the document ends, but we may surmise at least 
part of the denouement. Phelps, and probably Dr. Eager, were 
accomplices to some extent with Skinner. If Skinner was 
apprehended, he would most likely have been sent to the assembly
26NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 115-116.
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for further trial, but no record of that seems available. Skinner 
probably escaped, without his book which had been presented as 
evidence, and perhaps Eager did as well. Phelps, by virtue of his 
public confession, a most satisfying ritual, was probably reinstated 
into the good graces of the community upon payment of some surety 
for his continued good behavior, and the whole was reported  
dutifully to the government in Exeter as another example of loyalist 
attempts to subvert the liberties of a free people.
All of which points up the glaring deficit suffered by the colony 
in the middle months of 1776. The dilemma is reported succinctly by 
the Hanover committee: "we have seen no resolves of the Congress 
relative to such cases, but imagined the necessity that immediate 
measures should be taken to suppress such a disorder...."27 Caught as 
they had been in the logistics of rebellion, the assembly had failed to 
provide anything like laws for their new colony. Though early on the 
assembly had passed a resolve to the effect that the existing laws of 
the province should continue as before the rebellion had begun, such 
a resolution was vague and fairly useless with the usual mechanics of 
enforcement, the local magistracy, absent. The letter of the 
committee of Hanover provokes an interesting question. As the 
titular government of the town, should not its members have known 
what to do and what was expected of them in such a situation? 
Unless the committee was made up of men who, prior to the 
rebellion, had not achieved the status and power in the community
27NHPP, vol. 8, p. 117.
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of those who had been serving in the magistracy. That is, the 
committee must have been made up of new men, men who had not 
previously served in office. The others, the office-holders of pre- 
rebellion days, must not have supported the committee system, and 
therefore retired to the anonymity of their homes, or perhaps 
departed for the British lines once the rebel faction had seized 
control through the new apparatus of the committees of safety.
As it was, the assembly must have seen the Hanover situation 
as one requiring some response. On June 12, only a week after the 
new session began, the assembly assigned a committee to draft a set 
of laws for the colony. The second of the fourteen suggested laws was 
to be an act for the opening of the courts, while the fourth was to be 
an act concerning counterfeiting.28 Adding to the need at hand, a 
resolve of the Continental Congress arrived shortly thereafter, 
strongly suggesting that each colony should pass a law providing for 
the punishment of treason, and describing treason as the taking up of 
arms against any colony, adhering to the King, or giving any sort of 
aid and comfort to any such enemy. Counterfeiting was also to be 
considered treason.29
The New Hampshire legislature spent the next twelve months 
struggling to keep its soldiers paid and dealing with the problem of 
internal dissent. The various town committees of safety continued to 
arrest and examine a variety of suspects, many to be passed on to
28MZPP, vol. 8, pp. 142-43.
29NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 165-166.
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the assembly or the provincial committee of safety.30 The primary 
motive for this continued vigilance was the suspicion of an imminent 
invasion. Since the departure of Wentworth in August of 1775, the 
rebels had expected an assault from the sea. But late in 1776 and 
early in 1777 their concerned gaze shifted to the north. The first 
inkling that anything was amiss from that quarter was the Asa 
Porter affair.
In June of 1776 the rebel army was in retreat from Canada, 
and as the authorities awaited some word from General Sullivan, 
anxiety rose. The expectation was that an army of ravenous savages 
would come pouring down out of Canada in hot pursuit of Sullivan.31 
Even Ira Allen's letter of July 10, assuring the government at Exeter 
that Sullivan was well and that his troops were still an effective 
defense of the northern frontier, did little to assuage the fears of 
those in Exeter.32 Then came the news of the alleged duplicity of 
Colonel Asa Porter. Porter, prominent in the Coos district, was 
accused of passing intelligence to the enemy in Canada. Further it 
was alleged that he and some few accomplices planned to turn the 
district over to the control of the British. A plan was laid to send a 
party to Canada, and to request protection for the area from General
30Many more were dealt with at the local level. The usual procedure called for 
the arrest and examination of the suspect, followed by the determination of 
whether or not the accused was "unfriendly to the liberties of this country." 
Upon being so pronounced the accused was generally made to pay a surety or 
bond, often as high as £500, and usually confined to a specific locale, such as 
his place of residence. See, for example, NHPP, vol. 8, p. 308, also p. 195.
31AfflPP, vol 8, pp. 298-299. Letter from John Hurd, Esq. 7 July, 1776. & Petition 
from Conway, for assistance.
32NHPP, vol 8, p 300.
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Burgoyne. This seems to have been a direct result of a plan proposed 
publicly by Jonathan Hale as reported by Colonel John Hurd. The 
district was at the time full of rumors concerning a potential Indian 
attack. There were no troops in the area, the only defenses being 
hastily erected breastworks manned by the armed citizenry. Some 
inhabitants, such as Hale, suggested that if the assembly in Exeter, or 
the Massachusetts government, refused to send troops to defend the 
sparsely settled frontier, perhaps a plea could be made to Burgoyne 
to protect the district from marauding Indians. Hurd denied that 
Indians had even been sighted in the region, but strongly urged the 
assembly to send what troops it could and those with alacrity.33
Porter and his fellow conspirators were betrayed by Daniel 
Hall, a husbandman from Newbury. Hall testified that he was 
approached to join the conspiracy by David Weeks early in July. Hall 
claimed that Weeks had taken him aside and said that he wished he 
knew how Hall felt about the situation, and that he, Hall, had assured 
Weeks of his sentiments toward Government. Hall then explained the 
plan of sending a party to Burgoyne, and said that Hall would be a 
member of the group. But over the course of the next few weeks, the 
departure time was delayed repeatedly, waiting for news either from 
Canada or New York. Hall further named Colonel Porter as a primary 
mover of the plan, as well as Colonel Taplin. He also named others 
involved.34 As a result of Hall's testimony, the whole band of plotters 
was arrested by the committees of safety in Newbury and Haverhill,
33NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 306-307. Letter from Col. John Hurd.
34NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 329-330.
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and adjudged inimical to the country. The committees felt that 
Porter and his associates were too dangerous to remain in the Coos 
district, and since the committees also felt they had no power to 
punish men they considered to be traitors, had sentenced them all to 
be conveyed to Exeter for further trial at the hands of the Provincial 
Committee of Safety.35
Porter vehemently resisted being sent to Exeter. He filed a 
nine-point objection to the legality of such a course. Porter argued 
that it was inconsistent with the rights of a free people for the body 
which makes the laws to "have the power of executing the laws, or 
determining the cases of individuals. In the second point he stated 
that "jurisdiction implies superiority of power" but that it was 
"absurd" to construe that a legislative body could set itself up to try 
the case or determine the punishment of "the persons of their 
constituents whose servants they are, and to whom they are 
accountable for their conduct." Porter also allowed that since courts 
were at that point open for civil and criminal cases, he should be 
tried in a normal court and with a jury, but that this change of venue 
was being proposed in his case out of "personal prejudice." Porter 
continued to argue that the legislature had not been delegated either 
judicial or executive powers by the people, that the Coos was not 
represented in Exeter, and that it would be a terrible hardship on 
witnesses to journey to Exeter in such uncertain times, making his 
defense impossible and the whole proceeding "equally oppressive 
and burdensome with that adopted by the British Parliament so
35NHEP, vol. 8, pp. 325-327.
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much complained of in the late admiralty courts." Porter wrapped 
up his argument by reminding the Assembly that there was at the 
time no provincial law concerning the crime or punishment of 
treason. He further argued that the committee's insistence that he 
could not be tried in a criminal court before a jury because of that 
defect in the law was ludicrous since the committee's prescription to 
right that wrong was to have him tried by the legislature which itself 
ought to have made such a law. If it had, there would need be no 
attempt to deprive him of his right to a jury trial. As a final 
statement, Porter offered to be "tried by the country, and if found by 
the judgement of my peers to have done any act against this state, 
which having been done against the former government would have 
been determined treason by the municipal laws thereof, I am content 
to incur the like penalty."36
The assembly chose to ignore Porter's objections and finally 
heard his case themselves in early December. On the afternoon of 
Tuesday December 10, the house voted that "the said Asa Porter 
appears to be an enemy to the liberties of the United States of 
America, and that as such, he ought to be confined."37 Two days later, 
on December 12 th a committee reported back to the full house the 
design of Porter's confinement: Porter was to "be immediately taken 
into custody & confined in the jail in Exeter, with liberty of the yard 
of said jail, he giving bonds with two sufficient sureties to the
36NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 327-328. Objections to the Jurisdiction of the Assembly of 
New Hampshire in his case. Porter was wagering his life on the wisdom of a 
jury. The penalty for treason was a rather horrible death under English law.
37NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 413-414.
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Speaker of the House of Representatives in the sum of five hundred 
pounds lawful money for the use of this state, that he abide and 
remain a true prisoner, within the limits of said yard until further 
order of the General Court or Committee of Safety of this state."38 By 
December 23 Porter had escaped, if he had ever actually been 
incarcerated.39 The House responded by offering a considerable 
reward for his capture. That he was captured is certain, though when 
is unsure. But at some point prior to June of 1777, Porter was 
imprisoned for his alleged disaffection. On June 14, 1777 the house 
considered a petition from Porter, requesting his freedom to depart 
the state, and to reside with his father on his farm in Boxford, 
Massachusetts. The House agreed, provided that Porter pay yet 
another £500 bond and an additional sum for the expenses of 
"apprehending and securing him the said Porter from the first to this 
time."40 Porter was back in Haverhill by 1780, and at some point 
returned to the good graces of his neighbors, enough so that he 
served as one of the Justices for the Court of Common Pleas. He died 
there in 1818 at the age of seventy-six.41
About the time Porter was finally disposed of, a letter was 
intercepted, sent from Canada to Captain Benjamin Brooks of
38NHPP, vol. 8, p. 416.
39NHPP, vol. 8, p. 436.
40MHPP, vol. 8, p. 585.
41Sabine, Sketches, vol. 2, p. 198. See also NH Claims, John Fisher, vol II, p. 593. 
Porter deposed on behalf of the claim of John Fisher. By the time of the 
claim, the war was over, and Porter deposed in such a way as to sound as if he 
were a citizen of another country deposing for the benefit of a former 
enemy.
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Claremont. The gist of the letter was that preparations were 
underway for the long awaited invasion, and that the friends of 
government (as the loyalists styled themselves) in New Hampshire 
should be ready very soon since "I hope in six weeks we shall be 
able to clear all our friends from bonds and imprisonment: for God's 
sake let everything be carried on with secrecy and I doubt not 
through the justness of our cause we shall overcome the damned 
rebels."42
While its origin was in doubt, the import of the letter was not 
lost on the rebel government. An invasion was imminent, and then, 
more so than ever, the disaffected must be identified and dealt with 
quickly. The process of identifying the enemy within had begun the 
previous year with the Association Test. But simply signing the paper 
would not command the allegiance of so devious and disingenuous an 
enemy as a tory. The government was sure that many persons 
remained uncommitted to the cause, so many that the house passed a 
resolve in January of 1777 concerning "some inhabitants of this 
state disaffected to the government thereof," and giving them leave 
"to depart out of this state with their families and effects." The 
resolve went a step further, allowing those who were leaving to sell 
off their property, an action which was, by a previous act of the 
house, forbidden to suspected loyalists. The only requ irem ent 
imposed on those desiring to leave was that they inform the 
selectmen of their town at least thirty days prior to their departure,
42JVHPP, vol. 8, p. 589.
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and that the information of their intent "be published three weeks 
successively in the public newspapers of this state."43
To deal with those who chose not to depart and yet remained 
unconverted, the house passed a law empowering any and all local 
committees of safely to issue warrants for the arrest and detention 
with or without trial, anyone suspected of loyalist sympathies.44 At 
that point, a misspoken word could find an individual arrested, 
detained, examined and sentenced by a local committee. Mere 
suspicion of an act was enough to accomplish this, as in the case of 
Robert Fowle. In April of 1777, Fowle was detained on suspicion of 
counterfeiting. He agreed to testify not only in New Hampshire but in 
neighboring states against everyone he knew of engaged in that 
activity, in return for his own immunity from prosecution.45 Dozens 
of others were rounded up on the flimsiest of evidence, and nearly 
always found guilty of some degree of disaffection. Most of these 
dissenters were confined to their farms or to their towns of 
residence, and ordered to provide considerable sums for surety of 
their good behavior. Some were sentenced to close imprisonment at 
the various jails.46 The local committees were not infallible and on 
occasion it appeared as though they may have erred. One such 
occasion was the subject of a petition to the general court by one
43NHPP, vol. 8, p. 468. The last measure was designed to prevent departing 
loyalists from absconding on their creditors.
**NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 592-593.
45NHPP, vol. 8, p. 545.
46NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 593-598.
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Hugh Tallant who was imprisoned by an order of the Committee of 
Inspection of Nottingham West and Pelham. Believing him innocent 
of the charges, the legislature ordered Tallant's release after 
reviewing the evidence in the case, adding that "it appears to this 
house that although the said committees in some measure exceeded 
their power, yet what they did was with a good intent to preserve 
the peace and good order of the state."47 Tallant was however 
ordered to pay a bond of £200.
The policy of deputing enormous judicial and executive powers 
to the local committees of safety had a dual motive. First, as 
mentioned above, the level of invasion hysteria in the province was 
rising steadily. There seemed little time remaining before Burgoyne 
would descend upon the painfully unprotected northern frontier and 
bring with him the iron hand of British despotism.
At the same time the rebel government was struggling with an 
ever increasing demand for funds. Aside from the constant 
expenditures on the salaries and expenses of government (the 
members of the revolutionary government did not work for free but 
were compensated six shillings per day each and reimbursed for 
travel and lodging expenses), an army had to be raised and paid, the 
recruits demanding an ever-increasing inducement to enlist and go 
off to fight.48 On October 16, 1776, the House received a resolution
47NHPP, vol. 8, p. 332.
48NHPP, vol. 8, infra, and esp. p. 550. New Hampshire paid its troops on a 
monthly basis ranging from £2 per month to privates up to £6 per month for 
a captain, and travel money at 2 pence per mile from their homes to the 
headquarters of their unit. The members of the legislature received £9 per 
month while in session plus expenses. The Committee of Safety, consisting of
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from the Continental Congress requiring the recruitment of another 
three battalions for the continental service. Include in the resolve 
was the promise of a twenty dollar enlistment bonus for each non­
commissioned officer and enlisted man, as well as the offer of land 
for each man who served until the end of the war or until discharged 
by the Congress. The land would be provided by the United States, 
but the expenses involved borne by the states.49
To meet the expenses of the war it was difficult if not 
impossible to rely on taxes. Of the less than 900050 men in New 
Hampshire between the ages of 16 and 60, a considerable number 
were involved in the military on one level or another, and on one 
side or the other. Farms were not as productive, business such as 
importation and sale of goods was nearly non-existent,51 and most of
members of both houses, received their pay even when the legislature was 
in adjournment and it was increased to seven shillings per day.
49 JVHPP, vol. 8, pp. 349-350. The land grants offered were as follows:
colonel.................... 500 acres






& soldiers............... 100 acres
S^Based on the number of signers and non-signers of the Association Test in 
June 1776. NHPP, vol. 8, p. 204.
51 NHPP, vol. 8, p. 420. Letter of Meshech Weare to New Hampshire delegates in
Congress. The exception to the dearth of trade and trade goods was, according 
to Weare, carried on by men who bought up "prize cargoes and 
monopolizing them at any price seems to be the attention of the mercantile 
part who have the money in their hands." The implications in Weare's letter 
were ominous. The treasury of New Hampshire was quite empty and he was 
reminding the delegates that the Congress owed money back to the state. But 
he was also alluding to a class of men who were profiting handsomely from 
the war and the conditions created by it, yet who seemed little concerned by
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the newly growing manufacturing capacity of the state was devoted 
to war materials. The rebel government had to turn to alternative 
means to finance its continued existence and ultimate success. 
Toward that end the house repeatedly commissioned privateers to 
search the waters round about for stray vessels belonging to the 
enemy. But privateering was at best perilous and an unsure source of 
income.52
Better, and by the first half of 1777, steadier, was the influx of 
money derived from the arrest and judgement of suspected loyalists. 
The sureties demanded by both local and state Committees of Safety 
provided a considerable amount of money to the government’s 
coffers. These sureties were required "for the use of the state" and no 
appeal was available. But in the early spring another source of 
income first entered the thoughts of the rebel government, and 
before too long they would begin to exploit it with a vengeance.
Since the latter part of 1775 when the lumber ship Bochacheco 
was condemned and sold with its cargo (see above), the rebels had 
resisted the temptation of seizing the property of suspected loyalists. 
On March 27, 1777 the legislature ordered an investigation into the 
presence of goods in Dover belonging to James McMaster & Company. 
McMaster, one of four brothers from Scotland engaged in the 
merchant business in New Hampshire and Boston since the 1760s, 
was chased out of the province by a mob back in 1775. Nearly two
the fact that the government under which they were enriching themselves 
desperately needed at least the use of the money they were making.
52NHPP, vol. 8, p. 346. To expedite the process of confiscation and division of 
the spoils, the House created a Maritime Court in a resolution passed on 
September 5, 1776.
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years later, the rebel government felt it was safe to move against the 
goods left behind and ordered them sold off, the proceeds to be paid 
into the state treasury.53 Because the problem of counterfeiting 
showed no likelihood of abating, the House passed another law in 
June of 1777 to prevent the conveyance of the property of anyone so 
much as accused of the crime. The intent was that anyone whose 
actions may have led to the harm of the economy or the credit of the 
country should not be able to sell or otherwise convey their property 
to avoid its loss should they be attainted.
At the same time the mood of the state was one of grave 
concern. By early July reports of Burgoyne's advance from Canada 
began to trouble the councils of the Exeter government, soon to be 
followed by news of the fall of Ticonderoga. That and the reports of 
the frantic retreat of the army from that neighborhood produced a 
crisis of faith: could the rebels hold the northern frontier with only 
militia? Letters poured from Exeter to the militia commanders of the 
province, ordering the mustering of the militia and searches for 
provisions, blankets, weapons, and especially kettles, as all cookware 
had been abandoned to the enemy at Ticonderoga. By all 
appearances, the British were moving southward and headed for the 
Connecticut River. The supposition was that they would cross the 
river near Hanover and then proceed down through New Hampshire 
toward Boston. It was indeed Burgoyne's intention that the New 
Hampshire men believe that such was the case. In his instructions to 
Colonel Baum, Burgoyne outlined his plan of sending the diversionary
53NHPP, vol. 8, p. 524.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
164
column under that Hessian officer toward New Hampshire for two 
purposes. First, Baum was to make it appear that the entire British 
army was headed in that direction, causing the commanders of the 
rebel forces in New York to relax their vigilance and to draw off 
potential re in forcem ents from New England. His second objective was 
the accumulation of horses, cattle and wagons, with as much of a  food 
supply as could be had. Baum's orders were quite explicit, however, 
that looting was to be avoided, and that receipts be issued for any 
and all goods or livestock requisitioned.54 Baum's force consisted of a 
regiment of Hessian dragoons, several detachments of provincials, 
some force of regulars, and a body of Indians. On August 16, 1777 
General John Stark with his regiment and a number of militia 
companies from New Hampshire and New York found Baum and his 
men encamped at Bennington well to the west of the Connecticut. 
After a day long battle, those British not killed or fled were captured 
as many as seven hundred prisoners were taken. The fighting was 
especially fierce as the British breastworks were taken, since they 
were m anne d  in part by loyalist troops who expected that death on 
the field might be a better fate than that which they could expect 
from their former neighbors.55
54NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 664-666. The copy of Baum's instructions was captured at the 
battle of Bennington 8 /16/77.
55NHPP, vol. 8, pp. 670-671. Stark's victory at Bennington was significant. The 
capture of Baum's instructions relieved the pressure on the rebels at Exeter, 
armed with the knowledge that Burgoyne and the main British army were 
pushing more directly south toward New York. The rebel victory was 
disheartening for loyalists or others who might have been near to casting 
their lots with the British, while it boosted morale considerably in the rebel 
ranks following as it did the disastrous retreat from Ticonderoga. The Battle 
of Bennington was also the only action fought during the war on what could
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Once the immediate concern of outright invasion was abated, 
and reinforcements dispatched, the rebel government turned its 
attention back to finances. One particularly distressing development 
in the state was the tendency for certain men to purchase large 
quantities of catde and sheep and then drive them out of the state. 
The government was unsure where the livestock were going, but 
they suspected strongly that much of the trade was being carried on 
outside the state and with the enemy, who were paying hard 
currency for cattle. To prevent the practice from continuing, the 
legislature passed an act on September 26th forbidding the export of 
cattle or sheep without written proof that the livestock in question 
were destined either for the Continental forces or for a proper 
consignee in some other neighboring state. The local committees and 
magistrates were empowered by this act to stop and question anyone 
observed driving a quantity of livestock into or through any town, 
and if satisfactory proof was unavailable in a reasonable period of 
time, the questionable animals were to be forfeited and sold. The 
profits of the sale of such seized animals were to be paid in to the 
state, less expenses of the locals involved.56 The house also acted to 
end another disturbing practice. Public confidence was shaken in the 
value of paper money. Inflation was becoming a severe problem due 
as much to a crisis in public confidence as to the enormous quantities
even vaguely claimed to be New Hampshire soil, the controversy over the 
New Hampshire Grants not yet having been settled. See also Clarence E. 
Bennett, Advance and Retreat to Saratoga in the American Revolution. 
reprint Boston: 1972. pp. 35-37, and Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels, 
The American Revolution Through British Eyes. New York: 1990. pp. 143-147.
56NHPP, vol. 8, p. 696.
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of state and continental paper in circulation. Added to that of course 
was the concern that some bills at least were surely counterfeit, and 
it was no wonder that many merchants refused to accept payment in 
paper, but rather demanded hard money. The act of September 26, 
1777, forbade that practice and also forbade "exchanging a larger 
sum of paper money for a lesser sum in gold or silver."57
Just under three weeks later, on October 16, 1777, Burgoyne 
surrendered to General Gates at Saratoga, New York. Taken prisoner 
with Burgoyne were a number of loyalists, among them Simon Baxter 
of Alstead. Though the rebels at Exeter had no way of knowing it 
then, the war in the north was effectively over, and the 
repercussions of the British loss that fateful day would reverberate 
until the final loss of Cornwallis' command at Yorktown.
The rebel government was encouraged by the defeat of 
Burgoyne. The legislature proclaimed a day of thanksgiving, just as 
they had proclaimed a day of fasting, prayer, and humiliation prior 
to the fateful battle when it seemed the survival of the state was 
doubtful. The ritual observance of such days was a survival of earlier 
times, a way of involving the entire community in the effort and a 
way of asking the intercession of the Supreme Being, in whom most 
of the population believed and trusted. A new confidence infused the 
rebel leadership as the threat of invasion receded and the possibility 
of success in the endeavor of independence seemed real.58 The
57NHPP, vol 8, p. 696.
580ne sign of this new confidence came in March 1778 when the House voted 
to dismiss the cadre of guards it had assigned to the jail at Exeter. The summer 
before, the government had appointed an officer, Colonel David Gilman, and
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confidence they felt was translated into action by the passage of a 
new act to punish those who had broken faith with the new order. On 
November 28, 1777, the House passed an act which prevented the 
"transfer or conveyance of the estates and property of all such 
persons who have been apprehended upon suspicion of being guilty
of treason, misprision of treason, or other inimical practices, and
also for securing all lands within this state as well as of such persons 
as have traitorously deserted or may have gone over to or in any 
way or manner joined our enemies, as of those who belong to or 
reside in Great Britain."59 The intent of the act was to freeze the 
assets of any and all loyalists, whether still residing within the state 
or not. Such an act prevented the absent loyalists from selling their 
own property in absentia, or conveying it to relatives who might still 
remain in residence. The majority of the prominent loyalists having 
left the province by this point in the war, could no longer predict a 
British victory with anything resembling confidence. As Saratoga had 
breathed new life into the rebel cause, it had dashed the hopes of the 
loyalists of New England that they might again enjoy their homes and 
property in peace again. Consequently, they might have moved to 
reap what little they could of the profits from their lands and goods 
still in the state or at least transfer the property to relatives who 
remained there. Even at that date the leaders of the triumphant
sixteen men to guard the jail around the clock. The jail at that time was full of 
suspected loyalists and other miscreants, and the government feared their 
escape to do mischief in the town or to join the forces of the invading enemy.
59NHPP, vol. 8, p. 721.
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faction had already conceived of the next major step they would 
take, the wholesale confiscation of loyalist land and property.
Despite the resounding success of Saratoga, the fact rem a in e d  
that the rebels of the American continent still faced the might of 
what many have called the most powerful nation in the world of that 
time. The losses of Burgoyne at Saratoga amounted to very little 
compared to the numbers Great Britain could field. The expense of 
running a war continued unabated after October 1777 while the 
difficulties of raising sufficient funds remained equally consistent. 
Nevertheless it was considered possible for the rebel leaders to vote 
for a significant increase in their pay, doubling their per diem from 6 
to 12 shillings, and their travel expenses from 2 to 4 pence per mile. 
The members of the Committee of Safety gained 2 more shillings per 
day, rising to 14 shillings.
At the same time the legislature received a resolution from the 
Continental Congress informing them of the need for a new tax, the 
raising of five million dollars in the coming year of 1778. New 
Hampshire's portion was to be $ 200,000, to be raise by taxing the 
inhabitants who had until then not been asked to contribute in that 
way to the continental effort.60 To ameliorate the effects of this tax, 
the Congress recommended a number of measures designed to 
improve the economy of the country and the prosperity of its people. 
Congress suggested the implementation of laws regulating the costs 
of goods and wages, as well as laws to prevent usury, forestalling, 
engrossing, and other activities pernicious to the welfare of the
6°NHPP, vol 8, pp. 728-734.
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people. Finally at the end of the document Congress "earnestly 
recommended to the several states as soon as may be to confiscate 
and make sale of all the real and personal estate therein, of such of 
their inhabitants and other persons, who have forfeited the same, and 
the right to the protection of their respective states."
The Exeter government spent much of 1778 on internal 
matters of extreme political significance. Their first priority was the 
calling of a convention of representatives from any and every town 
and village which desired to participate. The purpose of the 
convention was the creation of a new and permanent form for the 
government of the state. The immediate cause for such a move was 
not necessarily the sudden belief that independence was at hand, but 
rather the fact that a considerable segment in the state was refusing 
to participate within the existing framework of government. 
Beginning in November of 1776, a number of towns in the northern 
region centered around Hanover protested the form of the 
government, calling it unconstitutional because it did not afford 
every incorporated town representation and that it required a 
considerable property qualification for election. Twenty-two towns in 
the northern district bound together and refused to reply to the 
assembly by sending representatives or even holding the elections 
under the current laws.61 In January of 1777 the legislature 
authorized the printing of a description of the form of government as 
it existed, and its dissemination around the state, but especially to
61NHPP, vol 8, pp. 421-426. The majority of those towns continued to refuse 
their participation by sending no representative to Exeter at least until the 
fourth session of 1778.
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the people of Grafton County where the majority of the disaffection 
resided. Additionally, a committee was appointed to deliver the 
printed documents to assemblies in the recalcitrant towns and to 
explain the governmental plan as well as the fact that the structure 
was temporary, to last only until the war cooled down and more time 
could be spared to create a better plan. In February of 1778, it 
seemed that the time was at hand and the legislature voted to call a 
convention for June toward the creation of a new and permanent 
plan of government.62 At the same time the existing government 
chose to vote its ratification of the Articles of Confederation 
submitted by the Continental Congress for ratification some weeks 
earlier. With such weighty matters to consume its time it should be 
no wonder that it took until November for the assembly to conceive 
of and pass the laws recommended by the Continental Congress the 
year before.
The Act of Proscription and Banishment came first. Passed on 
November 19, 1778, that act listed seventy-six specific men by name 
"and all other persons who have left or shall leave this state or any 
other of the United States of America as aforesaid, and have joined or 
shall join the enemies thereof." Those named and those left 
purposely anonymous63 were forbidden to return to the state for any 
reason without the express permission of the government. Were they 
to do so, the entire apparatus of government was deputed to arrest
62The convention was apparently not held since in 1781 another vote 
authorized the calling of another convention for June of that year.
63The act also attainted anyone who took up arms against the country, or in 
any way aided the enemy, without naming individuals.
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and confine them, and to see that they were immediately removed 
from the territory of the state. Anyone who persisted and returned 
again, was liable to be executed. Anyone who conveyed such a 
person to the state or who harbored one of the proscribed 
individuals was liable to be fined £500, half to the state and half to 
the diligent individual who discovered the crime and sued to bring it 
to light. The act further decreed that the list for the state of New 
Hampshire was to be circulated among the other states, and that lists 
of a similar nature were to be solicited from the other states as well. 
On November 28 another act was passed confiscating the real and 
personal property of twenty-eight men by name. Committees were 
established in each of the counties whose role it was to secure and 
amass an inventory of all of that property, and then to sell the 
personal property at public auction and account for the money to the 
state.64
In April 1781 another act was passed for the confiscation and 
sale of all property belonging to any absentee from the state. By that 
time too, the estates of John Wentworth and Stephen Holland, at 
least, were sold.65 The material ties which bound the loyalists to 
their homes were severed by these acts. None of the men of 
substance was able to return to New Hampshire and few of the
64M£PP, vol. 8, pp. 810-814. Both acts appear in their entirety.
65The sale of Wentworth's personal property began on March 18, 1779. It 
would seem that the real estate and the remainder of his personal goods were 
still being sold as of June 1780. NHPP, vol. 8, p. 861. Stephen Holland's entire 
estate including land was sold as of April 1781. ibid. p. 899. The journals of the 
General Assembly and Council as printed in the state papers series begin to 
be a bit sketchy after 1778. The amount of detail found after that year is 
considerably less.
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loyalists listed in the Act of Proscription tried. Of those, only Robert 
Fowle, listed as Fowler in the act, returned to live out his life in 
America. Few of the men listed were able to regain anything like 
their previous level of wealth and influence. John Wentworth 
eventually became governor of Nova Scotia, but lost hundreds of 
thousands of acres of property in New Hampshire, the value of which 
he could not recover, even considering the claims process. Under the 
terms of the claims commission, unimproved land was not eligible for 
compensation. John Fisher, Wentworth's brother-in-law, became 
under Secretary of State in 1781. Few others fared anywhere near as 
well.
The acts of the rebel government banishing the loyalists and 
then confiscating all that they had worked for prior to the war, acted 
also to dissolve the bonds between the exiles and their homeland. 
Gone were the fields they had walked and worked. Gone were the 
homes where they had raised their children or planned to do so. 
Their businesses, livestock, furniture, household goods, every 
personal item left behind was now sold to strangers for the 
aggrandizement of a government the absentees held in contempt as 
base usurpers of rightful power and legitimate government.66
Nearly as hurtful as the loss of their property was the feeling 
endemic among the loyalist claimants that the property was sold not 
only to their detriment but also to the good of a few among the
66In an act of kindness the House voted in April 1780 to allow Captain Samuel 
Gilman, the trustee appointed to dispose of Wentworth's estate, to deliver 
John Wentworth's furniture from his Portsmouth residence and the family 
pictures from the Wolfeborough estate to the former governor's father, Mark 
Hunking Wentworth. NHPP, vol. 8, p. 857.
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rebels who were in a position to profit greatly from acquisition of 
condemned estates. Stephen Holland, for example, contended in his 
memorial that "the sale of part of the memorialists' estates made in 
pursuance of the act of confiscation was only by way of form for the 
purpose of conveying them as a reward to persons who were active 
in the American cause, as nobody would bid upon them when they 
offered to become purchasers."67 Holland's wife had been evicted 
from his home by a party of armed men in May of 1779. He further 
argued that Robert Smith who was the trustee for the most part of 
his confiscated estate had sold a great deal of property to Smith's 
relations for far less than the market value of the property in 
question, and then absconded without making a proper return to the 
state.68
Edward Goldstone Lutwyche added that the trustees charged 
with selling his confiscated property in 1778 "appear to act like a 
parcel of robbers dividing their booty, in which each endeavors to 
keep the appearance of fairness and get as large a share as possible." 
Much of Lutwyche's property was distributed prior to sale to an 
enormous number of claimants who claimed that he owed them 
debts prior. Lutwyche argued that those debts had already been
67NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, p. 782. Holland's contention may well be 
true. According to a letter to the Assembly dated April 16, 1781, the entire 
estate of land in Londonderry was sold to Colonel George Reed for $46,500.00. 
While the value of the land was estimated at $35,933.00, and it would seem 
Reed overpaid for the price, he also held notes from the state which more 
than equalled the consideration he was giving for the property. In effect he 
was offering to pay the state for the land with its own more or less worthless 
paper. NHPP, vol. 8, p. 899.
68NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, pp. 931-932.
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handled, that the claims were spurious, and added, "this kind of 
conduct in taking advantage of the absent loyalist is he presumes 
nothing new to the Commissioners, as in the course of their 
investigation many instances must have occurred."69
Certainly the commissioners suspected that some fraud was 
attendant upon the sales of confiscated property. After the peace was 
signed in 1783 one of the commissioners, John Anstey, toured the 
former colonies in an effort to assess the actual losses of the 
memorialists. One of his goals was to procure a copy of the laws of 
the state for the use of the commission in determining the impact on 
the loyalist claims. This he could not accomplish, much to his 
surprise, "although there are not less than four several printing 
offices in the state of New Hampshire." The only complete set of laws 
was in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court, and that Anstey 
was allowed to read. Based on his investigations, Anstey concluded 
that "the laws such as they may be, are reported to have been most 
shamefully executed, and to have served the purposes of fraud and 
peculation."70
Firmly in control of the province after 1778, the rebel 
government created the identity of "tory" and imposed it on the 
absent loyalists as well as those who remained behind striving to five 
out the storm quietly. In response to circumstances, particularly a
69Nff Claims, Edward Lutwyche, vol. HI, pp. 1066-1068. A considerable number 
of other loyalists contended in similar terms that their property had been 
conveyed in such a way as to benefit a only few members of the rebel elite.
70NH Claims, John Anstey, "Upon the Subject of Confiscation" Unpublished 
report to the Commission, from the introductory portion of the loyalist claims 
Vol. I, pp. 99-102.
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shortage of funds, the government determined that all absentees 
were traitors and no longer entitled to the protection of the law. By 
extension, anyone who refused to join the rebellion was suspect, and 
the Continental Congress extended the reach of that suspicion to the 
pacifist minority, particularly Quakers.71 Once absentees had been 
labelled traitors, it took no great leap of imagination or logic to arrive 
at the conclusion that they never again ought to enjoy the property 
they had abandoned, and that the monies derived from the 
confiscation and sale of the property of traitors could be used to 
further insure that the liberties of the people would be protected. 
The confiscation and sale of loyalist property became, in the minds of 
the rebel faction and the population in general, the just reward for 
traitors. In the minds of the exiles, the loss of their property acted to 
exacerbate the sense of loss they already experienced, by being 
forced to leave their homes and sometimes families by their support 
of what they viewed as the legitimate government of the province. 
Thus law in New Hampshire transformed those who viewed 
themselves as "loyalist sufferers" into "enemies of the liberties of the 
people" in the eyes of their former neighbors.
A few loyalists attempted to reclaim their property through 
legal channels after the war ended. In October 1785 George Meserve 
filed a petition which argued that he had been banished and his 
property confiscated "without trial," and that he had been 
"condemned unheard." Meserve had left in 1775, and so he alleged
71 NHPP, vol. 8, p. 673. There is little evidence of persecution of Quakers in New 
Hampshire itself, beyond the intrusion of committee members into the 
archives of the society.
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that he had departed while New Hampshire was still a province, 
"while she acknowledged her dependence on Great Britain and 
consequently prior to the existence of the United States....He 
conceives his departure at that period could be no offence to the 
United States, and that he could not justly incur any forfeiture of his 
estate on that account." Despite the ingenuity of his petition, 
Meserve's action was read and summarily dismissed.72 John Stinson 
of Dunbarton was not as creative. After the war he returned to New 
Hampshire to personally recover his property if he could. But 
pursuant to the Act of 1778 he found himself arrested and held for 
trial as a traitor. His memorial, written in his absence by Stephen 
Holland leaves no clue as to his fate, though he was awarded £190 in 
compensation, the exact amount he had requested.73
The laws enacted by the rebel government were designed to 
ostracize the loyalists, to put them outside the law, to exclude them 
from the community to which they had belonged. The loyalists 
themselves rarely expressed similar sentiments. The absentees 
retained for a long time as many ties with their former communities 
as distance and the situation allowed. They responded to their exile 
by holding to a belief that their former estate might be restored 
almost to the bitter end when they began to feel to some degree 
betrayed even by the government of Great Britain, for which they 
had sacrificed their all. By the end of the war, the rebels had 
characterized the loyalists as traitors, put them outside the law, and
72NH Claims, George Meserve, Vol. Ill, pp. 1365-1366.
73M/ Claims, John Stinson, Vol. IV, pp. 1753-1778.
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wiped away the physical and material traces of their very existence 
by seizing and selling their real and personal property. Those who 
had remained in the province quiet and unobtrusive were allowed to 
do so only on their good behavior, and often with heavy bonds paid 
to the committees or the legislature. In a sense those loyalists paid 
heavily for the privilege of watching their former situation die and 
change from within.
A community tom  asunder by civil war experiences many 
difficulties. Once the loyalists had proclaimed their identities 
publicly, their participation in the normal routine of provincial life 
became impossible. This was especially true for men of prominence, 
and even more so for those who chose to depart the community early 
in the war. To compound the problem of a self-proclaimed loyalist, 
the rebel faction acted to create its own definition of the loyalist and 
promulgate that identity to the populace as a whole. The result was a 
period in which conflicting identities, conflicting realities, vied for 
popular acceptance. Eventually the rebel conception of the loyalist 
identity won out and became the truth accepted by most Americans 
to the present time. With the Act of Proscription, the rebel 
government attempted to identify specific individuals named in the 
act as loyalist traitors. They further tried to encompass any number 
of others within that definition by association, if those unnamed 
individuals could be shown to have somehow aided or abetted the 
enemy. The Act of Confiscation deprived the specifically identified 
loyalists of their property for the use of the state. It seemed to the 
government, and to the people, that such an act was justified. 
Traitors had no right to expect the state which they had betrayed
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owed them the protection of their rights to property, and besides the 
need was great. But during the war, even after the threat of military 
action was lifted from the minds of the people of New Hampshire, 
they were forced to grapple with the question of the loyalist identity.
There could be no question: John Wentworth was a loyalist by 
any definition imaginable; Wentworth had adhered to the 
government of which he was a representative as the royal governor 
of a crown province. Upon leaving his post he had immediately taken 
up arms against the land of his nativity and before the end of the 
conflict he had assumed a new position in Nova Scotia. Wentworth 
had the distinction of the preeminent place in both of the Acts of 
1778, and his enormous estate was indeed confiscated and sold. It 
would seem from that there could be no mystery, no doubt regarding 
the disposition of such loyalist property. But in 1780 the court and to 
some extent the people were forced to confront again the idea of the 
loyalist as a member of their community and to grapple with 
questions concerning evidence, justice, and the rights of testators 
dead long before politics could interfere with the devising of their 
wills. The following story illustrates such questions well, and asks the 
reader to consider questions of evidence, both in the juridical sense 
and in the historical sense. I have provided as much detail as 
possible to allow readers to reach their own conclusions.
In 1771 Thomas Packer, Sr. died leaving a widow and a son 
and a will. The widow was the aunt of the then governor, John 
Wentworth, and Packer provided for her quite adequately. The son, 
Thomas Packer, Jr., was by all accounts (save his own) somewhat 
estranged from his father. The senior Packer was a man of the most
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strict moral character and integrity, while Thomas Jr. was known for 
his reckless, if not licentious, behavior. The senior Packer left his son 
life estate in a farm of sufficient income to support himself and a 
family in reasonable comfort, though the property was to revert to 
the estate at the younger Packer's death. The bulk of Packer's 
considerable fortune was left to his nephew on his wife's side, John 
Wentworth. The will was probated, and proven in July of 1771. 
Wentworth, as executor, disposed of the estate in the manner of the 
will's instructions, and that was the end of the matter. At the time, 
no questions were raised by any party to the affair.
In 1775, John Wentworth departed from New Hampshire for 
the last time, though he probably did not think so when he left. But 
as the rebellion progressed and the tide began to turn badly for the 
British side, it certainly seemed as though Wentworth would not be 
back. In 1778 Wentworth's entire estate was confiscated and he was 
attainted a traitor, barred from ever returning to the state. Seven 
years had passed since Thomas Packer's will had been proven, and 
three had elapsed since the governor had left. Still, no question was 
raised concerning the legality of Packer's will. Late in 1779, a year 
after the property in question had been consigned to a trustee for 
the state, Samuel Gilman, Thomas Packer, Jr. decided to contest his 
father's will. But the law did not provide for the appeal of a dead 
probate judge's ruling eight years later. The appeal should have been 
made at the time the will was proven, or immediately thereafter, but 
as Packer suggested, such an appeal would have been to the then 
governor and his council, the executor of the will in question, and its 
major beneficiary.
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To facilitate his appeal, Packer needed a  resolution of the 
legislature allowing him to appeal the decision of the probate judge 
under these extraordinary circumstances and to determine a venue 
for that appeal. Packer approached John Langdon, then the speaker 
of the house, and sold Langdon a parcel of land.74 A short time later, 
the bill Packer needed was proposed and passed through both houses 
of the legislature. Packer would be allowed to appeal, and his venue 
would be the Superior Court of Judicature. That court's decision 
would be final.75 Subsequently, on the first Tuesday of March, 1780, 
the trial began. Over the ensuing court sessions spanning the next 
thirteen months, an engrossing story emerges.
On a spring day in 1771, Jacob Sheafe stood in the doorway of 
his shop in Portsmouth. Perhaps he was sweeping his entryway, or 
perhaps it was one of those invigorating spring days when the wind 
still carries just a bit of the crispness of winter, but the sun promises 
the warmth of the coming summer and it is just so difficult to stay
74JVH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2199. John Wentworth, Jr. wrote a 
supplemental memorial while his uncle was serving in Nova Scotia. In it he 
claims specifically that John Langdon was acting in collusion with Packer, 
Jr. Wentworth has no real proof but he argues that a land transaction 
between Packer and Langdon took place prior to Packer's bill being 
introduced, and that Langdon used his interest as a leading light of the rebel 
faction and as speaker of the assembly, to slide Packer's bill through both 
houses. This whole question seems to have been raised because the 
Commission thought that Wentworth was not entitled to compensation for 
land that was not his. The Wentworths were arguing in this supplemental 
memorial that the land was indeed his, that it was confiscated like all the rest 
of his property, and that he was not the defendant in that trial which took 
place in 1780. By virtue of his attainder, Wentworth was precluded from 
defending himself, even by attorney. Indeed the only minimal defense 
which took place was mounted by the state's trustee, Samuel Gilman, and his 
attorney John Pickering.
75NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2195-2246.
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inside a stuffy, dark store. So Sheafe happened to be standing there 
in his doorway when along walked Doctor Hall Jackson. Hall Jackson 
was the son of the aging Doctor Clement Jackson, and with his father 
was in attendance on Thomas Packer, Sr. Sheafe did not mention how 
he knew Hall Jackson, or for that matter how he knew Thomas 
Packer, Sr., but Portsmouth was not a large city and it seems likely 
that many inhabitants traded at Mr Sheafe's store and thereby he 
would become familiar with them and their doings. Some nine years 
later, Jacob Sheafe remembered that it was just a  day or two before 
the senior Packer's death that Hall Jackson had walked up to him on 
that fine spring day and told him that "Packer was almost gone and 
had almost lost his reason, that he had made no will, neither was 
capable of it."76 Those were interesting comments coming from a 
man who would swear as a witness to the legality of a will in just a 
few weeks.
A day or so later, a group of friends were gathered at the home 
of the dying Thomas Packer, Sr. Packer's friend and physician, Dr. 
Clement Jackson was there, as was Jackson's son, Hall, also acting as 
one of Packer's doctors. Packer's close old friend Clement March was 
also present. On hand too were William Parker, the sick man's 
attorney, and surprisingly, Thomas Packer, Jr. That the son should be 
in attendance at the deathbed of his father is surprising because they 
had not gotten along for some years past. Witnesses would recall that
76JVH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2234. Deposition of Jacob Sheafe. 
Wentworth was able to acquire copies of the entire case, eleven documents in 
all. He also obtained a copy of the act of the legislature allowing the case to 
be brought.
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Packer had not visited his father for nearly eight years, nor had the 
father visited him. As a deponent would state, the younger Packer 
was "a man of most dissolute life and morals, reputed always a 
drunken, worthless man, with three sometimes four women of bad 
fame living with him."77
According to witnesses, the dying Packer had asked William 
Parker to attend him that day in order that he might write a new 
will. Packer and his attorney were closeted for some hours, alone, 
and then Parker left for the evening, saying "that Mr. Packer had cut 
him out a large job, which would take him all night, and that he must 
write the will at home."78 Early the next morning Packer Sr. was 
agitated because his attorney had failed so far to return with his new 
will. Packer asked his friend and physician Clement Hall to go to 
Parker and ascertain the status of that document. Hall did so and 
found that Parker "had not wrote the will or any part of it." Parker 
had been told of the urgency the night before as he left the dying 
man's house, but apparently had disregarded the doctor's warning 
that "if he did not finish the will that night it was probable Mr 
Packer would be incapable of making one in the morning."79
77Mf Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2202. Deposition of Stephen little, May 
28, 1789. little was deposing on behalf of Wentworth's claim to the land as 
compensable. He was at Packer's house the day the old man died, probably in 
company of the governor who had gone to visit his uncle. little was a close 
associate of Wentworth's, and a physician as well.
78NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2210. Testimony of Dr. Clement 
Jackson, 24 May, 1780.
79Mf Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2211. Testimony of Dr. Clement 
Jackson, 24 May, 1780.
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Parker arrived at his client's house in the middle of the 
morning and went straight in to see Packer. At around noon, Clement 
Jackson, Hall Jackson, and Clement March were asked into the room 
to witness the making of the will. It was on this crucial moment that 
the case brought by Thomas Packer to break his father's will turned. 
Thomas Packer, Sr. was hours from death. All of the witnesses could 
agree that he seemed weak and out of breath. When asked, Clement 
Jackson recalled that in the middle of that afternoon, three hours or 
so after making his will, the old man died. The attorney for the 
appellant asked: "From the time Mr. Parker last came to the time of 
Mr. Packer's death, do you apprehend his strength of body and mind 
were such as would enable him to direct how to make a will?" 
Jackson answered: "His strength was exhausted and his breath so 
short that he certainly could not give directions how to make a long 
will." The attorney pressed his point and asked if Packer in his 
current state could have remembered all the details of his estate and 
Jackson replied that he was out of the room for some time but at the 
moment at which the will was executed, no, Packer did not have the 
faculties to do so. Then Jackson was asked if the will had been read 
to the deceased, and Jackson replied that he did not know. If it had 
been read to him, the attorney continued, could he have understood 
it? Jackson replied "No, not at the time it was executed."
John Pickering then took up the questioning on behalf of 
Samuel Gilman, trustee for the state. "When you saw Mr. Packer the 
day before he died, do you think he was then capable of making a 
will?" Jackson: "I think he was, I saw nothing to the contrary." 
Pickering: "Do you think at any time on the day of his death he was
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capable of making such a will as Mr. Parker said he had directions to 
write the night before?" Jackson: "I do not think he had strength to 
do it, I did not see that his understanding was impaired." Pickering: 
"Had Mr. Parker wrote such a will as you understood he was 
directed, and read it to Mr. Packer the morning of his death when 
Mr. Parker came, was he capable of understanding it?" Jackson: "I 
believe he was, I saw nothing to the contrary."
The other attorney spoke up: "Had Mr. Packer strength to sign 
his name?" Jackson: "No, not so as for any person to read it." "How 
was his utterance?" Jackson: "A litde stammering, owing to shortness 
of breath." "How did his name appear after he attempted to sign it?" 
"Not legible by any means." "Did Mr. Parker tell Mr. Packer to make 
his mark to the will instead of writing his name?" "Yes, Mr. Parker 
said Mr. Packer's mark would be sufficient." "What did you hear Mr. 
Packer then say? "Mr. Packer said 'I had begun and I will finish.'" 
"Did you hear Mr. Packer declare the writing he signed and you 
witnessed to be his last will and testament?" "Yes." "Did Mr. Packer 
appear to have his senses when he signed the will?" "He had not lost 
his senses but his strength was impaired and he was in great 
measure incapable of reasoning upon anything in my opinion." "Did 
Mr. Packer appear to know people when he signed the will?" "For 
anything I know he did." Jackson then admitted that after he swore 
the oath before the probate judge attesting to Packer's being of 
sound mind at the time the will was executed "but when I heard the 
form and afterwards reflected on it, it made me shudder, and had
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any person interrogated me I should have explained myself as I now 
have done."80
The next witness was Hall Jackson, son of the previous witness, 
and a close personal friend of Thomas Packer, Jr. He too attended the 
dying Packer and his recollection of the events of those two days was 
similar to that of his father up to the point of the execution of the 
will. There the accounts diverged, Hall Jackson adding that "He found 
Mr. Packer's strength so far exhausted, and his speech had so much 
failed him that it was impossible for him to make such a will as he 
purposed the night before, that he therefore had  advised him 
[Parker] to sum up all in one general head and leave it to his 
executor who he said no doubt knew his mind and would do the 
same things Mr. Packer would direct was he capable of doing it." 
Jackson gave the same account of the signing of the wiU as had his 
father, but continued his tale: "At this time Mr. Packer was perfectly 
sensible so far as it related to objects that immediately presented 
before him: he knew his friends, he knew he was dying, he knew he 
was signing and publishing a will, but that he was capable of 
dictating a sentence or of comprehending the sense or reason of a 
sentence if read to him, or of scrutinizing into the propriety of any 
matter that be done in a will he [Jackson] solemnly declares that it is 
his opinion that he [Packer] was not." Jackson here introduced the 
idea that perhaps the will was not written as Packer had intended it 
to be, and that the dying man could not have known it if it were not
&°NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2214-2216. Testimony of Dr. Clement 
Jackson, 24 May, 1780.
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as he wished. The younger Dr. Jackson also added that he had 
avoided attending the proving of the will for as long as possible, and 
that when the oath was administered, that he had taken down his 
hand and not sworn to the condition of the testator. Neither, did he 
think, had the other witnesses.81
Jackson was asked about a Mr. Peirce who had come to him in 
Packer's garden after the execution of the will, and alleges that he 
related the entire story to Peirce. Peirce apparently testified that 
Jackson had told him that all of the witnesses were agreed that 
Packer was of sound mind when disposing his will, but Jackson did 
"not particularly recollect it."82 Jackson also related the arrival of 
John Wentworth at Packer's deathbed, and admitted that Packer was 
very happy to see his nephew. The two were left alone a short while 
and then Wentworth called the rest of the company into the room, 
where they waited, and shortly afterward Packer had died.
The two Doctors Jackson were the only witnesses rem a in in g to 
the execution of Packer's will. William Parker had died in the 
meantime, as had Clement March. One of Packer Jr.'s witnesses, a 
Noah Emery of Exeter, claimed to have been at Mr. Parker's the 
morning of Packer's death, and testified to the comments of Dr. 
Clement Jackson as to the extremely poor state of Packer's health and 
faculties. But Emery was most damaging when he claimed to have 
been taken aside by Clement March just before he [March] died, and
81Mf Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2217-2222. Testimony of Dr. Hall 
Jackson, 24 May, 1780.
82Peirce's testimony was not included in the papers that the clerk of the court 
supplied to Wentworth.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
187
told that March too had doubted the capacity of his old friend Packer 
to make his will, and that he too had taken down his hand when the 
oath was sworn before the probate judge.83
The appellant obtained another deposition from Josiah Gilman 
of Exeter, who claimed to have been at Clement March's house one 
day in 1774 and to have discussed the will with March at that time. 
Gilman deposed that March told him "that he was a witness to it, but 
said he thought him [Packer] in no capacity to make a will, for they 
could hardly keep him awake to sign it, and further said it was not 
Mr. Packer's will and he did not think Mr. Packer knew what was in 
it."84 Adding to that line of argument was Henry Dearborn. Dearborn 
deposed that he had been living with Hall Jackson at the time of 
Packer's death, and that he had heard Jackson say again and again 
that "he did not think Mr Packer knew what the will was that he 
signed a short time before he died, adding that he [Jackson] thought 
Mr. Packer was struck by death before he signed said will, and was 
too far gone to be in a proper capacity to execute a will. Said 
Jackson," concluded Dearborn, "often intimated that he thought said 
will was rather a will of some other person or persons than of Mr. 
Packer."85
83NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2227-2229. Deposition of Noah 
Emery, 5 April, 1781.
84Nff Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2230. Deposition of Josiah Gilman, 5 
April, 1781.
85NET Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2232. Deposition of Henry Dearborn, 5 
April, 1781.
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Dearborn, Gilman, and Emery were all close friends of the 
appellant, and all related having heard things from men who were no 
longer alive to testify themselves. For good measure Packer, Jr. called 
upon Elizabeth Salter, the daughter of Clement March, and Mary 
Jackson, the wife of Hall Jackson for further evidence. In her 
deposition Salter could only say that Thomas Packer, Jr. had visited 
her father shortly before her father's death, and that after Packer 
had left, her father had said that Packer could have his father's will 
broken before he [March] and Clement Jackson died. But then Salter 
added "or words to that effect." Perhaps Elizabeth Salter was 
mistaken, perhaps she could not remember her father's exact words, 
perhaps he said that Packer could not break the will until after 
March and Clement Jackson died.86 Mary Jackson corroborated her 
husband's story but embellished it just a bit saying "I heard my 
husband say unto his father the said Clement Jackson, do you think 
that if Mr. Parker had been bad enough to have made an instrument 
to have conveyed all Colonel Packer's estate to him the said Parker, 
whether the said Packer would not have as readily signed it as the 
other, he answered, Yes."87
Thomas Packer, Jr.'s strategy should be apparent. He first called 
as witnesses the two remaining eye-witnesses to the execution of the 
will. Hall Jackson was his intimate friend, according to Stephen Little 
who was also a physician in Portsmouth at the time of Packer's
86NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2234-2235. Deposition of Elizabeth 
Salter.
87Mf Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2235-2236. Deposition of Mary 
Jackson, August 17, 1780.
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death. Little was also Jackson's brother-in-law, and deposed that 
Jackson was a man of "very doubtful character" and that one should 
"have little dependance on his word at any time." Clement Jackson, 
also according to Little, was a good man but also "was a very infirm, 
old man, and not a little influenced by supporting the character of his 
son from any imputation on his son's veracity in this instance."88 
The rest of Packer's witnesses, all by deposition, purported to have 
heard the words of a man who could no longer speak for himself. 
And their claims diverge wildly from the testimony of Clement 
Jackson. Each of the depositions was calculated to cast some doubt on 
the will of Thomas Packer, Sr. Either the man was too sick to 
understand or sign the will, or perhaps the will he signed was not 
what he had intended. The evidence presented nearly accused 
William Parker of concocting the will out of air, or worse yet, out of 
the mind of some other shadowy figure who stood to gain the most 
from such chicanery. No one came forward to claim that he had 
heard William Parker say anything questioning the will, though he, 
too, had been dead for some time. Indeed, of all of those who visited 
Packer on the day of his death, only Parker knew what was in the 
will that the old man signed just hours before his death. But Packer's 
aim was not to besmirch the reputation of his father's lawyer as 
much as it was to infer that John Wentworth had engineered the 
whole dastardly affair. Packer was relying on the prevailing attitude 
in the state, a feeling of strong dislike if not outright hatred for
88M / Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2202. Deposition of Stephen little, May 
28, 1789. Little's deposition was not made for the trial in 1781, but for the 
Claims Commission in 1789.
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loyalists in general and of the leading loyalist of the area, the former 
governor, in particular.
The defense put on by Gilman and Pickering was perfunctory. 
They could not resurrect the other potential witnesses, both dead, 
nor could they call anyone else who was certainly present or 
material to the case, men like Wentworth or little, since both were 
attainted traitors. They were able to obtain a deposition from the 
widow of the probate judge, John Wentworth, who was also, 
conveniently for Packer, deceased. Sarah Wentworth deposed that 
when the four witnesses entered the room with the judge, she had 
left, but remained in the open doorway, eavesdropping out of simple 
curiosity. Sarah Wentworth stated that she "heard the judge inquire 
not only of the witnesses together but each of them separately 
whether the said testator was of a sound disposing mind at the time 
the said will was executed. They answered separately that he was. 
The said Clement Jackson," she added, "was at that time as capable of 
making his will as he had been for some time before." Mrs. 
Wentworth also recalled a conversation between her late husband 
and the late Clement March at a dinner some time after the will was 
proven in which March said that Packer, at the time his will had 
been executed, "as capable of it as he had been for some time."89
The only other evidence presented by the "defense" was the 
deposition of Hunking Wentworth who offered that he had had many 
conversations with Thomas Packer, Sr. before his death, and that in
89NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2238-2239. Testimony of Sarah 
Wentworth, July 17, 1780.
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all cases the elder Packer had vehemently argued that he would give 
no part of his estate to his son, except perhaps one farm for the term 
of his life, and that he would leave nothing to his son's children 
either, all because he disapproved of his son's conduct.90 At that 
point the evidence was concluded, and some thirteen months after 
the trial had begun, the case went to the jury 91
With the hindsight of better than two hundred years it might 
be possible to chuckle at the flimsy fabric of lies and innuendo which 
passed for evidence in the appeal of Packer's will. It might also be 
possible to bristle at the thought that a sinister figure, the loyalist 
governor, had conspired to rob a grieving son of his inheritance. Just 
as we cannot with certainty discern the absolute truth in this case, 
neither could the jury in 1781. Those men who heard the evidence 
might just as easily have seen the aged Clement Jackson equivocate 
slightly so as not to contradict his son's testimony and perhaps 
perjure him. They could not see the lesser witnesses squirm or shake
90NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2240. Deposition of Hunking 
Wentworth, July 17, 1780 .1 cannot be sure if Hunking Wentworth was a 
relative of the governor or not. It seems likely he was in some way, and if so 
his testimony would be of little value given the feeling towards the loyalist 
branch of the family.
91Or perhaps the jury had had the case since long before it had begun, even 
before the bill had been passed allowing Packer's appeal. A nearly full 
column advertisement was placed in the New Hampshire Gazette on April 13, 
1779. Placed and paid for by the clerk of the assembly, the advertisement 
informed the public that a petition had been received by the house 
requesting an appeal to the will proved in 1771. The advertisement gave 
specific details of Packer, Jr.'s allegations, that the will was false, that the 
probate judge was uncle to Governor John Wentworth, and "that the said 
petitioner had always demeaned himself as a true friend to the states of 
America, their union and their cause; that he has paid taxes for the support 
of the war- assessed on those very lands which would otherwise have been 
sold."
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in the witness chair because the testimony of Dearborn, Emery, and 
Gilman was given by written deposition. The witnesses for the other 
side both bore the name Wentworth and thus could be discounted 
regardless of the degree of relationship to the former governor, if 
any. The jury in this case was left with two questions: was Thomas 
Packer, Sr. capable of making and attesting a will just a  few hours 
before he died? and, whether or not he was, was the will h e  
attempted to sign really his will, or was it the product of an evil plot 
masterminded by the thrice-damned loyalist who was the only one 
to gain from depriving Thomas Packer, Jr. of his father's legacy?
In late April of 1781, the jury arrived at a verdict: "The jury 
find[s] the paper in the case purporting to be the last will and 
testament of Thomas Packer, Esq., deceased, is not his last will and 
testament." John Wentworth, Jr. and Stephen Little both argued in 
papers submitted to the Claims Commission that the jury's decision 
was based solely on the loyalism of Governor Wentworth.92
The success of Thomas Packer, Jr.'s appeal was a tribute to the 
success of the rebel government in creating a new identity for the 
loyalist portion of the provincial community. The rebels created a 
"them" to juxtapose against the newly formed "us" of the community 
which came to be called the State of New Hampshire, and in an even 
larger sense, the "us" which became the United States of America.
92Further evidence of the jury's condemnation of loyalism and the loyalist 
defendant lies in the fact that they chose to deprive the state of needed 
revenue by their decision. The award to Thomas Packer, Jr. delivered the 
land from being sold at public auction for the benefit of the treasury. In a 
sense the jurors took from their own pockets and gave to Packer, only to 
deliver a message to Wentworth and the other loyalists.
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The transition from "we" to "us and them" was aided by the loyalists 
themselves. As we have seen, the loyalists proclaimed their own 
identities individually and collectively through the actions which 
labelled them publicly as loyalists. The loyalists were further 
individuated by the external forces to which they were exposed, the 
physical sufferings, the trauma of which acted to reaffirm the self- 
identification of each as a loyalist sufferer, and to produce a 
collective, communal sense of shared experience necessary to the 
creation of a self-conscious community of loyalists. Finally, as we 
have seen in this chapter, the rebel government acted to formalize 
the identification of loyalists through law, and to subvert the  
traditional forms of law and order to the needs of an usurping power, 
creating extraordinary ways of searching out, penalizing an d  
outlawing dissenters from the community. John W entworth's 
loyalism identified him in the minds of his former neighbors as an 
outsider, no longer the well-liked governor of a prosperous comer of 
British North America, but a "damned tory" capable of subverting the 
will of a dying man and ruthlessly appropriating a young man's 
inheritance.93 The jury which found for Thomas Packer, Jr. was not
93The assembly was not clearly convinced that Packer's claim was completely 
legitimate, or at least that it was so legitimate that he should have the entire 
estate returned to him as it had been constituted at his father's death. In the 
act which permitted the appeal, the widow's portion was upheld as devised, 
regardless of the outcome of the appeal. That much was natural. But 
Wentworth had sold portions of Packer's estate to a number of individuals 
prior to the rebellion, and had deeded other parcels for a variety of 
charitable reasons at the behest of the testator. As executor, Wentworth was 
charged to endow schools and other publicly beneficial institutions with 
portions of the estate. The assembly further added in the resolve that even if 
the appeal went against Wentworth, all of the lands that he had received 
through the will and which he had conveyed prior to the rebellion were to 
remain in the hands of those who had so acquired them. Several were named
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giving its approval to his mode of living, or even really announcing 
its belief in the scenario his witnesses presented in a m ost 
circumstantial way. That jury was condemning John Wentworth for 
his desertion of his homeland and his adherence to a way of 
government and  a way of life that they had by then been 
conditioned to find most reprehensible. The verdict was not so much 
for Thomas Packer, cheated heir, but against John Wentworth, 
loyalist
specifically and others were left deliberately ambiguous in order that the 
owners could produce their titles and have them confirmed. Neither in the 
act of the assembly empowering Packer to appeal the proving of the will, or 
in the course of the trial itself, was Wentworth accused of mishandling the 
estate as its executor. NH Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pp. 2206-2209.
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Chapter Five
Who Will Rule at Home:
Identity and the Battle for Cultural Supremacy
To the Tories.
Wanted for his Majesties Service, as 
an Assistant to his Excellency General 
Howe and Hugh Gaine, Printers and Pub­
lishers of the New York Gazette, a Gen­
tleman who can lie with Ingenuity.
Enquire of Peter Numskull, Composer and 
Collector of lies for their Excellencies, at 
New York. NB. A good Hand will
receive the honour of Knighthood.1
The struggle within New Hampshire during the period of the 
successful rebellion which we now name the American Revolution 
was a struggle over personal and communal identity. We have 
already seen in chapter one the results of the conscious and 
unconscious attempt of the loyalists to create a community identity 
for themselves primarily through their own words in the claims 
submitted to the Parliamentary commission and relevant ancillary 
documents. The loyalists who filed claims for compensation told a 
coherent tale using a shared vocabulary. The story of their actions 
and resultant sufferings demonstrates the community of loyalists 
born amid the trauma of a rebellion which drove them from family
lNew Hampshire Gazette or Exeter Morning Chronicle. June 24, 1777. This 
advertisement appeared in Robert Fowle's 58th issue. Only three numbers 
were published subsequently before his arrest on charges of treason by 
counterfeiting.
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and home, and cost many of them the accumulated wealth of a 
lifetime. The fact that the loyalist claims documents were written 
based upon self-interest has no real relevance when that objection is 
raised to question their usefulness as a means of deriving a narrative 
based on their perspectives. After all, the accepted narrative of the 
American Revolution, based as it is on the relevant writings of 
members of the rebel faction, was as driven by self-interest as that 
of the losing side.
In chapter two we explored the self-identification of loyalists 
through the actions they undertook in support of government. Each 
action or omission perpetrated by a self-avowed loyalist served to 
identify him to the community in which he lived. Moreover, those 
actions served as a means of self-affirmation, a way of reminding the 
individual of who and what he was even in the face of the increasing 
isolation and persecution he may have suffered as the rebellion 
progressed. The actions detailed by the loyalists who filed claims 
after the war serve as examples of the similar actions taken by many 
thousands of loyalists throughout the colonies. Indeed the exploits of 
New Hampshire's loyalists were tame compared to the adventures of 
many who hailed from provinces where actual military activity took 
place. Though many New Hampshire loyalists left their province to 
serve in the British army or in provincial units, none of them saw 
action near to home the way the loyalists of New York or 
Pennsylvania did. The rebellion in New Hampshire was a peaceful 
one, which made the experience of New Hampshire's loyalists unique.
In chapter three the rebel faction's response to self- 
identification was demonstrated in the many forms of physical
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retaliation employed against known loyalists and their families. The 
very idea of a "known" loyalist proves that the actions of the friends 
of government defined their identities within the community. The 
rebels responded to the outspoken loyalists by physical reprisals: 
mobbing, housebreaking, and imprisonment, the latter sometimes in 
conjunction with what might today be described by human rights 
advocates as torture.
But the rebel faction carried the identification process further 
into the realm of formal inquiry through several devices described in 
chapter four. The rebels successfully derailed the effectiveness of 
royal government beginning in December of 1774, and within a year 
had crafted a workable form of government suitable to their needs. 
Even before Wentworth's departure in August of 1774, the rebel 
congress sitting at Exeter had reached out into the towns with a 
network of committees designed to control things at the local level 
and identify potential opponents. The royal governor was powerless 
as the militia refused his call during the attack on Fort William and 
Mary in December 1774, and Wentworth was able only to maintain 
the sham of actual government from that point on. Following his 
departure, the rebel government sought the semblance of legal 
methods to identify their enemies and rid the province of all those 
who could not or would not support the new order. These included 
the Association Test, the surveillance activities of the committees of 
safety, ostracism and shunning, and inevitably the most formal 
expressions of communal disapproval: actual banishment coupled 
with the confiscation of real and personal property.
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But none of this took place in a vacuum. Around New 
Hampshire a shooting war raged; men bled and died on both sides of 
an armed conflict the aim of which was to d e te rm in e  the political 
destiny of a continent. Surrounding that war swirled another, 
perhaps more important struggle, the battle that spawned the 
rebellion: a cultural conflict which split the residents of British North 
America at the local, provincial, and later, national levels. This 
chapter will place the rebellion in New Hampshire squarely within 
the definition of a culture war: an ideological clash between two or 
more opposing camps, both (or all) absolutely convinced of the 
righteousness of their cause.2 The culture war is carried out publicly, 
primarily through the available forms or media for public discourse, 
but the struggle may extend into the realm of actual physical conflict, 
as it did during the American Revolution. It was Carl Becker who 
suggested that the revolution was as much about who would rule at 
home as about home rule. In this he was entirely correct, though he 
may not have gone far enough. The revolution was about not only 
who would wield political power, but how the society would define 
itself and ultimately how each individual would construct an identity 
based upon the new independent community or the traditional 
colonial one.
The eventual outcome of the struggle for independence was 
determined by the activism of the rebel faction from 1763 on, and 
the naive complacency not only of the British government but its
2James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: the Struggle to Define America. New 
York: 1991. See also Gordon S. Wood, The Radicahsm o f the American 
Revolution. New York: 1991.
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friends in America as well. Beginning with protests concerning the 
Proclamation of 1763 and the Stamp Act crisis of 1765, the self- 
styled "whigs" of British North America began a concerted effort to 
win control of the provincial assemblies and the communications 
media of the time, the newspapers. Their political struggles met with 
varying success from colony to colony, but in New Hampshire at least 
they were able to claim a majority soon after the ascendency of John 
Wentworth to the governor's chair in 1767. There is little, if any, 
evidence to suggest that even the most ardent of whigs had 
considered the road to independence prior to 1774. Most of those 
whose occupation, station, or interest caused them to consider the 
larger issues of the time could agree in principle that there were 
problems with the relationship between the British government and 
her colonies. Most could also agree that the source of those problems 
was an intractable ministry and an unresponsive parliament.
In hindsight historians can now see the blunders of the 
ministry in blindly assuming the innate inferiority of the residents of 
the colonies and holding to the belief that the rustic provincials 
would eventually accede to the measures proposed by their 
superiors in England. While the authorities in London proceeded in 
stubborn ignorance of the situation, ignoring the warnings of their 
governors and sundry officials on the scene, the friends of 
government in America began to recognize their peril. In response to 
the assembly's creation of a standing committee of correspondence, 
Wentworth suspended the session for seven months in 1773.3 The
3Wilderson, Wentworth, p. 221.
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assembly which reconvened in 1774 was quickly dissolved, and then 
met illegally to empower the creation of a provincial congress to 
meet in Exeter. When in 1774 a new election was called, Wentworth 
attempted to stack the house in favor of government by exte n d in g  
three new writs to towns in the interior he felt would re tu rn  
members favorable to his position.4 That act, however, only 
engendered more controversy and further exacerbated an already 
precarious situation. Within days Wentworth was forced to flee to 
Fort William and Mary for the protection the two nearby British 
ships could offer himself and his family.
It was apparent to Wentworth at least by December of 1774 
that all royal authority had departed the province. The N ew  
Hampshire Gazette continued to print his official proclamations, but 
Daniel Fowle, its printer, was consistent in his support of the radical 
faction as demonstrated by the quantity of space he devoted to the 
news of the provincial congress, the activities of the committees of 
correspondence, and the volume of opinion pieces he included, many 
of them copied from the more radical papers of Boston and 
Philadelphia.5
The content of the New Hampshire Gazette during the early 
years of the rebellion brings into stark relief the fact that the rebel 
faction was deeply entrenched in the provincial infrastructure. The
4 Wilderson, Wentworth, p. 254.
5New Hampshire Gazette, May 13, 1774. Camillus, for example, penned an angry 
diatribe protesting the concept of taxation without representation. The 
opinion pieces of the previous few months had been devoted to the tea 
controversy.
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rebellion was not a mass movement from the bottom up consisting 
primarily of the poor, oppressed or the landless. The rebel faction 
was led and for the most part constituted of wealthy merchants and 
landowners, magistrates, militia officers, and assemblymen, some of 
the best men in the colony.6 It would be easy, but unjust, to  
minimize their commitment to a new order and attribute their status 
as rebels to jealousy of the entrenched Portsmouth elite, those 
Wentworth clansmen and associates who had monopolized power in 
the province nearly from the accession of Benning Wentworth in 
1741. Surely some may have admitted to that as their primary 
motive, but certainly not all. And neither petty jealousy nor simple 
greed could have moved such a number of men of substance to risk 
their very lives in a cause in which they did not fully believe.
It was instead the belief that the time had come to redefine the 
nature of the provincial community which impelled the rebels to 
take control of the reins of government, haltingly at first, in the 
latter part of 1774. As mentioned above, when Wentworth lost 
control of the militia, which became clear during the attack on Fort 
William and Mary in December of 1774, royal government became 
for all intents and purposes merely a fiction. From that point and 
beyond, Wentworth and the other loyalists clung tenaciously to the 
false hope that order as they perceived it would be restored. Indeed 
for some time they seem to have remained ignorant of the actual 
state of affairs, badly misunderstanding the apparent strength of the
6Wilderson, Wentworth, p. 250, as well as various other references to the 
makeup of the faction's leadership.
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rebels and underestimating the strength of the rebel appeal to the 
broad masses of the population of the colony. Whether consciously or 
not, the leaders of the rebel faction understood the need for popular 
support in their cause. They recognized that a small minority could 
not effectively control the province by coercion alone, even though 
for the moment at least, the faction had a monopoly on the threat of 
force. Both sides of the conflict were convinced at that point that it 
would be only a matter of time until that changed and a significant 
force of British regulars would alter the balance of power. Gage's 
refusal to send troops in response to Wentworth's appeal in the 
spring of 1775 removed the governor as well as the immediate 
threat to the rebels. It did not remove the threat of imminent 
invasion, however, or at least it did not remove that threat as a part 
of the rebel faction's argument for the next two to three years. At 
least in New Hampshire, argument replaced bullets as the means to 
an effective revolution, discourse replaced the battlefield as the 
arena in which the rebellion would be fought.
Wentworth's departure in August of 1775 marked a major shift 
in the intensity and direction of the culture war in New Hampshire. 
The division between rebels and loyalists had not been as clear when 
the writings filling the newspapers were devoted to the 
constitutional questions of taxation and representation or the other 
issues which slowly divided the self-proclaimed whigs from the so- 
called tones. Those pieces continued to illuminate the thinking of the 
reading public, but a considerable number of rebel7 writers began to
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construct a new reality for the reading public, a new reality designed 
to draw the reader into the fold of the convinced rebels, and at the 
same time to totally discredit the position of the ideological enemy, 
the tories.8
The goal of the rebel campaign in New Hampshire was the 
reformation of provincial society into a new and significantly 
different one than had existed prior to the middle of 1775. To 
accomplish that end the rebels created a new government the 
legitimacy of which rested on the relatively new and un tried  
Enlightenment concept of popular sovereignty, the idea that the 
power to rule was derived from the consent of the ruled. Once a new 
government, however unstable at first, was in place, it became 
possible for the rebels to utilize both of the possible methods of 
political persuasion: discourse and force.9
7Throughout the struggle, the rebel writers referred to themselves 
consistently as whigs. Even the word "patriot" is noticeably absent. Now to 
suddenly shift our terms and refer to the rebel writers as whigs seemed to be 
too confusing, but to continue to use the term rebel when referring to the 
whig writers seemed less so, even should someone wish to delve further into 
the original sources and find the word whig used almost exclusively when 
referring to the rebel faction. For the purpose of clarity, then, I will 
continue to use the term rebel when referring to the leaders of the radical 
faction or the usurped government, and when referring to the writers who 
adopted the appellation whig .
8This strategy is being replicated in modem America according to Hunter, 
Culture Wars. Hunter describes the strategy of adversaries engaged in a 
discursive struggle, arguing that two forms of argument are used: positive 
and negative. "The positive face of moral conflict is expressed through
constructive moral reasoning and debate the negative face of moral
conflict [is] the deliberate, systematic effort to discredit the opposition." 
p. 136.
9Iincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society, p. 3. "Together, discourse 
and force are the chief means whereby social borders, hierarchies, 
institutional formations, and habituated patterns of behavior are both 
maintained and modified." Force "is regularly employed by those who hold 
official power to compel obedience and suppress deviance."
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We have already seen how the rebels employed force or the 
threat of force to achieve their ends where the loyalists were 
concerned. That threat of force overshadowed all of the residents of 
the province, not only loyalists. The example of mobbed or beaten 
loyalists must surely have had some effect on the majority of men 
and women who were unsure which way the conflict would go and 
thus had not committed to either side. But the rebels needed 
commitment from the majority in order for the rebellion to succeed. 
Money had to be raised, men had to be enlisted, and supplies had to 
be gathered. The rebel writers who filled the friendly majority of 
newspapers in the colonies were aware that a great deal of 
convincing needed to be done.
Toward that end, the rebel writers began to create a new myth, 
a myth which could be used simultaneously to paint the enemy both 
foreign and domestic in a totally unfavorable light, and at the same 
time elevate the patriotic whigs to nearly legendary status in the 
minds of the readers. Bruce Lincoln defines this kind of myth as "a 
form of meta-language in which preexisting signs are appropriated 
and stripped of their original context, history, and signification only 
to be infused with new and mystificatory conceptual content of 
particular use to the bourgeoisie. Myth, Barthes argued, 'has the task 
of giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making 
contingency appear eternal.'”10 In other words, the whig/rebels 
created a new way of looking at the present by adopting a special 
way of viewing the past. The whig view of history, prominent for
10Lincoln, Discourse, p. 5.
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decades in the court/country controversy in England was 
rehabilitated and appropriated by American writers with an added 
twist, the ministry and parliament were now so corrupt that they too 
were subverting the ancient constitution and depriving the 
Americans of their rights and liberties. The rebel writers also created 
the myth of the legendary ancestors, the people who had originally 
colonized the province and given for all posterity their example of 
heroic stature to the present generation to follow; "Brothers! Let us 
think of our heroic ancestors who fought and bled and died for this 
country. Let us think of our aged fathers and mothers, think of our 
wives and children, let us look forward to posterity ... in this great 
day of conquest."11 The myths perpetuated by the rebel writers had 
to be powerful constructs which provided a new reality agreeable 
and persuasive to their audience.12
The positive discursive style of the rebels was full of language 
designed to convey a sense of greatness to their cause. The phrase so 
often used was "glorious cause" but the entire body of their work 
was infused with descriptive phrases which stressed the 
righteousness of the rebellion, the virtue of the rebels and the 
historical continuity with the great heroes of the past from the Bible 
to English champions of liberty and justice. No sacrifice was too great, 
and everyone in the province must be in agreement, they alleged: "it
11 New Hampshire Gazette, May 20, 1774. An American.
12Uncoln, Discourse, p. 24. According to Lincoln, myths are "that small class
of stories that possess both credibility and authority a narrative possessed
of authority is one for which successful claims are made not only to the 
status of truth, but what is more to the status of paradigmatic truth."
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appears to be the general sentiment that the man is unworthy the 
name of an English American who would hesitate one moment to 
prefer death to the slavish subjection demanded by the ministry and 
parliament of Great Britain."13 Already in 1774 the whig/rebels were 
preparing their audience for the possibility of war.
The moderates and future loyalists were unprepared for what 
would come their way.14 In August of 1774 Brutus would write to 
the public urging caution, prudence, and unity. He also advised 
careful constitutional means to solve the problems between the 
colonies and great Britain.15 But the lonely voice of Brutus was 
drowned in the sea of rebel writers which filled the pages of the New 
Hampshire Gazette, the only newspaper in the province since its 
founding in 1756. Throughout the latter half of 1774 and into 1775 
Daniel Fowle, the printer, gathered articles from other colonies and 
from English papers, the vast majority of which took the same 
position.16 The ministry was bent on subjugating the colonies, 
depriving the colonists of their rights as Englishmen, and bleeding 
them dry of their property.
13New Hampshire Gazette, June 2, 1774. Anonymous.
14Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783. 
Chapel Hill, NC: 1941. p. 249.
15New Hampshire Gazette, August 12, 1774. Brutus. Reprinted from a 
Philadelphia newspaper.
16Fowle did print the series of letters by Daniel Leonard under the pseudonym 
"Massachusettensis," as well as John Adams' replies as "Novanglus." As a 
result of his seeming neutrality, Fowle was haled before the assembly and 
admonished for his lack of patriotic zeal. See Bernard Bailyn and John B. 
Hench, eds., The Press and the American Revolution. Boston: 1981. p. 35.
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The Gazette was also the source for news, and the type Fowle 
chose to print was calculated to assist the rebel cause. He printed 
detailed accounts of the doings of the provincial congress as well as 
the news from the continental congress in Philadelphia. Fowle also 
reported rumors of carpenters recruited from New Hampshire being 
sent to Boston to build barracks for the occupation troops, a report 
which led to the arrest and consequent ritual confession of Nicholas 
Austin as discussed previously. In a letter to the paper the 
Portsmouth committee stated "That it is our opinion these men who 
have been so base to undertake as artificers (and thereby reflecting 
not only on their respective town but the province in general) should 
be considered as enemies to our liberties, and should not be received 
at their return, as members worthy of society."17
Fowle also chose to print excerpts of letters received by private 
individuals from overseas or from other colonies as sources of news 
or inspiration. One, a letter from a man in New York to a friend in 
Edinburgh, stated that America would resist the invasion of British 
troops by converting them into free American landowners living like 
princes.18 Another letter from London bolstered the American 
argument concerning taxation, the correspondent admitting that "we 
have no more right to tax the Americans, unless through the medium 
of their representatives, than we have to tax the Irish." w It was 
important that the general public be encouraged to resist the threat
17New Hampshire Gazette  ^October 28, 1774.
18 New Hampshire Gazette, October 21, 1774.
New Hampshire Gazette, October 28, 1774.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
208
of retaliation for their resistance to royal authority, and for the 
people to believe that they were not alone in their struggle against 
tyranny. At least in 1774 the rebel party line contended that the 
people of Great Britain were sympathetic to the American cause.
Toward that end Daniel Fowle found a piece in the London 
Public Ledger dated November 1774, an open letter addressed to 
Lord North. In it, Gracchus stated "I would, my lord, I could my 
countrymen from the state of inactivity and corruption in which they 
are enthralled, could they be prevailed on to join vigorously in 
opposition with their brethren in America, they would soon 
overthrow their oppressors, send you to a scaffold, and restore the 
almost forgotten liberties of their country. But this is not, alas, to be 
expected, Englishmen seem to have lost all sense of pub lic  
virtue....our descendents shall gratefully acknowledge that the 
liberties of England were preserved in America."20
Inspired as they were by words like those, the inhabitants of 
Portsmouth and the province in general had to be exhorted to adopt 
a new, more rigorous way of life. The Portsmouth town meeting, in 
an attempt to exert civil control in December of 1774, created a 
committee to assume executive powers and resolved "that the town 
bear testimony against the common practice of playing at billiards 
and cards and also that they disapprove of every other species of 
gaming and dissipation, recommending industry and frugality to the 
inhabitants as more becoming under the present grievous
20New Hampshire Gazette, December 23,1774.
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oppressions and embarrassments of this town and continent."21 The 
resolve was aimed at the governor and his friends, predominantly 
Anglican, who saw no great sin in engaging in games and frivolity. 
The rebels, however, consciously embraced the puritan heritage of 
the founders of the New England colonies and their antipathy 
towards such popish extravagances.
At the same time another incident occurred which bears some 
consideration. On the face of it, the first letter from Stephen 
Boardman seemed to be merely an attack on a loyalist. Hardly an 
apology for his hand in the affair, Boardman wrote to explain a 
situation which must have attracted some attention and aroused 
concern among the people of Portsmouth and the region in general. 
Boardman recounted that William Pottle of Stratham had entered the 
town on business and that as he approached the state house, a group 
of around one hundred men were gathered there. At that point 
someone had shouted "There is a Tory...there is an enemy to his 
country....see how he looks...behold him, how he looks!" The writer, 
Boardman must have been a member of the crowd, since he added 
"Upon this, knowing the said Pottle had conducted in a manner 
inimical to his country, and thinking this a suitable time to intimidate 
and humble him, I said 'Gentlemen this villain has appeared an open 
enemy of his country.'" The crowd then advanced on Pottle and 
physically assaulted him. How badly Pottle was handled is nowhere 
made clear. Boardman concluded his say by adding "though I abhor 
all illegal mobs and assemblies and would have no man's person or
21 New Hampshire Gazette, December 16, 1774.
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property injured I think everyone who is a friend to America is in 
duty bound to condemn such a man and have no connection or 
dealings with him 'till repentance and reformation entitle him to 
forgiveness."22
Boardman1 s letter elicited a  pair of responses within a couple of 
weeks. The first was a lengthy letter co n d em n in g all mob actions of 
the kind Boardman seemed so proud:
At a time when the reins of government are evidently 
slackened, when the sacred name of liberty is so 
villainously prostituted to the most licentious purposes, 
when nothing more is wanting to pull down the 
ungovernable rage of a furious mob on the head of an 
honest and worthy citizen than for some malicious 
disappointed wretch falsely to represent him as an 
enemy to the constitutional rights of his country, I say, at 
such a time as this the public ought to be exceedingly 
cautious how they listen to any reports that may in the 
least tend to inflame the minds of the people against any 
person whatever, whether these reports and insinuations 
come dressed up in the sly garb of a Horse Jockey, the 
hypocritical cant of a Saint, or the still more detested 
authority of a Trading Justice, they are equally despicable 
and unworthy of notice. Every honest, well-disposed man 
is to be respected especially such as have faithfully 
served their country in public stations and employments 
and even such of these as have been so unfortunate as 
not to have had the advantages of education, are much 
more to be honored and valued than some who with all 
their boasted literature will remain stupid puppies to 
their life's end.23
22New Hampshire Gazette, December 30, 1774.
22 New Hampshire Gazette, January 20, 1775.
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The letter, signed "A Lover of Peace,” was from Greenland and 
appeared in the same number of the Gazette as William Pottle's own 
reply. Though some of "A Lover's" allusions might be difficult to 
trace, his intent is clear, not so much to defend Pottle individually, 
but to attack the rebel tendency to accuse individuals of inimical acts 
without any clear or evidential basis, and without any pretence at 
due process. The signs were dear to that writer that such continued 
behavior would be terribly injurious, not only to real loyalists, but to 
others, innocent of any political convictions, who could be publicly 
attainted and attacked with potentially serious consequences. Pottle 
himself began by asking, "See Reader, what lengths enthusiastical 
zeal may lead a man under the the notion of duty." He then listed 
and denied three charges that had been levelled against him, 
including holding a mock meeting in competition with an important 
local meeting. Pottle then suggested that Boardman was really 
motivated by personal animosity, and asserted strongly that a 
deacon (Pottle chose to ignore Boardman's identification of himself as 
a member of the committee of inspection, and rather pointed out that 
Boardman was a deacon of the church in Stratham) ought to behave 
in a much more Christian manner toward others.
Boardman replied within a month, raving that Pottle was an 
enemy to his country and that there was no truth to the idea that he 
(Boardman) held some grudge concerning his seat as deacon.24 
Pottle's response to this was a month in coming but to the point. 
Boardman, he said, was unchristian and jealous. He lied when he
24New Hampshire Gazette, February 17, 1775.
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suggested that Pottle's father had attempted to oust him from the 
deacon's place, and that the real root of his attack had n o th in g to do 
with Pottle's own conduct, there being nothing there for which he 
should be remonstrated, but that Boardman was seeking petty 
vengeance because of a land dispute some time in the past which 
Pottle had won through arbitration.25
Public disputes such as the Boardman-Pottle battle served a 
purpose in the discursive arena of the cultural clash in New 
Hampshire. From the rebel perspective, the tale of Pottle's fate at the 
hands of the Portsmouth mob served as a warning to others to 
amend their behavior or face a similar fate. Pottle's responses to 
Boardman's accusations were the efforts of an individual to defend 
himself personally. To the rebels those letters were nothing but the 
squirming protestations of a traitor. To the loyalists they were the 
reasonable explanations of a man falsely accused of a crime which 
was no crime. The entire situation pointed up one of the principal 
contentions of loyalist discourse, that the attacks on individuals as 
enemies of liberty really had nothing to do with the current political 
crisis, but rather emanated from personal enmity and petty grudges 
that small and dangerous men could now air out by falsely accusing 
any old foe and thereby reaping vengeance for old scores real or 
imagined. This sort of public allegation also served another purpose 
in the rebel strategy. By publishing attacks on loyalists, either 
specific or general, they hoped to elicit responses which would
25New Hampshire Gazette, March 31, 1775.
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render the identity and counsels of the enemy open to public 
scrutiny.
Not every attempt to bait a response was successful. Early in 
February of 1775 another letter came to Fowle's hand which he 
immediately printed. Addressed to "Master Printer...." it was the first 
piece of rebel writing in the province to attack loyalists as a  group. 
The letter affected the style of a  poor farmer:
A man of our town m s  down to the Banke last week with 
butter, when he got home we all crowded about him to 
hear the news. He told us as how the great ones at the 
Banke were almost frightened out of their wits and had 
to get a great long paper to prevent their being killed and 
having their throats cut. It seems that they are afeared 
that the town folks are all run mad and going to kill them 
because they aren't mad too. Master Printer, pray tell us 
in your next news what there is in the paper. I think he 
called it asushashun and that they promised to shoot 
anybody that would not let them sell tea, play cards and 
dice the devil's device, and do anything else they were a 
mind to. The man said that one of them told him that it 
was a story and a lie trumped up by the sons of liberty to 
cast a slur on the tories and that was nothing more than 
to keep them safe this winter and prevent their being 
hanged in the spring as all the sons of liberty would be 
when the King' forces came over. Now pray Mr. Printer, 
do let the paper be published that we may know all 
about it for we suspect it is all a lie told by our neighbor 
us, for the man who brought the news is a comical fellow 
and will make no bones to tell a fib to make fun or 
mischief either.26
26New Hampshire Gazette, February 3, 1775. The text of the Association was 
finally printed in the number for March 31, 1775 but no great issue was made 
of it at that time.
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The letter, signed Plowgogger, referred to the Oath of 
Association taken by the prominent men of Wentworth's circle and 
their chief supporters in the Portsmouth area. The signers even at 
the time must have known the Association would have a n  
inflammatory effect on the local mob, though no serious disruptions 
accompanied this rebel attempt to stir up even more mob animosity 
toward the loyalists. In February Wentworth was still governor, the 
pretence of legitimacy still adhered to his acts and those of the 
council, and his appointed officials and magistrates still in  theory 
constituted the only legitimate authority in the province. Of course 
Wentworth had declared the province to be in rebellion in December, 
and the fact of the matter was that the militia was firmly in rebel 
control. This control was so firm that the existing officers remained 
in command of their men, and were apparently engaged in recruiting 
even more men to stand ready in case the British should send troops 
to the province. In Durham, Major John Sullivan was engaged in 
weekly training exercises with a new militia company. In March he 
wrote to the Gazette to respond to public criticism of those exercises 
as being somehow illegal. Sullivan wrote that the group was merely a 
training company and denied that any illegal assembly was taking 
place. The following week a writer styling himself Monitor replied to 
Sullivan's disingenuous letter flatly stating that militia officers must 
be appointed by writ of the King through the royal governor. Monitor 
also remarked that the exercises in Durham were extremely 
wasteful, that the time expended by the men in such fruitless 
training ought to be better spent in productive work. What if, 
Monitor wondered, all of the towns began to follow Sullivan's model
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in Durham, and spent one day each week in such a wasteful fashion. 
Imagine the cost to the economy of the province. Monitor concluded 
with a warning that "this extraordinary spirit to acquire the use of 
arms at a juncture when the noise of civil discord begins to roar in 
our neighborhood marks strongly a disposition to employ our arms 
against the power and authority we ought to support and defend, 
every appearance of which should be avoided with the utmost 
caution and circumspection."27
Monitor wrote in typical loyalist style and language. He spoke 
in the plural, assuming that he and the other loyalists were and 
would remain a part of the larger community. Monitor also assumed 
that there remained a reverence for duly constituted authority and 
law. This was the central mistake of loyalists throughout the 
provinces at that point in the conflict. The loyalists believed that the 
rebel faction was extremely small. They had no conception as yet 
that so few men could sway the minds of the majority, and they 
were only just beginning to realize just how much control the rebels 
had acquired of the media of the time, newspapers and printed 
matter in general. The loyalists also underestimated the efficiency of 
mob action, especially when focused on specific loyalist targets such 
as printers. Finally the loyalists misjudged the amount of effort that 
the ministry was willing or able to expend in order to put down a 
rebellion quickly. Much of the caution suggested in loyalist pieces at 
the time stemmed from the belief that swift and sure reaction would 
come from England in response to the actions of the rebel minority.
27New Hampshire Gazette, March 10, 1775 and March 17,1775.
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They were warning their neighbors not to get caught up in rebellious 
activities, lest they give the appearance that they too were in 
rebellion against the proper and legitimate government. The loyalist 
discourse, especially that portion of it which appeared in public in 
New Hampshire during this period relied almost exclusively on 
reason and rational appeal to the public's good sense. The loyalist 
writers based most of what they argued on the assumption that 
everyone understood and accepted the English constitution as the 
guiding document by which government gained its authority. The 
idea did not occur to loyalist writers that the basis of legitimate 
government could be changed. Thus all of their appeals were based 
on the given principle that lawful authority rested with the governor, 
council, and the magistrates appointed by that agency, and that any 
interference with, or other denial of that legitimacy was de facto 
illegal.
Sullivan replied by calling Monitor's letter the "production of a 
distempered brain." He mocked Monitor's concerns over the cost of 
training days by wondering if perhaps the cost of Sunday 
observances ought to be kept track of as well. The derisive tone of 
Sullivan's reply was typical of rebel rhetoric. What they could not 
refute with fact, they ridiculed. The rebel writers relied on emotion 
and abstract language to move their audiences. When attacked they 
responded with emotional appeals to righteousness. Rare was the 
attempt to display clever irony such as that which appeared in the 
same number of the Gazette as the above mentioned Sullivan letter. 
Daniel Fowle chose that last number in March to insert the text of the 
loyalist association along with a commentary attributed to Spectator,
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a possible reference to the whig paper of that name popular in 
England earlier in the century but still widely read and reprinted in 
the colonies. This was not Spectator's first appearance and he had 
already seen the text prior to its publication. Yet he was responding 
to the text as it appeared to the general public for the first time.28 He 
wondered what laws the association referred to and asked its 
subscribers whether they meant to support province laws or all laws, 
specifically the acts of parliament which seemed to be the source of 
the recent political struggle. If they meant to support those 
particular laws, then did they mean to do so by way of another mob, 
one just as illegal as those which they alleged that they had formed 
their association to defend against?29
No reply was forthcoming from loyalist pens until the column 
by Candidus in the middle of April. This was not his first venture 
into the rhetorical fray. In February he had taken up the loyalist 
litany of caution. Candidus warned that the trade of the province 
would be curtailed and the freedoms at hand would be diminished 
with the arrival of troops in town. He added also that the people 
seemed "too unconsiderate and precipitate, being hurried by the 
violence of heated passions." Once again a loyalist writer attacked the 
emotional basis of the rebellion, the haste in which it was embraced 
by those who did not stop to think things through. Spectator
28Bther Spectator was Daniel Fowle himself, a close associate that Fowle could 
rely on, or a rebel writer closely associated to the leadership of the faction, 
entrusted with an advance copy of the text, and instructed to attack it with 
tact and wit.
29New Hampshire Gazette, March 31, 1775.
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conduded by suggesting the shallow character of the devotion of the 
mob, or of those who controlled it, alleging that the faction was 
manipulating men for their own ends: "they too often leave the 
subject in controversy and reek their vengeance for private injuries 
under the false pretext of the cause of liberty, a cause too glorious, 
too important to be sullied by such evasive, u n m an ly  principles."30
Once again in April Candidus worried about America's ability to 
withstand an invasion. He fully agreed with the principal position of 
the colonies: "for my own part I must own the idea of taxation 
without representation appears to me incompatible with the British 
Constitution." Yet he could not agree with the extraordinary acts of 
resistance advocated by the rebel faction. And as if invasion were 
not a great enough threat that should induce all reasonable men to 
listen to the "advice and wisdom of the coolest and most considerate 
men among us," Candidus introduced the idea that sectional 
differences might have yet another serious impact on the province. 
Candidus suggested that the southern colonies might see a rebellion 
in New England as an opportunity to seize control of the merchant 
trade so important to the northern economy.31
30New Hampshire Gazette, February 17, 1775.
31 New Hampshire Gazette, April 14, 1775. At about the time this article by 
Candidus was printed, a man named David Zubly, Jr. was a committeeman in 
Savannah, Georgia. According to his own words he was at that time "inimical 
to Great Britain" and a captain in the rebel militia. His ideas mirrored those 
of Candidus, as he added "He thought that Great Britain had no right to tax 
America, but he did not approve oif opposition by force of arms, neither did 
he wish for independence." The Georgia planter was eventually to confirm 
his loyalism by departing his home and joining the refugees in Nova Scotia. 
Loyalist Claims, David Zubly, Jr., vol. XIII, p. 113.
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But all of Candidus' caution and conspiracy theories were swept 
away in the excitement which followed the news in the next number 
of the Gazette. The exchange of fire between regulars and militiamen 
in Lexington and Concord, and the subsequent hasty retreat under 
fire by the British force, galvanized the rebel movement everywhere, 
not least in New Hampshire. The time for lofty argument was over. 
The letters of Daniel Leonard as Massachusettensis and the 
contrapuntal Novanglus letters by John Adams stopped running in 
the Gazette. Michaiah wrote an open letter to George El cautioning 
the king to show concern for his provinces, and suggesting that the 
king was listening to evil counsellors who would convince him to sign 
a death warrant for three million of his subjects. Michaiah warned 
the king that his eternal soul was in grave danger.32
Despite the continued presence of the governor the Portsmouth 
town meeting voted to give full discretionary power to "the 
committee." In addition it decided that "any inhabitants of this town 
who shall be obnoxious shall be only accountable to the committee 
for their conduct." The courts were closed and the extra-legal organs 
of a rebel junta were in control.
For several months the newspaper was dominated by news 
from other cities. But the content of that news served the purposes of 
the rebels just as well as continued propaganda. There were weekly
32New Hampshire Gazette, April 28, 1775. See also the Book of Micah in the Old 
Testament. Micah the prophet was warning his readers of the errors of their 
ways and suggesting the promise of a future state in which the righteous 
would achieve great things. Micah the prophet was also concerned with 
internal enemies: "For the son dishonoureth the father, the daughter riseth 
up against her mother, the daughter in law against her mother in law; a 
man's enemies are the men of his own house." Micah 7:6.
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accounts of the proceedings of the continental congress as well as 
news from the rebel camp surrounding Boston. Parliamentary debate 
over the situation in America was printed especially those portions 
critical of ministerial policy. In the background the committee was 
doing its job, hunting down suspected loyalists and forcing them to 
publicly acknowledge their crimes. Like the public humiliation of 
Nicholas Austin discussed above, these public recantations were an 
attempt by the rebel faction to incorporate common religious 
symbols and ritual into the vernacular of rebellion. In May of 1775 
the first three published apologies appeared in the New Hampshire 
Gazette. Signed by P. Bailey, Thomas Auchincloss,33 and James Me 
Master, the three pieces differed in precise wording but followed a 
distinct pattern. First, an apology for past words or actions 
(acknowledgment of a sinful nature), which transgressions had 
"proved of great disadvantage to this town and the continent in 
general." Then followed a profession of faith and fidelity in which 
each convert pledged to "risk my life and interest in defense of the 
constitutional privileges of this continent."34 Such public conversions 
were more likely found transpiring at the request of the committees 
while still in the inquiry phase. No further examples appeared in the 
pages of the Gazette after that of Ebenezer Loverin in June. It may be 
that enforcement procedures changed inside the committee, or that 
the majority of loyalists were keeping a very low profile. At least
33Thomas Auchincloss died in a shipwreck during the passage from New York 
to Halifax. His widow, Mary, was a claimant. The record of the outcome of her 
memorial was lost. NH Claims, vol. I, p. 116.
34New Hampshire Gazette, May 26, 1775.
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two of the first three penitents became claims filers after the war. Or 
the cost may have deprived the act of its ritual significance. 
Immediately below the first three confessions appeared the 
following: "As it is likely there will be a number of confessions, 
recantations, etc. it is expected at least that one dollar accompany 
each confession etc. as it will be an evidence of their sincerity." Fowle 
saw an opportunity to augment his flagging revenues at the expense 
of what the printer saw as a steady flow of penitents.35 He was 
certainly convinced that a considerable number of confessions would 
be forthcoming, though two weeks later he was announcing the 
probable cessation of the paper due to a shortage of paper and the 
poor payment habits of his subscribers.
The rebel mythmakers continued their attempt to create a 
sense of righteousness among the people they hoped to count as 
among their number. "An American" suggested that recent events 
proved that God was on America's side and that ultimate victory was 
at hand.36 The rebel writers also began to create another myth, a 
counterweight to the glorious crusade of the liberty-loving 
Americans. They began to attack the image of Great Britain, its 
inhabitants, rulers, and supporters in America. The negative face of 
discourse discussed by James Hunter included derision, ridicule, and 
the attempt to totally discredit the opposition with personal attacks 
and accusations of all sorts of crimes. The belief that anyone who was
35For more on the concept of printers accepting payment by the piece for the 
printing of unusual or controversial topics see Charles E Clark, The Public 
Prints. New York: 1994.
36New Hampshire Gazette, July 11,1775.
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not with us was against us (to paraphrase) became the operative 
assumption. Americanus began the campaign by suggesting that 
anyone who opposed the cause or did it any harm ought to "quit the 
country and his personal estate seized for so much as may be 
thought his proportion of the public debt, and if found insufficient 
then his real estate to be incumbent for the same."37 This demand for 
the confiscation of loyalist property came at a time when the royal 
governor still awaited succor in Fort William and Mary, though also 
at a time when the debate over inflation was just beginning.38 It was 
also a time when any rash remark could accomplish two things 
quickly, land its speaker in a great deal of trouble, and supply the 
rebel propagandists a perfect example of the evil which lurked in the 
heart of every "tory." Matthew Christian of Antigua, who had taken 
refuge aboard HMS Scarborough which was anchored off the Fort, 
allegedly wished "the small pox in all our borders and especially in 
the damned rebel army ’round Boston." Christian, safe aboard a
37New Hampshire Gazette, August, 1, 1775.
38Though that discussion has little to do with our subject, it seems a word must 
be said here. Beginning with a letter signed A Farmer on 1 August, 1775 a 
steadily growing stream of pieces appeared discussing the problem of rising 
prices. This would continue well into the war, trickling to a stop only after 
the Continental Congress and the state assemblies passed extensive laws 
regulating prices. The divide was not between consumers and merchants so 
much as it was country farmers and town merchants. The farmers for the 
most part blamed merchants for engrossing finished goods, charging 
exorbitant prices compared to the prices that the farmers could get for their 
raw produce. The merchants wrote back arguing that the costs of goods 
coming into the country were inflated before arrival due to British 
depredations on merchant ships and on the trade with other neutral states. 
The farmers did not accept that and continued to blame merchants as disloyal 
for their pricing practices, though the merchants fired back accusing the 
farmers of overcharging for their crops as well.
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British warship was untouchable, but the committee of Portsmouth 
voted to exile him from all ports "in the known world."39
The paper was quiet through August, fa ilin g even to mention 
Wentworth's departure during that month. September's numbers 
contained notices of the closing of the courts for a  year and the text 
of Wentworth's proclamation dissolving the assembly made hastily 
from the shores of Gosport, Star Island, one of the Isles of Shoals. In 
mid-October a notice was published of a d in n er held by "a select 
company of gentlemen, all true friends of America." This gathering 
dined on turtle and raised a considerable number of toasts to various 
patriotic causes including "may every noble whig in America be 
always provided with good turtle, and the tories sent to sea in the 
shells."40
In the middle of 1776 Benjamin Dearborn temporarily took 
over the printing of the New Hampshire Gazette in Portsmouth. 
Daniel Fowle had complained that he was tiring of the job in 1775 
after nineteen years and it appears he turned the paper over to 
Dearborn. Little changed editorially or visually. Dearborn even 
continued to number the paper from its original publication date in 
1756. He did append the title A Freeman’s Journal to the nameplate. 
Dearborn also stepped up the number of opinion pieces in the paper, 
specifically those relating to the political situation, especially as 
compared to Fowle's last year of publication. One of those first was a
39New Hampshire Gazette, August 8, 1775. Exactly how that was to be 
accomplished is unclear, though the plan did call for letters to be sent to 
officials throughout the area with which Portsmouth could correspond.
40New Hampshire Gazette, October 17,1775
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scathing attack on loyalists reprinted from the Providence Gazette. 
The authors, Amicus Patriae and Filius Libertatis desired that the 
government "seize and confine within the narrow circuit of a jail or 
prison the sons of this infernal monster." They alleged that "as our 
saviour was betrayed by one of his disciples, so is our country by her 
pretended friends." Their central theme included the idea that the 
wealthy were not to be trusted either because they did not support 
liberty or because they put personal interest before the general 
good.41 The same number saw the first of many lengthy pieces 
signed as Orthodoxus. That writer felt compelled in his first piece to 
describe in extraordinary detail the "orthodox political faith of a true 
whig." Orthodoxus continued to spew forth his windy political tracts 
for months. In June, A Watchman advised that readers ought not 
listen to tories who advise caution, adding that they had been 
advocating such all along only seeking to delay or destroy liberty. Of 
course the intent of A Watchman was to prepare the support for the 
imminent break with Great Britain even then still being debated in 
Philadelphia. The residents of New Hampshire were well aware of 
the doings of the congress, and as discussed previously, they were 
not all convinced that independence was such a great idea.42
Orthodoxus continued his weekly pieces in support of 
independence and the liberty of America through the month of July, 
ending the month with another piece of negative propaganda. On July 
27 Orthodoxus described the British as "our cruel oppressors ...who
41 New Hampshire Gazette, June 8,1776.
New Hampshire Gazette, June 29, 1776.
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come armed with fire and sword to waste and destroy our country 
robbing us of our lives, exposing to the greatest danger and distress 
men, women, and children, and cowardly butchering even the 
helpless and unarmed." This attack was followed the next week by 
Amicus Reipublica who claimed that "America...is attacked by 
unnatural enemies without and still more wicked wretches within 
who are aiming to destroy her, may they fall into those very pits 
themselves they have digged for her and like Haman be hanged on 
the very gallows they have erected for others."43
Those two pieces and another in January of 1777 typify the 
invective used by the rebel writers to create an image, an identity in 
the minds of their readers. An Enemy to Tories contended that "there 
are many such shameful wretches among us at this late hour that 
would sell their God, their country, their wives, their children, and all 
that is near and dear to them." The writers had a dual purpose, first 
to totally destroy the loyalists in the eyes of their neighbors by 
implicitly connecting them with the British enemy. The second goal 
was to rid the land of the scourge of enemies within: "Upon the 
whole, what ought to be done in order to rid us of such vermin?
 provide some kind of a bark and after putting on board some
provisions, set them adrift and make it death for any of them ever to 
land on any part of the American shore that is inhabited by free 
men."44
43New Hampshire Gazette, August 3, 1776.
**New Hampshire Gazette, January 14, 1777.
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The language of the whig/rebels is complex and full of 
resonances with other places and times. Their objective was to make 
of the British a race of monsters, so infernal and frightening that 
there could be no hope of compromise. In late 1776 and 1777 the 
rebel cause was not as sure as the rebel leaders would have liked it 
to be. A sizable number of the inhabitants of the province were as 
yet unhappy with the precipitous nature of the declaration of 
independence, and many were equally unhappy with the state of 
provincial government. Some of the same arguments used against 
John Wentworth in the matter of extending representation to towns 
were still being used to attack the rebel assembly. In response, the 
rebel writers were trying diligently to create an enemy so fearsome 
it would drive the divisive issues right out of the minds of their 
readers. While Gage and Burgoyne issued proclamations and pardons 
to those who would listen and return to their loyalty to the crown, 
the rebels related the loyalists to devils incarnate.
The passions of the readers were inflamed by continually 
printing news pieces such as "An Account of the Inhumane Cruelties 
to Prisoners in New York," which told of starvation and disease, of 
torture and the introduction of the small pox by deliberate act.45 
The trend continued through 1777 and 1778. The refrain became 
familiar as the victory at Saratoga brought renewed confidence and 
commissioners from the king seeking to make an early peace without 
the grant of independence. But it was too late for such as that, and 
too late for reconciliation with the loyalists as far as General
45New Hampshire Gazette, March 22, 1777.
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Livingston was concerned. Writing to the continental congress in 
response to the suggested act offering pardon and reconciliation to 
the loyalists, Livingston lamented "Alas, how many lives had been 
saved and what scene of inexpressible misery prevented had we 
from the beginning treated our bosom traitors with proper severity 
and inflicted the law of retaliation upon an enemy too savage to be 
humanized by any other argument" He continued calling the loyalists 
"a race of murderers before unequalled" who "waged an infernal war 
against their dearest connections." Furthermore, they were "apostates 
from reason....whose very presence among the genuine sons of 
freedom would seem as unnatural as that of Satan among the sons of 
God."46 Livingston's words might well be understood since in New 
York the war between loyalists and rebels had become as savage a 
civil war as had ever been fought. But the inclusion of this piece in 
the New Hampshire Gazette, now back in the hands of its founder 
Daniel Fowle, must have had some other reason than a need to fill 
space.
The Gazette was by then reflecting a distinct sense of optimism. 
Most of the news from the war front was good, especially that 
surrounding the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga. Problems still 
remained, however, particularly problems involving money. The 
battle still raged between shopkeepers and farmers over who was 
raising prices faster, and why. Counterfeiting was having a serious 
effect on the provincial and continental currency, a crime that was 
rightly or not attributed primarily to loyalists. In fact the loyalists
46New Hampshire Gazette, July 7, 1778.
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were being blamed for the entire war: "to our internal foes are we 
indebted in a great measure for the present war, the immense 
expense incurred and the devastation, ravage, and ruin suffered by 
us...”47 The rebel writers were attempting to convince the populace 
that no war would have ensued had it not been for the loyalists. The 
thrust of that contention arose from the idea that it was a loyalist 
plea for the protection of their interest that impelled George HI to 
embark on war in the first place. By the end of the war that idea was 
prevalent. As late as 1781, just three weeks after the news of 
Yorktown had arrived in New Hampshire, a satirical piece was 
printed purporting to be a conversation between Prince William 
Henry and Sir Henry Clinton. The Prince, upon being told of the real 
situation in America cried "Damn the loyalists, all this comes from 
listening to their tales. They teased my father into this cursed war. I 
wish he may hang Galloway at the yard arm of a seventy-four....I will 
be revenged on your vile loyalists who have divided the British 
empire and brought this ruin upon my father's family."48
The rebels' intentions were multiple. First, in 1777, the rebels 
were yet afraid of invasion, even in New Hampshire. The Canadian 
threat seemed quite real especially as Burgoyne approached the 
province through upper New York. Victories at Bennington and 
Saratoga went a long way to assuage those fears. At that point a 
secondary objective came into focus, the conversion of loyalist 
property into funds the province desperately needed. To accomplish
47New Hampshire Gazette, August 23, 1777.
48New Hampshire Gazette, November 17, 1781.
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that, the enemy needed to be clearly identified and made to look as 
though he were a minion of the devil himself. The reports of loyalist 
and British atrocities from the other colonies provided the only clear 
means of demonstrating the danger from within to which even New 
Hampshire might fall prey. Despite the successes of 1777 the rebels 
needed the apparition of "Britons, Hessians, Savages, and more 
savage tories."49 That was especially true in New Hampshire where a 
substantial body of the unconverted remained fairly unmolested and 
residing in Portsmouth. The state of affairs there was, from the 
perspective of one writer, terribly dangerous. M' Namora wrote that 
"It's astonishing to see daily the insults offered by the Tories and 
unnoticed by the Committee." Namora alleged that the loyalists had a 
sophisticated network of intelligence agents who gathered reports for 
the British in New York, and were able to learn of the outcomes of 
battles elsewhere even before the rebel authorities. Thus these tories 
were able to disappoint and delude the public by making claims of 
British victories, exaggerating rebel losses and minimizing their 
victories. Namora continued that these traitors continued to have 
dinners and drink toasts and that they gave each other secret signs 
in the streets by eye contact and head nods, and that something 
ought to be done about i t 50
A reply appeared the following week. That Benjamin Dearborn 
had the courage to print it is attributable to the fact that it came at a 
time when the outcome of the conflict was still seriously in doubt,
49New Hampshire Gazette, May 25, 1779.
50New Hampshire Gazette, September 21, 1776.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
230
and to the fact that the writer appealed to his pride as an 
"unprejudiced impartial printer." Signed, I Am What You Will, the 
loyalist writer mocked Namora's paranoia:
Well done Namora, you talk sense, you preach liberty, 
real genuine liberty, downright alamode liberty, by God. I 
must observe however that I was at first a good deal 
alarmed on discovering your design of abolishing looks 
and nods, those dear conveyors of our secret m ea n in g, 
but when I found you only meant significant ones, and 
that out of the abundance of your great goodness and 
im partiality you had confined it to tories, I was 
immediately reconciled to it and discovered by the help 
of certain political microscopic glasses, that it tended to 
the public good....'Tis a disgrace to the state to allow such 
significant looks and nods and if the legislative body of 
these states have not in their great wisdom already  
provided a punishment adequate to the diabolical nature 
of so black a crime (which hardly admits of a doubt) I 
think the honorable committee of this town, if they desire 
that the trumpet of fame should sound their praises to 
after ages cannot have a fairer opportunity of 
immortalizing their names, that by enacting laws against 
such treasonable and unheard of practices which would 
at once discover their patriotic zeal for their country, 
their wise and godlike penetration into the nature and 
cause of things, and their unerring knowledge of mankind 
who carry on daily the most villainous conspiracies in no
other language than looks and nods I humbly think a
significant look ought to be punished by a burning out of 
the optics, and a nod by severing off the offending head 
from the unoffending body.51
The humor of What You Will was lost on some like A. B. who 
responded by saying "we have some among us who not only refuse 
to submit to the authority by which we are governed, but in the most
51 New Hampshire Gazette, September 28, 1776.
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insolent and unprovoked manner, ridicule those by whom we 
consent to be governed."52 It is suggestive that A. B.'s was the only 
response to What You Will, perhaps a sign that Portsmouth's or New 
Hampshire's rebels had greater things on their minds, but it is also 
interesting that no further loyalist writings appeared in the Gazette 
until March of 1779.
By then the war appeared lost to most Britons and even the 
loyalists who fought on beside the regulars sensed that perhaps the 
ministry lacked any real will to win, or the ability to direct a war at 
all. By that time too, the property of loyalists who had departed the 
province or taken up arms under the king's standard had been 
confiscated and at least awaited sale. Those who had left had either 
been named and banished or proscribed by virtue of their action in 
taking up arms, attainted traitors in either case. The loyalists who 
remained may still have harbored some dim hope of a British 
victory, but such is doubtful. It would seem that instead they were 
endeavoring to ameliorate the impact that a rebel victory might 
inevitably have on them and their absent friends. Toward that end, 
when a town meeting was convened in Portsmouth in March of 1779, 
a petition was introduced for the purpose of repealing a portion of 
the confiscation act. The supporters of the petition desired that the 
town meeting endorse their effort and transmit it to the legislature 
for approval. According to AZ who wrote to the Gazette to protest this 
meeting which he contended was hastily called, the whole thing was 
a plan fomented by "those kind of beings called tories, together with
52New Hampshire Gazette  ^October 12,1776.
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great numbers of a worse character (if possible), I mean the two- 
faced go-between gentry whose conduct is regulated by our good or 
ill success..."53 AZ further claimed that the meeting was dominated 
by that group and their friends.
The following week a response was printed from Veritas who 
vehemently denied the presence of tories and their sympathizers at 
the meeting but suggested instead that many of the foremost men of 
the town had been there, including a former representative of the 
state to the Continental Congress, and several members of the state 
assembly. Veritas explained that the petition (which was submitted 
to the legislature but after passing the lower house was defeated by 
the council) was concerned only with the point that the loyalist 
estates were confiscated without due process. A Freeholder, in the 
same number, added "No one can detest a tory more than myself, nor 
do I think any punishment too severe for such as have malignantly 
deserted their country or took up arms against it, but I can never 
consent that even one of them or any other person for any crime 
whatsoever should be punished without a trial."54 The author 
concluded by castigating a government more tyrannical than that 
which the country was fighting against.
A reply from AZ was swift and scathing. In the number of the 
13th, AZ responded with vitriol calling Veritas a liar in no uncertain 
terms and at length, and then contended that the petition was a tory 
contrivance. After blasting Veritas and tories in general, AZ advised
53New Hampshire Gazette, March 30, 1779.
54New Hampshire Gazette, April 6, 1779.
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A Freeholder to be very careful "in future about railing the present 
government 'the mock liberties of a boasted American constitution' 
as it is apprehended he will be indicted for high treason if he should 
persist therein." As if threats and vilification were not enough, 
beneath the letter AZ included a poem entitled "To Veritas" which 
read:
Poor misguided Veritas, how couldest thou 
in a fit so mad prostitute thy pen 
to such ignoble use? Sure some demon 
invaded then thy melancholy mind 
and in that gloomy hour didst it turn all
thy noble flights of fancy to ______
and abuse to please but a wretched few 
Harpies and Parricides that daily suck 
the vital blood from this wounded country....55
The next number saw a reply from Veritas full of n am e-ca llin g 
but little else. A Freeholder, threatened in the last exchange, fought 
back by saying he was not afraid to contend against "crafty and 
designing men [that] thrust themselves into legislative power, who to 
satisfy their own selfish purposes or indulge a malicious disposition 
should subvert our happy constitution, abolish our most valuable 
privileges and in their stead substitute the most arbitrary acts of 
violence and oppression, then truly every honest man will have 
sufficient cause not only to be cautious but to fear that instead of 
being mocked with the formality of an indictment he may find 
himself fettered in the dreary apartments of an Inquisition."56 The
55New Hampshire Gazette, April 13, 1779
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exchange of letters ended with that piece but the feeling that tories 
represented a threat to the peace and security of the state persisted. 
Those fears were fueled by the rebel writers who consistently 
portrayed loyalists as "savage tories." The reading public was not 
allowed to forget die kinds of atrocities practiced by the British and 
the tories, crimes all the more heinous in rebel eyes for that they 
were committed by former neighbors, by brothers. AZ's use of the 
word "parricides"57 was not a conceit based on classical allusion but a 
reference to a civil struggle which in other provinces actually saw 
brothers slaying each other. The rebel writers complained that 
"among the many errors America has been guilty of during her 
contest with Great Britain few have been greater or attended with 
more fatal consequences to these states than her lenity to the 
tories."58 Despite the efforts of the rebel writers and the printer who 
filled the pages of the New Hampshire Gazette with their words, the 
loyalists still resident in New Hampshire rem ained relatively 
unmolested. Indeed it might be that very situation which provoked 
even more concern among the locals.
It became a pronounced fear among the rebels that loyalists 
would somehow insinuate their way into a place where they could 
assume responsible positions in the government. For that reason
56New Hampshire Gazette, April 20, 1779.
57The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines parricide as "One who murders his 
father or near relative or one whose person is held sacred; person guilty of 
treason against his country." H.W. Fowler and F.G. Fowler, eds., The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary of Current English. Oxford: 1917.
58New Hampshire Gazette, September 7, 1779, taken from the Pennsylvania 
Packet, August 5,1779.
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Fowle copied a warning from A Whig reminding his readers that the 
cause was not yet won, nor would it be if the vigilance of the 
community were relaxed. "Rouse America, your danger is great from 
a quarter where you least expect it, the tories. The tories will yet be 
the ruin of you."59 In September of 1779 assembly elections loomed 
large in the minds of the populace, and with the threat of imminent 
invasion nearly gone, the electorate was in danger of sliding into a 
sense of complacency which the ardent rebels found dangerous. Thus 
their need to remind the readers, indeed to enlarge upon the theme 
that the tories were responsible solely for the conditions of fear and 
economic disturbance through which the province had suffered since 
1775. "who were the occasion of the war?" asked A Whig. "The tories. 
Who persuaded the tyrant of Britain to prosecute it in a manner 
before unknown to civilized nations and shocking even to 
barbarians? The tories." The whig/rebels would convince the voters 
that the loyalists were completely responsible for the war, and still 
in a position to affect the outcome. The solution offered was difficult 
but necessary, "'tis time my countrymen to rid ourselves of these 
bosom vipers....Think of these things betimes, my countrymen, before 
it be too late and your posterity forever have reason to repent your 
lenity to the tories."60
It is significant that such exhortations to persecution of the 
loyalist remnant should need to come from the pen of a writer from
59Neiv Hampshire Gazette, September 7, 1779. taken from the Pennsylvania 
Packet, August 5,1779.
60jvevv Hampshire Gazette, September 7, 1779. taken from the Pennsylvania 
Packet, August 5,1779.
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Pennsylvania, and just as significant that Daniel Fowle, who had  
resumed printing the Gazette, should choose to publish the writings 
of A Whig. One might suppose that pieces of this sort were included 
at the behest of the ruling faction, the rebel leaders requiring or 
requesting the printer to print this campaign. If that were so, 
however, one might easily wonder why no local writer took up the 
refrain and called for a continued persecution of the loyalists in the 
local community. Fowle ran the article by A Whig in two full 
columns on the front page of that number, a section generally 
reserved for the most important war news or publications of the 
rebel government. For the most part, the only other political analysis 
which claimed front page priority were the letters exchanged 
between Massachusettensis and Novanglus back in 1775 at the 
outset of the struggle. Even those weighty words were quickly 
relegated to the middle pages as they progressed, as were the 
columns of Thomas Paine entitled the American Crisis. It is 
conceivable that Fowle chose to attack loyalists so vehemently 
because of his nephew, Robert Fowle.
Early in 1776 Robert Fowle had left the printing office in 
Portsmouth and set up his own press in Exeter. There beginning 
with an announcement broadside dated May 22, 1776, the younger 
Fowle printed the New Hampshire Gazette or Exeter Morning 
Chronicle. The first real number appeared in June. Robert Fowle's 
paper was notable for the lack of letters and articles expressing the 
positions of either side and the few pieces which appeared in the 
single year the paper was published were exclusively rebel in origin. 
The pieces included were also all by local authors, or the printer
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failed to attribute them to the papers from which he may have 
copied them. Those facts would be less than remarkable were it not 
for Fowle's arrest for counterfeiting in 1777 (the end of his 
newspaper career), and that upon his escape, he joined the British in 
New York. As mentioned previously, he became a member of 
Wentworth's Volunteers and eventually made his way to England. 
The content of Robert Fowle's newspaper consisted of news and 
advertisements, though it was the news that seems more interesting. 
Fowle printed detailed accounts of rebel military movements, as well 
as summaries of skirmishes and battles. In contrast to the similar 
stories which appeared in the Portsmouth paper, Robert Fowle 
seemed very interested in the numbers of rebel troops involved in 
maneuvers, and in the numbers or amounts of supplies, arms, and 
ammunition which were procured by the rebel faction. It is possible 
that while Fowle disguised his loyalist inclination behind the few 
anti-loyalist pieces he printed, he conveyed logistical information to 
the British through the details of his news stories.61
Whether or not Daniel Fowle sought to distance himself from 
his loyalist nephew, the elder Fowle continued his campaign against
61 New Hampshire Gazette or Exeter Morning Chronicle. June 1, 1776 through 
July 15, 1777. Two arguments might be made concerning Robert Fowle. Either 
he was a loyalist through and through and chose to gather intelligence for 
the British, passing it to them through the means of his newspaper, all the 
while allegedly counterfeiting provincial currency in order to throw the 
rebel economy into turmoil, or he was a greedy counterfeiter who, when 
caught, found a sudden call to the cause of the King’s standard. It is 
impossible, I think, to discern the truth at this remove. It may be relevant 
that he did return to New Hampshire and lived out his days in America, dying 
in Brentwood, New Hampshire in 1802. But did he return because he was not a 
true loyalist and he was no longer attainted for his treason, or did he return 
because he could not live in Britain on the meager pension he was granted 
by the Claims Commission?
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loyalists with another warning from A Whig. "Beware of those who 
have not been firm and unshaken from the beginning of the contest 
to the present time; beware of those who, under the mask of 
Whigism, are now hand in glove with persons strongly suspected to 
be enimical to our cause."62 The attacks of A Whig went 
unchallenged by loyalist writers, either because none dared to raise 
the pen or because Fowle chose not to open the forum to dissenting 
voices. The last moderate loyalist writer was A Freeholder. In April 
of 1779 he penned the last salvo in the exchange discussed 
previously with AZ. Yet the rebel position was taken up the following 
year by A Farmer who again (though for the last time during the war 
years) asserted the rebel myth of "insinuating traitors, who at this 
time employ every engine and pursue every probable method to 
discourage a virtuous people bravely struggling for their freedom 
and who would gladly wallow in the blood of those whom under a 
veil of friendship they wish to deceive and ruin. The various artful 
measures adopted by these cruel parricides are too numerous to 
relate..."63
It can be seen now that the New Hampshire Gazette of 
Portsmouth, and only to a very minor extent Robert Fowle's paper in 
Exeter, became the primary vehicles by which the culture war was 
fought in New Hampshire. Such a discursive struggle was 
necessitated by conditions peculiar to the rebellion in New 
Hampshire, but present in different form in the other provinces as
62New Hampshire Gazette, November 23, 1779.
63 New Hampshire Gazette, August 5, 1780.
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well. The rebel faction in New Hampshire was neither large nor 
particularly powerful at the outset of the contest. Indeed one writer 
has concluded that it may have been more the influence of the 
Massachusetts model than the incendiary leadership of indigenous 
rebels which began the process in New Hampshire.64 Yet the faction 
was faced with the task of converting a significant portion of the 
populace to its viewpoint as quickly as possible, while faced with the 
potential of invasion and actual fighting. The rebellion in New 
Hampshire was fought not primarily in military terms but as a 
struggle for the "hearts and minds" of the inhabitants. The struggle 
from the rebel perspective was indeed one of conquest, in which 
through the methods of discourse, a new identity was fashioned for 
the community. Even the control of the militia and the sophisticated 
surveillance and policing network encompassed by the provincial 
and town committees were inadequate to meet that need through 
coercion alone. Victory required the conversion of the mass of men in 
thought as well as action. As Lincoln put it, "such a radical recasting 
of collective identity, which amounts to the deconstruction of a 
previously significant sociopolitical border and the corollary 
construction of a new, encompassing sociopolitical aggregate, can 
hardly be accomplished through force alone."65
The rebel strategy required more than mere acquiescence to 
the change in status. Military means were inadequate to convince or 
compel the populace to embrace the "glorious cause." It was
64Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 16.
65Lincoln, Discourse, p. 4.
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necessary to recast the colonial identity into a new American 
identity, one based upon but superior to that identity which had 
defined society for two centuries and more. In the course of doing so, 
the rebels created the myth of the evil Briton and the even more 
despicable tory, casting the enemies of the people into stark terms of 
good and evil worthy of Milton. By creating the dichotomy of 
righteous "patriot" versus diabolical "tory" and Briton, the rebels 
accomplished a means of control and conquest far more effective and 
lasting than any which could have come about through some form of 
military occupation. The rebellion in New Hampshire was won by 
effecting the change of allegiance among the people from the mother 
country to the province, by shifting the commitment of the hearts of 
the people to the new polity.66 No amount of force could effect that 
change in identity, only a victory in a war of persuasion, a war for 
which the loyalists were unprepared at the outset, and in which they 
never succeeded in recouping their initial losses.
Both sides in the culture war of 1775 to 1781 appealed to 
tradition, though each defined it differently. To the whig/rebels, 
tradition began with the mythical freedoms of Saxon England, 
freedoms trampled underfoot by successively more despotic 
monarchs until revived in the Glorious Revolution of 1689. Those 
liberties were endangered again by the corruption and evil of the 
ministry and the tyrannical George HL Only the virtue of a free and
66LincoIn, Discourse, "Ultimately, that which either holds society together or 
takes it apart is sentiment, and the chief instrument with which such 
sentiment may be aroused, manipulated, and rendered dormant is discourse." 
p. 11.
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independent America withstood the gathering darkness, only the 
righteous who hearkened back to the purity and strength of the 
generation which had founded the New England colonies could hope 
to persevere against the forces of the diabolical king and his savage 
minions the tories.
Tradition in loyalist terms had its roots in the same soil, though 
its proponents adhered to the belief that law and the English 
constitution were alone a sufficient bulwark against the incursions of 
despotism. The rending of society by rebellion and the crusade for 
independence were unnecessary and unnatural. Rational men, they 
believed, could calmly and deliberately reach an accommodation 
with the government, and perhaps effect its dissolution and 
replacement by right-thinking men who would recognize and respect 
the colonial position. But the private agendas of the leaders of the 
radical faction dictated rejection of such a course and the prosecution 
of a struggle for the faith of the majority, a struggle won handily by 
the rebels. The proof of the completeness and speed of the rebel 
victory lies in the lack of organized resistance by the loyalists on 
either the military or discursive levels. The rebels had taken control 
of the legislature in 1774, and demonstrated control of the militia in 
December of that year. They had monopolized the media and begun 
the discursive conquest of the province by that time as well. By early 
in 1775, the infrastructure of government was firmly entrenched, 
and the revolution in New Hampshire had been completed before the 
first shots were fired.
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Chapter Six
Zealous Sufferers, Identity and the Formation 
of the Loyalist Community
I was sent for yesterday to visit a sick and dying man at 
Greenland Place near the foundling hospital, whose name 
was Thomas Cumings of New Hampshire in America. He 
has a pension of £40, a wife, and several children....He has 
been heard before your honourable board on his claims 
and is now starving, dying, and wanting every necessary 
of life. Is without money and indebted to his landlord (a 
poor gardener) above £40 for house rent and victuals. 
Physicians will not visit him unless for a guinea each 
visit, and medicines cannot be had without money. 
Several small collections have been made for him and his 
wretched family among such American loyalists as have 
small pensions...1
The next words penned by Samuel Peters in his letter to the 
Claims Commissioners betray a sense of bitterness and loss. Peters 
continued stating: "as those who have large pensions cannot spare six 
pence for human nature in distress. The little whole has again and 
again been expended and he as poor as ever."2 Peters' letter was too 
little too late; Thomas Cumings died less than two weeks later. At 
first glance the situation Peters described might seem to indicate that
1 Samuel Peters to Claims Commissioners as part of the memorial of Thomas 
Cumings, NH Claims, vol. I, p. 377.
^NH Claims. vol. I, p. 378.
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there was in London at that time no community of loyalists, no 
support structure at all. Mary Beth Norton, at least has argued nearly 
that very point. In The British Americans, Norton asserts evidence 
showing that there was little interaction between the loyalists of the 
various provinces during or after the war. But how much interaction 
is necessary to show the existence of a community?
Samuel Peters was not suggesting that no community existed 
among the New Hampshire loyalists in London. He was instead 
lamenting a breakdown in that community. He was criticizing the 
portion of the community that had the means to help those who 
needed their help, and yet refused to do so. Their refusal did not 
signify the absence of community, merely that the "better sort" were 
shirking their community obligations.
This chapter will argue that as the process described in the 
previous chapters unfolded, the transformation of identity 
undergone by the loyalists produced a number of physical 
communities of loyalists (in Canada, the Floridas, and the Caribbean, 
as well as in England). But it will also show that the transformation of 
the loyalist identity produced a larger ideational community that 
encompassed most if not all of the loyalists regardless of their 
eventual geographic place of settlement.
The process through which the loyalist identity was created 
began with a decision each potential loyalist had to make for himself 
and possibly for his family. As we saw in Chapter One, several factors 
guided the choice of remaining loyal as opposed to the perhaps easier 
choice of joining the ascendent faction in rebellion. It might seem 
that prominent loyalists had no choice to make. The lives of certain
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
244
men were intrinsically tied to the royal interest, G overnor 
Wentworth for one. Yet to assert that Wentworth had no choice 
would be untrue and would be to deny his human capacity for free 
will. John Wentworth had a choice and chose to embrace the royal 
cause. At the same time his opponents had assumed the choice he 
would make and treated him accordingly. The same could be said for 
most of the prominent men who would rem ain loyal.
Yet many prominent men figured in the forefront of the rebel 
faction. So prominence, and the wealth and public influence that 
produce that prominence, were not determining factors in the choice 
to remain loyal. And as we have seen, neither were family 
connections, religion, or profession. The cause of the decision to 
remain loyal came from within the identity of each loyalist, the 
identity that I have described as the "who" we perceive ourselves to 
be. Amid the defining factors in each potential loyalist's self-concept, 
was the deep-seated belief in law and constitutional government that 
was revealed later in the claimant memorials. They were "zealously 
attached to the King and Constitution of Great Britain."3
After the outbreak of rebellion the zeal and attachment of the 
loyalists were manifested in the projected identities of "who" they 
projected themselves to be. In Chapter Two we examined the acts of 
loyalists as they projected their identities publicly. Certainly some 
acted out of self-interest alone, or from some other reason. Among 
the thousands of claimants and the thousands more who did not file 
a claim for compensation, there must have been a considerable
3 Loyalist Claims, Hugh Dean, vol. XII, p. 171.
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number who identified themselves as loyalists out of extrem e 
necessity or other less defined motives. Certainly some of the claims 
were fraudulent.4 For the Claims Commission to determine that a 
claim was fraudulent, or at least unworthy of compensation, meant 
that the claimant had not met some test of loyalty. The Claims 
Commission itself determined the worthiness of a claim based first 
on the identity of the loyalist. If the claimant did not meet the 
standards for conforming to the loyalist identity, the claim was lost. 
Only after the claimant could reasonably be considered a loyalist 
based on the criteria of the loyalist identity could the commission 
weigh the validity of the material losses claimed. But these were two 
separate issues. A man could be a loyalist but receive no 
compensation, yet he could not receive compensation if he lost 
everything but was not a loyalist.
One example of such a case might clarify the point. Under the 
name of James Nevin, Isabella Nevin submitted a petition to the 
"Lord commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury" on April 30, 1778. 
Isabella claimed to have come to England "about the beginning of the 
disturbances in America, which soon afterwards broke out into open 
rebellion."5 Living in New Hampshire, she had been comfortable, as 
her husband had held the post of Collector of the Port of Piscataqua,
4Among others, the claim of James Gordon, a self-styled land speculator who 
had allegedly acquired an interest in a vast tract of Indian land in Georgia 
with two partners. According to the other parties in the deal, Gordon had no 
monetary interest at stake though he was claiming for compensation for a 
full third of the lost land and improvements. See Loyalist Claims, James 
Gordon, vol. XII, p. 79; and Alexander McNaighton, vol.XII, p. 141.
5NH Claims, James Nevin, vol. ID, p. 1460.
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and was a member of the Council. However she had been forced to 
flee the province because of the demonstrated loyalty of her family. 
Though Isabella Nevin's circumstances were reduced by her flight, 
things went from bad to worse. As she reported "about seven months 
ago, she had the misfortune to be crushed against a wall, and thrown 
down by a brewer's dray in the street." Nevin added that she was 
thankful to be alive and "able to crawl about again," but requested 
the assistance of government to support herself and two children. 
Despite the support of a certificate dated 25 April, 1778 from  
Governor John Wentworth,6 Isabella Nevin's petition was denied by 
the Treasury. Persisting, Nevin wrote to Lord George Germain in 
May.7 Whether or not Germain replied, Nevin was unable to gain 
support. She reiterated her claim to the Claims Commission in 1784, 
but was again denied, the commissioners stating, "we are clearly of 
opinion that Mrs. Nevin is not entitled to expect or receive any 
allowance from government as an American Sufferer."8 Though 
clearly a pathetic case, Isabella Nevin could not claim aid based on 
her husband's loyalty. James Nevin had died in 1769, and in the 
words of the commissioners he had "died many years before he could 
have an opportunity of showing his loyalty in the present dispute."9
Certificate of John Wentworth, NH Claims, James Nevin, vol. Ill, p. 1459.
7Nevin to Germain, 5 May, 1778. NH Claims, James Nevin, vol. Ill, p. 1455-56.
8NH Claims, James Nevin, vol. m, p. 1472.
9NH Claims, James Nevin, vol. HI, p. 1472. The Nevin case raises complicated 
issues of the loyalist identity and of gender. For the purposes of the claims 
process, neither Isabella nor her husband James could be identified as 
loyalists. James Nevin was dead before the issue became a choice for him, and 
his widow was already in England before the rebellion could force her to
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Chapters Three and Four considered the rebel response to the 
loyalists' decision. By projecting the "who" they believed themselves 
to be, the loyalists subjected themselves to reprisals from those 
observers that received the "who" that others perceive. The loyalist 
identity perceived by the rebel authorities was other than that which 
the loyalists believed themselves to be. The loyalists saw themselves 
as true Americans, men of principle who would fight if necessary to 
preserve the union with Great Britain and the life that that 
connection had provided. The rebels on the other hand perceived the 
loyalists to be enemies and traitors, betrayers of the community to 
which they had belonged. Their responses are indicative of a 
community attempting to deal with outsiders, with "otherness."
To do so, the rebel leaders redefined their opponents, creating 
the "who" they constructed the loyalists to be. Chapter Three 
explored the physical repercussions which befell the loyalists as a 
result of the perception of their identity as enemies to the 
community. Once the period of physical reprisals subsided, the 
creation of the "tory" identity began in emest. As Chapter Four 
relates, the first constructed identity following that period was 
defined by the legal definition of treason. Once the loyalists were
choose either. Mrs. Nevin was not denied compensation because of her 
gender, but rather because she could not claim, directly or indirectly, to 
have made the choice to remain loyal. The other female claimants in New 
Hampshire did not share that disability. Two were widows of identifiable 
loyalists, and one was the mother of the governor. The sources for New 
Hampshire are not adequate to analyze the impact of gender on either the 
claims process or the loyalist identity. The same may be said of blacks and 
Indians. There simply is no data at all concerning them. As this study grows 
in the future with the inclusion of all of the claims from all of the provinces, 
I hope to add a chapter on the identity formation of loyalist women, and 
should there be any claims from racial minorities, those will be considered as 
well.
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defined as traitors and no longer as neighbors, the government was 
able to attaint and banish them and to seize their property.
From the outbreak of the rebellion to its conclusion, a 
discursive struggle raged concurrently with the military one. In New 
Hampshire a t least, the high ground belonged to the rebels. With 
nearly complete control of the press, rebel writers created a more 
complete identity for their ideological opponents. Chapter Five 
detailed the battle for the allegiance of the residents of the province, 
a struggle mirrored elsewhere in the rebellious colonies. Only in the 
garrison towns were the loyalists able to respond with any success to 
the "who" the rebel writers projected them to be.10
As a result of this conflict of identities, the loyalists arrived at a 
point where each had assumed a new identity, a new "who" each 
perceived himself to be. Gone were most of the old defining 
characteristics. Land and other property were lost to rebel cupidity. 
Offices no longer existed, and most professionals struggled to ply 
their skills in  new and sometimes austere circumstances. Though 
merchants and artisans still could carry on their business with some 
success, their sense of place was lost. Their homes were in the hands 
of strangers and they were banished by law from their former lands 
and communities.
The newly defined loyalists created a new community, an 
ideational one, if not a geographic one. It was a community of shared 
experience, of shared suffering, and one of shared need. That need,
!0See for example, Cynthia Dubin Edelberg, "Jonathan Odell and Philip 
Freneau: Poetry and Politics in the Garrison Town of New York City," in 
Robert M. Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and Community.
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as well as the experiences and suffering that created it were 
revealed in the claims the loyalists wrote.
Jack P. Greene has argued that a society creates an identity 
through the interaction of four forces or variables at work in the 
community: environment, shared goals, shared standards, and a 
shared history.11 Greene stipulated that the interaction of the four 
variables produce a corporate identity, an identity vital to the 
existence of a community since it provides each member of the 
community with a way of finding "meaning in their own individual 
lives."12 All of the variables were present among the loyalists of New 
Hampshire during and after the war.
Once a community comes into being, it continually develops its 
corporate identity. It does so as its individual members articulate 
their conceptions of what that identity is, and refine their sense of 
belonging to it. This is what Samuel Peters was attempting to do in 
his letter to the Commission. Though he had probably chosen the 
wrong forum for airing his sense of loss, Peters was affirming the 
existence of the loyalist identity, and the community to which that 
identity was now committed.
Greene added that the corporate identity is augmented by yet 
another view, that of those who view the community from the 
outside. So for the creation of a valid corporate identity there must 
be not only self-conceptualization, but also the recognition of those
11Greene, "Changing Identity in the British West Indies," in Imperatives, 
Behaviors, and Identities, p. 14.
12Greene, "Changing Identity," p. 15.
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outside the community in question. To a certain extent those outside 
the community must agree with the individuals within as to the 
nature of the community. The loyalists met Greene's criteria as a new 
community and expressed their self-conception through their 
writings, among them their memorials to the claims commission.
The New Hampshire loyalists shared geographic proximity in 
their place of origin sufficient to forge a kinship wherever they 
eventually settled, not only among themselves but also with loyalists 
of other provinces.13 The loyalists certainly held shared goals: 
survival at first, and then the reconstruction of secure and 
prosperous lives. Perhaps more than most communities, the loyalists 
held shared values, preeminent among them their adherence to what 
they believed to be the lawful authority in British A m erica, 
Parliament and the Crown. They developed over time into two 
distinct communities due to environment, the settlers of peripheral 
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Canada separating from those who 
settled in metropolitan England, but by the time those distinctions
13The extent to which the loyalist community extended beyond the former 
provincial divisions is in some doubt. Norton argued forcefully that the 
absence of cooperation among the loyalist groups in London proved the lack 
of a loyalist community. "In short, there was little sustained intercolonial 
mingling among the refugees, either in residential neighborhoods or at 
communal meeting places." (Norton, p. 68) "The various exile circles, then, 
existed independently of each other. There were a few points of congruence, 
places where the circles touched or interlocked, but on the whole these 
connections were both peripheral and accidental." (Norton, p. 71-72) Norton 
argued that the lack of intercolonial relations obviates the possibility that a 
loyalist community can be proposed. I beg to differ, and suggest that the 
supposed lack of intercolonial contact was relegated for the most part to the 
loyalist community in London. I also offer that the circumstances described 
by Norton do not rule out the communal sharing of the loyalist identity, nor 
a place in the ideational community.
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arose, the community residing in England could no longer truly be 
differentiated as loyalist from within the metropolis of which they 
had become a part. In fact the loyalist community in England was 
ephemeral, having only a brief life of its own, and transcending the 
physical limitations of a particular environment. If that were the 
case, and I believe it is, some other variable might substitute for 
Greene's "most important ingredient in defining the identities of the 
new society."14 A specific shared experience, a traumatic one, amply 
provided the environmental component necessary to the formation 
of the collective identity. This shared experience differed from the 
collective experience Greene lists as one of his variables. The 
collective experience, as he defines it, began at the moment of 
conception in the birth of the new community, and continued 
afterward. It was a shared history, expanding and changing with the 
passage of time. The loyalists brought with them to their new  
community a shared experience in the past, but that experience was 
of sufficient physical or emotional violence that it would tend to form 
a communal bond between individuals irrelevant of original 
geographical proximity.15
The first step in the self-conscious development of a communal 
consciousness was the concept of self-definition, or naming. As 
mentioned above, the men and women who adhered to the crown 
called themselves loyalists. That was the "who" each had become.
14Greene, "Changing Identity," p. 14.
15We see the formation of such communities in our own time over even larger 
geographic areas thanks to the ease of mass communications. National and 
even international communities form surrounding a shared traumatic 
experience such as AIDS, disasters, or war experiences.
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There is significance to this seemingly obvious statement. Certa in ly  
the earliest historians of the revolution chose to use the word "tory." 
Not in the sense that equated the loyalists to the court party of 
English politics, but rather as a pejorative term, much like the origin 
of the usage "puritan" in the early seventeenth century. By the time 
of the revolution in the American colonies, the word "tory" was 
reserved as an epithet, a verbal brand, a byword that tarred its 
target as surely as the word traitor. Thus we do not find the loyalists 
using it as a word to describe themselves. Tory was a word used 
almost exclusively by the rebel writers who pursued the war in a 
battle of words carried on in newspapers and pamphlets. One author 
wrote:
The terms, Whig and Tory, had never been used 
much in America. The Massachusetts people in 
general were of the principle of the ancient Whigs, 
attached to the Revolution and to the succession of 
the crown in the house of Hanover. A very few who 
might have been called Tories in England, took the 
name of Jacobites in America. All of a sudden, the 
officers of the crown and such as were keeping up 
their authority, were branded with the name of 
Tories, always the term of reproach; their opposers 
assuming the name of Whigs, became the common 
people, as far as they had been acquainted with the 
parties in England, all supposed the Whigs to have 
been in the right and the Tories in the wrong."16
16Qjaoted in North Callahan, Flight from the Republic The Tories o f  the 
American Revolution. Indianapolis: 1967. p. xi. Callahan attributes the quote 
to " the man who might be called 'Mr. Tory himself,'" but gives no clue to the 
identity of his source, its location, or really even its time. I have assumed the 
words to be contemporary. It is interesting to note further that after using 
this quotation in his preface, Callahan persists in the use of the term "tory" 
throughout the book and quite exclusively.
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Nowhere in the claims of New Hampshire loyalists does a single 
one of them ever refer to himself or a fellow as a  "tory." Instead 
several names or phrases frequently appear to describe the self 
concept they had erected: loyalists, of course, and "friends of 
government," "the King's friends," "American sufferers," and so 
forth.17
For the past two hundred years scholars have differed over 
what to call the loyalists. Writers of the nineteenth century, even a 
man as interested in the loyalists as Lorenzo Sabine, often called 
them tories while referring to the patriots as Whigs extensively. Such 
usage reveals the degree to which a scholar who spent years 
researching loyalists had bought into the myth manufactured by 
contemporaries and perpetuated throughout most of the past two 
hundred years, the myth of the stalwart virtuous patriot (whig) ever 
vigilant and successful in opposition to the bloodthirsty, deceitful 
tory whose response to the struggle for American liberty was to 
forsake his country in its time of need and take to pillaging his 
former countrymen or worse. To be sure, loyal military units were 
extensively used to gather supplies, and there seems to be no 
question that loyalist guerillas perpetrated numerous atrocities in 
the course of the war, but self-styled patriots were guilty of similar 
acts as well.
17NH Claims, infra. There are however two instances in the New Hampshire 
Claims where loyalists use the word "tory" but only in the sense that they are 
quoting or paraphrasing the words of their rebel opponents. I have yet to 
find a single use of the word in any claims from other provinces.
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Even today there is confusion in the literature between the 
terms tory and loyalist. Those who fear redundancy prefer to 
interchange the terms as though they were synonymous, while some 
like North Callahan or William Nelson18 prefer the shorter, and 
perhaps more evocative, tory. But it would seem that the usage ought 
to be determined by the thoughts and feelings of those we attempt to 
understand after two centuries. Aside from their self-conception, we 
might consult those communities outside who view the loyalists as a 
discrete entity. Two particular witnesses to the creation of loyalist 
communal identity were the patriots to whom they were opposed, 
and the British, with whom they were allied. In no contemporary 
accounts discovered for this study do British officials, military 
officers or other commentators refer to the loyalists as tories. Again 
and again in official dispatches letters home and so fo rth ,B ritish  
writers refer to the American loyalists as Loyalists or friends of 
government. It was the rebels who used the term as one of
18William H. Nelson, The American Tory. New York: 1961. Nelson admits to 
using the term "for the sake of convenience," but he also claims it is a 
relevant one because he wants to make a connection between loyalist 
ideology and the court party in England earlier in the century. That might 
not be possible. The loyalists, as so many recent works have pointed out, were 
as incensed as the eventual patriots at the unfortunate turn government had 
made beginning in 1765 with the Stamp Act. Prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities, they differed with their neighbors really only in the question of 
what nature the appropriate response ought to assume. The loyalist position 
relied on traditional assumptions as to the nature o f resistance and the 
degree to which that resistance could lawfully be exercised. The eventual 
"rebels" shared no such concerns, arguing that all means of resistance to 
oppression were legitimate.
^ C o n s i d e r  for example the contents of K.G. Davies, ed., Documents of the 
American Revolution 1770-1783. Colonial Office Series. 21 Volumes. Dublin, 
Ireland: 1972-1981.
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opprobrium, drawing frequently the caricature of the "damned 
tory,"20 suspected of every misdeed, and certainly every malefactor, 
committing whatever crime against the community must have been a 
tory.
The views of the diverse groups who admitted the existence of 
this loyalist community were crucial to its formation, its experience, 
and its eventual fate. They were also central to the impetus which 
produced the claims themselves. Continual British misunderstanding 
of the situation in America contributed to the formation of the 
loyalist community. Had the ministry been able to better understand 
the strength and location of loyal support, and act upon it quickly, 
the course of events might have been altered.21 Some estimates, like 
that of Samuel Hale for New Hampshire, contend that "nearly one 
third of the inhabitants for a long time retained their loyalty."22 But 
popular support dissipated quickly in the absence of British military 
support. Conversely, loyalist support was sometimes lost when the 
army was nearby, since the British routinely failed to differentiate 
between friend and foe. One correspondent writing home to England 
observed: "the friends to government have been worse used by these 
troops [the British army] than by the rebels. Plundering, and
20Anonymous, Historical Anecdotes Civil and Military: A Series o f Letters 
written from America, in the years 1777 and 1778, to different Persons in 
England; Containing Observations on the General Management o f the War, 
and on the Conduct o f our Principal Commanders, in the Revolted Colonies 
during that Period. London: printed for J. Bew, in Paternoster-Row 1779. p. 2. 
Hereinafter cited as Historical Anecdotes.
21Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, A Study in British Revolutionary 
Policy. Chapel Hill: 1964.
22JVH Claims, Samuel Hale, vol. n, p. 733. in a letter, Hale to Ira Allen, nd.
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destroying property, without distinction, have been practiced; 
insomuch that many people have joined Washington, because they 
found most protection from him, though otherwise well affected to 
the King."23 One claimant, John Fenton, complained that General Gage 
had destroyed his farm on Bunker Hill to erect fortifications there.24
Bom in the experience of war, or at least severe dislocation, the 
loyalist community sought ways to achieve its shared goals. Some of 
its members quickly turned to government, seeking to find for 
themselves that security promised in the proclamations of the King 
and his commanders in America. The first choice for most was flight 
from their homes and taking refuge within British lines. Once safe, 
often without wife or children, the loyalists found themselves 
engaged in work on behalf of the army. Gentlemen and officials 
usually found some employment in administration, like Edward 
Lutwyche of Merrimack who was appointed "Superintendant of the 
King's Spruce Beer Brewery" at New York in March of 1777.23 Many 
engaged in the formation of loyalist military units. Though without 
official duties while trapped in besieged Boston, John Wentworth 
began the mustering of a regiment, and continued gathering men 
upon his arrival in New York in March of 1776. Many of the New 
Hampshire claimants proudly mention serving with Wentworth’s 
Volunteers, though that unit may have never actually taken the
23Historical Anecdotes, p. 5.
24NH Claims, John Fenton, vol. n, p. 523.
25Mf Claims, Edward Goldstone Lutwyche, vol. II, p. 1048.
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field.26 Nor had Major William Stark's Corps, since it never reached 
full strength. Several other New Hampshire men commanded loyalist 
regiments. Robert Rogers, famous for his service in  the Seven Years 
War, commanded the King's Rangers raised in Nova Scotia in 1777. 
Raised in New York in 1781, the King's American Dragoons were 
commanded by Benjamin Thompson. The Queen's Rangers, another 
regiment raised by Robert Rogers, eventually merged with 
Thompson's King's American Dragoons.27 New Hampshire loyalists, 
like William Vance of Londonderry, were also "employed on secret 
services for government." One of the John Stinsons of Dunbarton, the 
nephew of General John Stark, went "out 28 times as a spy."28
Those of middling status or lower found employment either as 
soldiers in the constantly forming regiments, or in varying jobs in 
and around New York. Though only two of the New Hampshire 
claimants mention menial work, Samuel Mallows of Portsmouth was 
a waggoneer in General Howe's baggage train,29 and George Glen of 
Wolfeborough served as a "Forager,"30 many loyalists who took 
refuge in Boston and later New York were forced by circumstance to
26See Appendix 1 for a muster roll from Wentworth's Volunteers.
27Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xix-xxi.
28Mf Claims, William Vance, vol. IV, p. 1864; NH Claims, John Stinson, vol. IV, p. 
1744.
29Nff Claims, Samuel Mallows, vol. Ill, p. 1278.
30NH Claims, George Glen, vol. II, p. 705. Forager is his description of his 
position. The only specific act he mentions is the acquisition of "a number of 
the continental horse," which in the eyes of his enemies made him nothing 
but a horse thief.
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act as water bearers, wood-gatherers, or in the work of erecting or 
strengthening fortifications.31 Though laboring was tedious, the army 
was able to pay a living wage without the loyalist having to file a 
formal claim in England.32 Of course some were able to ply their 
trades, especially professionals such as doctors33 or clergymen.34
The New Hampshire claims reveal a pattern  among those 
loyalists who abandoned their homes to serve their king, or merely 
to save their skins. The most prominent among them, beginning with 
Governor John Wentworth, left New Hampshire in 1775. Most of 
those went immediately to Boston, and then on to either Halifax or 
New York at the evacuation in March, 1776. Wentworth and several 
other prominent men then made the trip to England in 1777 or 1778, 
and there they petitioned the Treasury for assistance. They were 
usually successful in obtaining some temporary support. Wentworth 
received a pension, £600 per annum, until his appointment as 
Surveyor General of the King's Woods with a posting to Nova Scotia in
31A considerable number of loyalists from the northern provinces who sought 
refuge in New York worked diligently there as well. Those who did not serve 
on active duty often proudly proclaimed their occupations while behind the 
lines. Many worked as carpenters and at the other trades. See for example 
two men from Newark, NJ in Loyalist Claims, Nathaniel Richards, vol. XV, p. 
319-330; William Stile, vol XV, p. 331-346. Neither had listed carpenter as the 
occupation held prior to the rebellion. One man was a carpenter before the 
war and he served as a master carpenter in the quartermaster's department. 
Loyalist Claims, Nathaniel Munro, vol.XV, p. 375-378.
32Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xi. The army was authorized to pay "a dollar a 
day" for those make-work civilian jobs.
33NH Claims, Dr. Josiah Pomeroy, vol. IV, p. 1522.
34Sabine, Sketches, vol. I, p. 546. John Houstonwas from Bedford. Badly treated
by the mob and his congregation, he apparently ended up in New York by 
1782 and was off to Shelburne, N.S. with a family of five.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
259
1783. The pension was then reduced to £300 since the position 
carried a salary of £800 per annum.35
Another group of New Hampshire men remained as long as 
they felt reasonably sure of the safety of their persons and their 
families. Those men, such as William Torrey or Zaccheus Cutter, 
served under the crown as magistrates or at least held prominent 
positions in their communities. They generally were able to hang on 
into 1777, and some as late as 1778 before fleeing to the British lines 
at New York or Rhode Island. A few, like Stephen Holland, were 
imprisoned for long periods of time. A final wave of claimants 
departed in 1777 to join Burgoyne on his march southward to the 
fateful rendezvous with destiny at Saratoga. Among them were 
Simon Baxter, Breed Batchellor, and the printer, Robert Lewis 
Fowle.36
The spate of petitions to the treasury in 1777 and 1778 by 
loyalists wealthy or lucky enough to get to England quickly became a 
burden to the government. As Palmer reports, "all refugees who had 
rendered some service to the Crown or who could claim to have been 
driven out because of their visible loyalty, were considered eligible 
for assistance."37 The number of refugees increased as the contest in 
America wore on, and as British policy and British arms failed to 
stem the tide of revolt. By March of 1782, at the fall of the North
^N H  Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, pl984-5.
^N H  Claims, Simon Baxter, vol. I, p. 131; Breed Batcheller, vol. I, p. 119; Robert 
Lewis Fowle, vol. II, p. 657.
37Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xi.
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ministry, some 315 refugee loyalists had been granted temporary 
support representing an annual expense of £40,280 sterling.38 Few 
applicants were refused at least a minimal allowance. The Treasury 
had held fast in the Nevin case.
Critics of the North ministry in Parliament were dissatisfied 
with the expenditures on behalf of so many new mouths to feed. 
Consequently a panel was appointed by the new government of Lord 
Shelburne to "inquire into these Treasury allowances."39 The 
examiners were John Eardley-Wilmot and Daniel Parker Coke, a pair 
of independent members of Parliament known for their impartiality 
and integrity. Both would soon be appointed to the claims 
Commission as well.
The language of the memorials and the supporting documents, 
more than any other evidence, provides proof of the existence of the 
loyalist community.40 The documents of the New Hampshire 
claimants and their colleagues elsewhere, display a consistency of 
vocabulary that can be neither coincidence nor conceit. Indeed the 
shared vocabulary was necessary for the identification of the 
community's goals.41 The language of the claims reveals the presence
38Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xii.
39Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xii.
40According to Hogg, "group cohesiveness might be seen as a linguistic
category or rhetorical device produced through discourse: something which 
constructs individuals in relation to one another as members of a 'group' and 
in contrast to other 'groups.'" Hogg, The Social Psychology o f Group 
Cohesiveness, p. 63.
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of a  number of deeply held views. The loyalists as a group refused to 
acknowledge the sovereignty of any new government. They deplored 
the excesses of popular action and the invasion of privacy. They tried 
to ignore the serious character of the revolution even after it was 
lost. They believed themselves to be the innocent victims of an 
unprincipled group whose only concern was self-interest, and as time 
passed many felt ill-used by the government they had sacrificed 
everything to serve.
The loyalists refused to submit willingly to the rebel 
authorities. From the loyalist perspective, the situation in New 
Hampshire by 1775 was one of anarchy. Even Governor Wentworth 
was forced to acknowledge, "the country is in the most deplorable 
state of disorder without law or government."42 W entworth’s 
admission was nothing new. As early as February, Lord Dartmouth 
had written Wentworth with new instructions, but acknowledged the 
situation and noting "so general a spirit of disorder and disobedience 
to lawful authority." Dartmouth agreed there was little Wentworth 
could accomplish until "other considerations will admit of giving you 
such support as may be effectual for that purpose."43 The other 
loyalists who described the situation in the province from 1774 to 
1776 shared the view that authority had broken down or had been
4 l"Any group of people that has any permanence develops a 'special 
language,' a lingo or jargon, which represents its way of identifying those 
objects important for group action." Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 21.
42Wentworth to John Durand, May 17, 1775 in NH Claims, John Durand, vol. I, 
p. 461
43Lord Dartmouth to Governor John Wentworth, February 22, 1775, in NH 
Claims, John Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2157.
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taken from its rightful holders. Simon Baxter of Alstead told of 
having "opposed the measures of the rebels, [and] raised men to go 
and protect the courts in 1774."44 As a result of his actions, Baxter 
continued, the Cheshire County court was able to sit and transact its 
business. But another consequence was the social and political 
ostracism which eventually befell Baxter.
Two of Baxter's statements are of particular interest. First, he 
alluded to a group of men attempting to block the proper business of 
the county court, and he called those who would have interfered 
with the operations of the county court "rebels." Elsewhere, Baxter 
added two more names for those faceless characters who attempted 
to defy constituted authority, "Whigs or Malcontents."45 In 
attempting to form an identity for their community, the loyalists of 
New Hampshire had also the need to create an identity for that other, 
that group which had in a sense helped to create their community in 
exile.46 Just as the Americans who fought for independence had 
plastered the name of "tory" on the loyalists, the "King's Friends" 
referred to their former neighbors primarily as "rebels." Other terms 
were employed from claim to claim. While Samuel Hale called the 
futile actions of crown officials the acts of "patriots," others referred 
to the opponents of government as "leaders of sedition," "the 
usurpers," and "the Faction."47 When referred to as a group, the
44NH Claims, Simon Baxter, vol. I, p. 134.
45 NH Claims, Simon Baxter, vol. I, p. 131.
46Strauss, Mirrors and Masks, p. 21.
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crowds which roamed the seacoast towns at will in 1775 were called 
"the armed multitude" or "lawless banditti."48 Nathaniel Hubbard of 
Stanford Connecticut "signed an agreement in writing to support his 
Majesty's government against all Innovations and Mobs."49
The rebels were a  minority, a  group of self-interested men, or 
men swayed by the connivance of a few. The rebellion was a 
manifestation of a singular disregard for law and authority. The 
activities of the rebels, mobs, housebreaking, armed insurrection, all 
exceeded the assumed limits of lawful behavior. Even the forms and 
acts of the newly "usurped authority" contradicted the traditional 
assumptions of the uses of law and legal procedure. The interference 
with and subsequent closing of the law courts on the part of the 
rebels was an action the loyalists feared and resisted with "zeal and 
attachment." Denied any possible due process, the loyalists could not 
acknowledge a government without laws to insure the rights of 
private property. It would be nearly two years before the courts 
again functioned regularly in New Hampshire, and by then the 
ideological battle had been won by the rebels. Whether by coercion 
and intimidation or by persuasion and the attraction of apparent
47NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. n, p. 777; Robert Fowles, vol. II, p. 677; and 
Ann Hulton to Mrs. Adam Iightbody in Ann Hulton, Letters o f a Loyalist Lady 
Being the Letters of Ann Hulton, sister o f  Henry Hulton, Commissioner o f  
Customs at Boston, 1767-1776. Cambridge, MA: 1927. p. 29. NH Claims, John 
Fenton, vol. II, p. 569.
48NH Claims, infra. See also Loyalist Claims, James Ketchum, vol. XII, p. 247 who 
"was led by the dictates of reason to oppose the factious multitude at the first 
dawning of the Rebellion." Nehemiah Clarke of Hartford was also assaulted 
by "a numerous banditti." vol. XII, p. 387.
49Loyalist Claims, Nathaniel Hubbard, vol. XII, p. 235.
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success, tiie populace of New Hampshire was solidly in rebellion by 
1778.
The committees of safety supplanted the courts in most 
communities, subverting the role of magistrates and justices of the 
peace. While many former officials as well as new men constituted 
the committees, they had no parallel in the English experience. 
English monarchs had governed through civilian commissions and 
officers for several hundred years, but those committees or single 
officials had had the legitimacy of royal appointment to rely upon.50 
And the resulting mixture of administrative and judicial powers in 
the hands of what were perceived to be venal, vengeful men could 
not be tolerated. The use of paid informants by the committees and 
the very acceptance of any whispered innuendo as evidence of a 
crime became a severe concern to the loyalists, especially those who 
remained in the province for as long as they possibly could. Coupled 
with these non-traditional institutions of authority were the actions 
of the provincial assembly, convened without the authority of die 
crown and clutching to themselves the powers of trying individuals 
for treason, and the widespread use of acts of a tta inder and 
confiscation. It was no surprise then that the loyalists referred to 
themselves repeatedly as "American sufferers" or "distressed 
loyalist[s]."51
s0Albert Beebe White, Self-Government at the King's Command: A Study in the 
Beginnings of English Democracy. Reprint. Westport, CT: 1974
S1NH Claims, infra, but for example, Robert Lewis Fowles, vol. II, p. 687.
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The provisional government which replaced that of John 
Wentworth under the royal charter received no more respect from 
the loyalists than the individuals who constituted its membership, 
the "insurgents."52 The language in which the loyalists described the 
new provincial government was indicative of more than their disdain 
for its members. These were the "ringleaders or their adherents" who 
had been central to the "insurrection."55 The loyal claimants, 
representing their silent brethren, disagreed with the fundamental 
existence of that institution. It represented "usurped authority," "the 
insidious attempts of the disaffected," to institute what amounted to 
an "usurped government." The structure revolved around "their 
committees," which were constituted of "factious and designing 
men."54 Feeling ran as high elsewhere. In Massachusetts Martin Gay, 
a Boston coppersmith, "took every occasion to express his abhorrence 
of the measures taken by the Americans."55
The New Hampshire loyalists also refused to acknowledge the 
depth and permanence of the rift between their province and the 
mother country. Like their British counterparts, the loyalists 
employed euphemisms in their writing to soften the impact of the 
emerging "war" on their psyches. The euphemisms varied. Their use,
52Loyalist Claims, Andrew Hewat, vol XIII, p. 41.
55Loyalist Claims, Matthew Hutchins, vol. XIII, p. 331.
54NH Claims, Fowles, vol. n, p. 679 & S. Holland, vol. n, p. 777 & 940; McMaster, 
vol. Ill, p. 1231; Baxter, vol. I, p. 134; Hale, vol. II, p.733.
55Loyalist Claims, Martin Gay, vol. XIII, p. 358. Gay was a native of America but 
abjured his nativity when he no longer identified himself with "the 
Americans."
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even into the post-peace years, did not. The conflict was referred to 
almost exclusively as a rebellion. It was either an "unnatural 
rebellion" or an "unhappy rebellion." Occasionally it was an 
"unfortunate contest" or a "period of the commotions."56 Only twice in 
the entire scope of the New Hampshire claims was the word war 
mentioned, once as the "late war," and once as the "late unhappy 
American war."57 The employment of such euphemisms was more 
than a literary conceit or a denial of reality. It was the assertion that 
legitimate authority resided in Great Britain and was dispensed to 
the colonies by the king. Like the language used to describe the 
"rebels" and the "usurped authority," the euphemisms concerning the 
revolution itself were a means of displaying the loyalist position, a 
position which became increasingly uncomfortable as the years 
progressed.
The language employed by so many conveys the loyalist 
position well. The political situation was not only disadvantageous to 
them and to the British, it was "un-natural." The use of that word 
implies far more than dissatisfaction. Something unnatural was 
contrary to nature. It did not figure into the scheme of things. It was 
monstrous, an abomination. The use of that term implies the sinful 
nature of rebellion according to the cosmology of the traditionally 
minded loyalist. Not only was this rebellion against "nature and 
nature's God," but all rebellion was contrary to nature. It is easy
56NH Claims, Michael Jose, vol. H, p. 991; Paul Wentworth, vol. V, p. 2498; 
William Torrey, vol. ID, p. 1807.
57NH Claims, William Torrey, vol. Ill, p. 1807; Elijah Williams, vol. V, p. 2556.
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today to append the label conservative to men of such a political 
persuasion. But the loyalists were not defending the status quo, 
meaning the specific situation that existed between Britain and her 
colonies, but rather the fundamental belief system underlying the 
existence of the empire. The supremacy and sovereignty of the king 
was at stake, and resistance to that deeply held belief w as 
unthinkable.
The language of the Claims documents clearly reveals a group 
of men who had lived in a community that had u n d e rg o n e  
catastrophic change. From their vantage point it seemed as though 
their neighbors had been afflicted with some sort of crowd hysteria. 
Again and again the elites among New Hampshire’s loyalists referred 
to being insulted by mobs,58 to being man-handled,59 and to having 
their homes ransacked while their lives or the lives of their families 
were threatened.60 Many claimants also complained of being 
dragged before committees, sometimes repeatedly over the course of 
weeks or months,61 an action they found to be more than 
inconvenient. It was not merely that these committees consisted of 
men who might be below the loyalist's social station. That complaint
58NH Claims, John Fenton, vol. II, p. 515. For only one example of many.
59NH Claims, Thomas McDonough, vol. ID, p. 1163; James McMaster, vol. HI, p. 
123Z
60NH Claims, Bartholomew Stavers, vol. IV, p. 1704; William Torrey, vol. Ill, p. 
1811.
61NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, p. 778; Thomas McDonough, vol. Ill, p. 
1168; George Meserve, vol. IE, p. 1290.
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was not mentioned. It was instead that the committees were not 
provided for in the Englishman's constitutional cosmology. There was 
no basis in law for their existence, much less the power they wielded. 
It is clear from the claims that the committees (never accorded the 
continuation of the name "of Safety") exercised enormous judicial and 
paramilitary powers. Arrests were made under their aegis, often at 
night, and often of men taken from their homes with no more 
evidence of a crime having been committed than the word of a 
stranger who claimed to have heard the suspect utter a statement 
either in favor of the king or in disparagement of the revolutionary 
cause. Town committees held drumhead trials and acted as jury and 
"executioner" at the same time. The only recourse the alleged loyalist 
had was an appeal to the provincial assembly. Such informal 
observations of due process were repugnant to the loyalists. Despite 
their published function of ensuring the personal safety and 
property rights of citizens in a time of trouble, the committees 
exercised no restraint over the mobs which formed in Portsmouth 
and roamed the seaboard countryside in 1774 and 1775. In at least 
one instance, it was the intervention of friends from town which 
precluded tragic violence on the part of an armed mob. Daniel Rindge 
had just returned from a neighbor's house where he had assisted in 
its defense against a mob when an armed party demanded entry into 
his home. As the argument escalated, muskets were leveled a t 
Rindge's wife. Rindge believed the men would have fired had not
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"some humane and moderate townsmen" intervened, "pleading for 
the defenseless sex."62
Faced with a situation they could neither accept nor 
understand, the bulk of committed New Hampshire loyalists 
departed.63 But even after fleeing the province, the loyalists' troubles 
were far from over. Though not typical, William Torrey's experience 
was illustrative of the extreme case of a loyalist's attempting to begin 
a new life just as the revolution had gotten underway.
Torrey lived in Portsmouth, carried on the trade of a merchant, 
and was a Justice of the Peace. He also held the office of "Landwaiter, 
Weigher, and Gauger for the Port of Piscataqua, which with fees and 
emoluments gave him upwards of one hundred pounds p e r  
annum ."64 Torrey also owned a half interest in a sugar works, 
discussed in Chapter Two. About the time of the governor's escape 
aboard a British warship, Torrey was seized by a mob and roughly 
treated. He was marched from Portsmouth to Exeter and there tried 
for treason.65 Though he was apparently acquitted of that charge,
62NH Claims, Daniel Rindge, vol. IV, p. 1571-72.
63The response was similar in other provinces. In those such as New Jersey, 
where British military activity came early on in the war, large numbers of 
eventual claimants flocked to the British standard in 1776. In the southern 
colonies, such as Georgia, prominent loyalists departed early, seeking safety 
in the Indies or in England. But a considerable number returned to the 
various centers of British military power, New York for one, and there joined 
the army or loyalist regiments to serve in the war. For examples see Loyalist 
Claims, Thomas Millidge, vol. XV, p. 47; John Leonard, vol. XV, p. 61; William 
Kennedy, vol. XIII, p. 179.
64NH Claims, William Torrey, vol. IV, p. 1781.
65This was Torrey's own explanation of the charge levelled against him. It is 
unlikely he could actually have been charged with "treason," as there was no 
treason law in place in the province.
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Torrey was sentenced to be confined in an unspecified interior town 
for a year and forced to provide "heavy bonds that he should not 
conspire against the state." After the year expired Torrey was given 
permission to leave New Hampshire. Leaving his wife and children, 
he traveled to Nova Scotia in June, 1778. Torrey owned a farm in 
that province and settled there, intending to bring his family to him 
as soon as the farm was profitable. But barely two months passed 
before the crews of two American privateers came ashore and  
"destroyed his dwelling house, & store houses, and plundered 
him....and left him destitute of support"
His Nova Scotia farm in ruins, Torrey left for Halifax aboard the 
first available ship, only to have the ship captured, not once but 
twice by American privateers who stripped him of all his papers and 
even his clothes. The second enemy ship put Torrey and some others 
off in a "small shallop" barely large enough to see them safely to 
harbor. The unfortunate Torrey found no assistance in Halifax and so, 
by borrowing against the value of his farmland, he bought passage to 
New York. The farmland was subsequently seized in satisfaction of 
that debt. In New York he asked the assistance of Sir Henry Clinton, 
but was told through the General's aide, Major Andre, that his only 
recourse was to take passage for England and there to petition the 
treasury. This was what Torrey did, and for his pains he was granted 
temporary support in the amount of £50 per year, in addition to his 
salary of £40. His salary was discontinued in October of 1782 when 
his office officially ceased to exist
Following his arrival in England, Torrey's experience became 
typical of the articulate members of the elite who filed claims under
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
271
the act of Parliament. While many New Hampshire loyalists had  
served with the army in America through the war years, the 
majority of the wealthiest individuals, mostly former crown officials, 
came to England in the period from 1777 to 1779. Those filed 
petitions immediately with the Treasury for temporary support and 
began a campaign to convince the government to compensate them 
and other loyalists for lost property. After the disaster a t Saratoga 
and the seeming abandonment of the northern theater outside of 
New York, the brief campaigns in Rhode Island and the capture of 
Philadelphia, New Hampshire loyalists came to recognize that a 
return to anything like the pre-war state of affairs was a vain hope. 
Almost all of the prominent New Hampshire men were banished by 
Act of the Assembly in 1778 and another act provided for the 
confiscation of all of their property in the same year. Other laws 
were subsequently passed nullifying debts owed to aliens and 
traitors who had taken up arms against the state, and making it 
illegal for any non-resident to own property at all. Faced with this 
bleak prospect for recovery, New Hampshire’s loyalist community 
strongly supported the movement urging government make 
allowance for restitution. The ministry and Parliament waited until 
the treaty of peace was negotiated, hoping in vain that the 
recognition of American independence would ameliorate the 
situation regarding loyalist property. But sentiment in  the new 
nation was still running extremely high against allegedly treasonous 
conduct, and resentment was inflamed by the memories of atrocities 
committed in the name of war. That both sides were equally guilty 
was forgotten quickly in the flush of victory as the leaders and
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loremasters of the new nation had already begun fashioning a 
national myth with which to bind their citizens ideologically into a 
"republican" community.
Even before the Claims Commission was established by 
Parliament, loyalists began to vocalize the shared experiences that 
would lead to a formulation of a community idea. The existence of 
the Commission provided a forum of sorts for the articulation of the 
story of the members of a new community cast out of their old 
community which had been tom apart by war The majority of New 
Hampshire claimants had made the journey to England and were able 
to file claims immediately, and with the benefit of a network of 
fellow claimants upon whose memories and testimony they could 
draw.
The sheer volume of claims received overwhelmed the five 
commissioners and delayed the payment of awards for years. All 
told, when the Commission made its first recommendation to 
Parliament in 1787, over 5,000 individuals had submitted claims and 
claimed estimated losses of £8,026,045 sterling.66 Though the 
procedure was simple, delays inevitably resulted as claimants 
searched for documentation to prove losses and witnesses had to be 
summoned from distant parts. At times the list of supporting 
witnesses could be quite impressive. The claim of George Sproule 
stands out if for no other reason than the array of certificates he was 
able to present in support of his claim. Sproule had served in 
America seventeen years prior to the revolution as Deputy Surveyor
66Palmer, Revised Sketches, p. xiii.
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to Samuel Holland in the Surveying Service engaged in a 
comprehensive survey of British territory in North America. He had 
intended to retire from the service, and toward that end, acquired 
property in New Hampshire as well as the post of Surveyor General 
of the province. Sproule went to Boston in April of 1775 and served 
on active duty as a field engineer throughout the war. Appended to 
his claim were certificates from governor John Wentworth, Sir 
William Howe, Lieutenant General James Robertson his commanding 
officer in the 16th Foot, Lord Cornwallis, Sir Henry Clinton, William 
Tryon, former governor of New York, and Stephen Holland. Despite 
these "several handsome certificates" and the certainty of his loyalty 
and service, Sproule was awarded only £70 on a claim of 
£2,328.14.0. Sproule was given nothing for his lost office since it was 
not "an office held immediately under the Crown and understood to 
be for life."67
The center of the New Hampshire loyalist community was the 
person of the former governor, John Wentworth. Wentworth and his 
closest allies formed a core group for their own mutual support and 
the support of others. They seemed to have been willing to 
substantiate the claims of nearly all of their fellow countrymen, at 
least with an affidavit attesting to loyalty and to the fact that so and 
so had been possessed of considerable property. A glaring exception 
to this was George Boyd. Boyd's claim was bolstered by a certificate 
from John Wentworth attesting to the fact that Boyd was set upon by
67Both quotes are from the Commissioners' notes in the summary and decision 
on Sproule's claim. NH Claims, George Sproule, vol. Ill, p. 1626-27.
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a mob shortly after he returned to Portsmouth from England in 1775. 
He had gone there to foment opposition to Wentworth and had 
succeeded in getting himself appointed to the council.68 Boyd had 
escaped the custody of the officials in Portsmouth and fled overland 
to New York. He then went straight to England, arriving early in 
1776. Boyd offered a fist of his property supposedly lost totalling 
£34,000 sterling. However, the other members of the New Hampshire 
loyalist community disavowed him totally. In a letter to the 
Commission, George Meserve observed that far from being destitute, 
Boyd had £20,000 or more in investment funds in England. Meserve 
wondered in consequence how it should be that Boyd was receiving 
£100 per year temporary support, a good bit more than most 
pensioned loyalists were then receiving. Meserve then added: "it will 
not be a matter of surprise should they [the Commissioners] in their 
course of enquiry meet with some men who would wish and 
endeavor to impose upon them. I think it therefore my duty to 
advise you to be careful of a Mr. Boyd from Portsmouth in the 
Province of New Hampshire who I understand has brought a claim 
against Government to a very considerable amount and who I am 
sure must fail in the first instance with regard to his loyalty for he 
never was possessed of any."69 As if that were not damning enough, 
the Commissioners also received a letter signed "No Imposter" 
further condemning Boyd's character and the veracity of his claim. 
The anonymous correspondent claimed that "I have lately returned
68Daniell, Experiment in Republicanism, pp. 43-44, 117.
69Nf/ Claims, George Boyd, vol. I, p. 190-91.
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from America. Was at Portsmouth New Hampshire last July in 
company with the first gentlemen of the place. They were making 
their laugh about a Colonel Boyd's humbugging the American 
Commissioners. His property they informed me had never been
confiscated. They look on him as a staunch friend to their cause.....
You will find the above to be facts."70 Peter Livius, another councillor 
and no friend to the Wentworth party, added that he had "a very bad 
opinion of his [Boyd's] moral character."71 For his part, Boyd claimed 
that a certain group of New Hampshire men had formed a 
"conspiracy against him with a malicious intent" because many of 
them owed him money. But Boyd's file contained no proof of his 
supposed largesse, and no documentation for the huge estate he 
claimed was lost. On the contrary, the commissioners did have a 
letter from Supply Clap, "attorney to said Boyd," which gave the 
distinct impression that his estate remained untouched and in the 
possession of his wife, children, and elderly mother. Clap even 
suggested that it would be no great trouble for Boyd to return to New 
Hampshire and resume control of his property. The Commissioners 
weighed the evidence and concluded: "We have decided that he has 
not lost an acre of this property and that he falls within that clause 
of the Act of Parliament which precludes him from any 
compensation, his claim being adjudged fraudulent."72 Boyd did
7QNH Claims, George Boyd, vol. I, p. 194.
71M / Claims, George Boyd, vol. I, p. 214.
72Mf/ Claims, George Boyd, vol. I, p. 215.
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attempt to return to Portsmouth in 1787, but died on shipboard two 
days out from home.73
The other members of the London core74 were Dr. Stephen 
little, George Meserve, Stephen Holland, and William Torrey. One or 
more of those could be found attesting to the claims not only of one 
another, but of nearly any prominent New Hampshire claimant. 
Holland acted also as agent for a number of New Hampshire 
claimants residing in Nova Scotia, and in one case, the guardian for 
the children of a deceased loyalist.75 The New Hampshire loyalists 
remained remarkably solid in their approach to the claims process, 
and were solicitous on each other's behalf. The only exceptions to the 
sense of shared loss and mutual respect were Boyd and Samuel Hale. 
Hale however was accorded the courtesy of burial by former 
countrymen, as is dear from William Pepperrell's letter of May 21, 
1787 asking for a small grant to George Meserve in order to bury the 
late Hale and settle his debts. No reply was noted, and no final 
decision was rendered on Hale's claim due to his death.76
73Sabine, Sketches, vol. I, p. 247.
74For a full account of the loyalist experience in London see Norton, The 
British-Americans.
75M f Claims, Benjamin Whiting, vol. V, p. 2536. Benjamin Whiting of Hollis 
and former sheriff of Hillsborough County had died in 1779 while in the 
King's service on Long Island. Holland filed a claim in his name on behalf of 
Leonard Whiting, the guardian. The commissioners were unable to grant 
compensation because there was no proof of loss. It is not clear what the 
relationship of Leonard was to Benjamin, but he , Leonard, was still living in 
Merrimack, NH, and was himself not a loyalist.
76NH Claims, Samuel Hale, vol. II, p. 759-769.
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The loyalist community, forged at least for a time in the bright 
fire of a shared catastrophe, remained united in one assumption: 
they shared the belief that they were not being fairly treated by the 
British government in light of their services and losses. Rightly or 
not, few if any of the articulate claimants felt they or their fellows 
were receiving adequate temporary support or prompt attention to 
their circumstances. Some went so far as to question the awards for 
claims. The claims files are full of letters to the Treasury and to the 
Commission asking for an increase in allowance, a speedier decision, 
or a reconsideration of the amounts awarded on claims already 
determined. William Torrey is again illustrative. Torrey's first 
memorial was dated February 11, 1784. He filed a second memorial 
in November of 1786, but an annotation on that document reveals 
that a decision had already been rendered, as the commissioners saw 
"no reason to alter their former determination."77 Undaunted, Torrey 
fired off another memorial in December 1786 which was again 
rejected. In June of 1788, John Wentworth, Jr. wrote as "agent for the 
Loyalists from New Hampshire" addressed to John Foster, secretary 
for the Commission, proffering yet another memorial from William 
Torrey. That was followed by another memorial in March of 1789, a
77 NH Claims, William Torrey, vol. HI, p. 1805. Torrey had added the assertion 
that his brother had died during the course of the war owing him over £500. 
How this had anything to do with compensation for services and losses the 
commissioners could not see. However in a later supplement Torrey 
explained that his brother, Joseph Torrey, was a partner in their merchant 
business and was living as agent in Montreal. Torrey had sent a ship and 
cargo valued at £3000 to the brother just at the outbreak of the war, and the 
brother had sold the cargo but sent the ship back empty. The proceeds from 
the sale had been used to raise a regiment of rebels from among the 
Canadians.
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letter in June of 1790, and a last memorial on November 8, 1790 
conveyed with a letter of endorsement from William Pepperrell.78
Sometimes it was necessary for a compatriot to express the 
extent of the need or suffering a loyalist might endure. Samuel 
Peters, as related above, wrote in May of 1786 on behalf of Thomas 
Cumings, a claimant awaiting determination of his claim. Peters 
described Cumings as "starving, dying, and wanting every necessary 
of life, [he] is without money and indebted to his humane landlord (a 
poor gardener) above £40 for house rent and victuals." Cumings 
received no further aid and died on September 29, 1786. His claim 
was continued by his widow.79
Prominence was no guarantee of success in the pursuit of a 
claim. John Fisher, who claimed losses in excess of £14,000, worried 
the commissioners incessantly with letter after letter repeatedly 
lamenting the "peculiar hardship of my fortune" and lamenting the 
loss of an "affectionate father" whose children's inheritance was lost
7&NH Claims, William Torrey, vol. in, p. 1806-08; p. 1809; p. 1818-23; p.1824; 
p. 1826. Torrey's persistence was not rewarded. His original award granted 
him £150 on a claim of £ 2277 in lost property and £100 per year for loss of 
income from 1775 until 1782. In addition his pension of £50 per year was 
continued. No additions were granted despite his barrage of plaintive 
petitions.
79NH Claims, Thomas Cumings, vol. I, p. 377; p. 380-402. It is in that 
continuation that Cumings' claim becomes most unusual. It seemed that 
Thomas and Mary Ann Cumings had been married in Nova Scotia on July 20, 
1784. But Mary Ann had been married previously to one Thomas Leslie, a 
soldier. She had accompanied her husband to America in 1777 when his 
regiment was stationed in Qjiebec, and had remained there when he marched 
south with Burgoyne. Leslie was reported killed at Saratoga and his widow 
remained in Canada until after the troubles when she met Cumings. 
Unfortunately for Mary Ann, a Lieutenant I. Jones wrote to the commission 
attesting that Thomas Leslie was alive and well and serving with the 20th 
Foot in Ireland. Cumings' pension ceased at his death and his claim for £1413 
in lost property was disallowed "for want of satisfactory proof of loss."
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in America. Fisher was eventually to collect £3500 on his claim, 
though he hardly suffered in the interim despite his melodramatic 
prose. John Fisher received a pension of £160 per year from 
sometime in 1776 in addition to his salary as collector of customs. 
The pension continued until he became Under Secretary of State in 
October, 1781. By the time of his last request for further favor, 
Fisher had become Secretary of the Excise and Distributor of Stamps, 
posts which paid over £880 per year between them.80
Printer Robert Fowle had a somewhat different experience. He 
remained in America attempting to aid "the British government in 
the exercise of his profession as a printer." Forced to flee New 
Hampshire in 1778, Fowle joined Burgoyne and was captured at 
Saratoga. He was allowed to "retire to Canada," but proceeded to New 
York where he served with Wentworth's Volunteers until December 
of 1781 whereupon he went to England. Fowle received no pension 
and in January of 1783 wrote to the Commissioners "I fear you are to 
this hour uninformed of the wretched situation of many of us: some 
have been obliged to apply to pawn brokers and I expect daily to 
hear your jails are filling for our credit is gone." In March Fowle 
wrote again to thank the commissioners for a pension of £50 per 
year, though he adds that the sum was not as much as others of "his 
Majesty's printers who are sufferers from the other revolted 
provinces." As this was the case he added that he would "(as early 
taught) be thankful for a little, as the proper road to obtain more." He
80NH Claims, John Fisher, vol. II, p. 552-655. Fisher was John Wentworth's 
brother-in-law.
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then added that he would "retire to a cheaper part of the kingdom 
more suited to the provision you have made for me." 81
Whether or not the pensions and awards were in reality 
adequate, the loyalist claimants felt and wrote that theirs was a hard 
lo t The language of the claims here argues for a new and deeper 
reading. Perhaps it was not merely the m aterial loss that the 
claimants lamented.82 It seems likely that the language reflects a 
certain convention, an assumption on the part of the loyalist 
community that all were in some way suffering, despite the relative 
wealth or dearth of their individual circumstances. That Fisher 
considered himself as much a sufferer as Fowle is certain. In a sense 
all suffered equally the loss of home. As pensioners in London or 
Bristol, the New Hampshire loyalists had lost their sense of place and 
their roles in the order of life. Some, like Fisher and John Wentworth 
were able to go on to successful careers. Many died while awaiting 
judgment on their claims. Others were left having to put lives back 
together as best they could with little or no help from the 
government they had sacrificed so much to uphold. Stephen Holland 
had his half pay of £88 per year and a grant of £30 to pay his 
passage to Nova Scotia where at age 50 he reclaimed his wife and 
children. Holland was granted £2538 on his claim of £8085, almost 
all of which was spent in support of his family left behind in New
8^NH Claims, Robert Lewis Fowle, vol. II, p. 657-703. Fowle eventually received 
only £100 on a claim of £925 for lost property which included all of his 
printing equipment. According to Sabine, Fowle returned to America where 
he married his youngest brother's widow and eventually died here.
82Alan Radley, "Artefacts, Memory, and a Sense of the Past" in Middleton and 
Edwards, eds., Collective Remembering, pp. 46-59.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
281
Hampshire. In the end Holland had a pension of £ 100 per year when 
he retired "a lame invalid" to "Colerain in the north of Ireland." 83
Holland was fairly fortunate. Eleazer Sanger of Keene had left 
his property behind in 1777 to join the army. He received nothing on 
his claim for £300 in lost real estate because his memorial was late.84 
John Stark, son of General William Stark, served through the entire 
war in the army, had his father die attainted a  traitor by his 
homeland, and his mother driven mad by the death of her husband, 
and lost his inheritance to confiscation. He finally received £1201 on 
a claim of £3345, almost half of which went into trust for his minor 
siblings.85
The majority of New Hampshire loyalists remain anonymous. Of 
those identified in some way, less than half filed claims, and only a 
small number received significant compensation. Those who did file 
claims represent an articulate minority whose memorials recount 
their sufferings and the suffering of their silent brethren. The claims 
themselves, though never published, were in a real sense the last 
salvo individual loyalists could fire in the losing battle of the culture 
war.
Having been for the most part barred from competing in the 
discursive struggle, a struggle which had seen them  renamed and 
redefined by their enemies in most inglorious terms, the loyalist 
claimants at last found themselves with pen in hand able to respond
83 NH Claims, Stephen Holland, vol. II, p. 971-1012.
84NH Claims, Eleazer Sanger, vol. IV, p. 1582-86.
S5NH Claims, John Stark, vol. IV, p. 1632-1702.
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to the charges brought against them by the rebel writers. Though 
hardly conscious of what the effect was, each writer was able to put 
words to the shared experience of losing a home, a way of life, and 
an identity. The loyalists were deprived of the "who" they perceived 
themselves to be, first by the choice they felt compelled to make, and 
then by their former friends and neighbors who seemed to forget all 
that had gone before. The rebel writers created a new identity for 
the loyalists to further a political agenda.
There were no distinguishing marks by which a loyalist could 
be known. Their color and stature was not unlike their rebel 
neighbors. They spoke the same language, dressed the same, and up 
to a point, believed in  the same things. It is perhaps that lack of 
"otherness" which compelled the rebel writers to seek the excessive 
when trying to redefine their opponents.
It is certainly the lack of "otherness" that makes the study of 
loyalism and its exponents so valuable. By understanding the loyalist 
identity we can perhaps gain a greater understanding of the forces 
and circumstances that produced a rebellion in America.
The voice of their community was lost to posterity, however, 
and their contribution to the whole of the history of the 
revolutionary era and to the history of America has been subsumed 
by the mythmaking of their victorious countrymen.86 The winners of 
the conflict earned the right to define America and expurgate the
86Lawrence H. Leder, "The Loyalist Historians: An Introduction," in Lawrence 
H. Leder, ed., The Colonial Legacy, Volume I: Loyalist Historians. New York: 
1971.
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loyalists from what might have been their rightful place. Only the 
memorials remained as the means by which they could express their 
side, their story.
The language of the memorials reveals a community rebuilt. 
The loyalists of New Hampshire, like their brethren from the other 
provinces, formed an ideational community, briefly grounded in 
reality in London, and eventually replicated in Canada. But that 
language also reveals a sense of loss. The loss experienced by the 
loyalists of the American Revolution went beyond acres of land and 
homes. It went beyond offices and inventories, stores and shops. It 
even went beyond the loss of friends and family members left 
behind or killed. The loyalists lost the "who" they had been prior to 
the rebellion. They lost their identity, as individuals and as members 
of a community. Only through much effort could they recover some 
of what was lost and redefine themselves and the new community in 
which they came to rest
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Conclusion
"There are many others but their distinctions 
are so metaphysical and fine spun I cannot 
comprehend them"1
The reasons for a man to remain loyal to the crown and 
constitution of Great Britiain have been the subject of much 
discussion for two centuries. As A.Z. observed as early as August of 
1775, it was sometimes difficult to understand the choice the 
loyalists made. For him and the other rebel writers, loyalists, or 
tones as they preferred, were identifiable as men who held positions 
in government, as "men bom  in the north part of Britain," and "men 
of interest." But A.Z.'s attem pt to categorically identify the loyalists 
was narrow and incomplete.
To be sure, most men who held offices under the royal 
government rem ained loyal. Perhaps many of those of A.Z.'s 
acquaintance who happen to have been bom in the north part of 
Great Britain chose loyalty, but the records show no correlation. If by 
"men of interest" A.Z. m eant men of property, certainly many of 
those remained loyal, but a considerable number of the rebel faction 
were wealthy and prominent as well. In the end there was no typical 
loyalist
This study shows that the path to loyalism was not short or 
easy. For every motive which produced a loyalist, office, wealth, 
birthplace, family connection, religion, and so forth, an example could
lNew Hampshire Gazette. August 29, 1775. A.Z., "Definition of Whig and Tory."
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be found of a  rebel who shared that circumstance or affinity. The 
path to loyalism was a process of identity transformation.
While all of the motives discussed here and elsewhere were 
significant, at the root of the process lay a strong belief that "being 
fully convinced as a Christian...his duty to his King m ust be 
performed by him to answer a good and just conscience.”2 Once the 
choice was made, the loyalists began to experience the new identity 
they had chosen by projecting it publicly. As we have seen the public 
projection of the loyalist identity took a variety of forms. The most 
common was to simply depart the community in which the loyalist 
had lived and worked, sometimes since birth. A m ajority of the 
loyalists who left their homes and families took up arms in support 
of their beliefs, a second act proclaiming the loyalist identity. Other 
acts of loyalism included speaking out against the rebel faction, 
protecting the extant system of government and judiciary, or even 
securing and returning British deserters to their regiments. Once the 
war of words had been transformed into a war of bullets, spying, 
recruiting, and counterfeiting became means of loyalist identification.
The coming of rebellion shook the identity of a portion of the 
population to the extent that they chose loyalism. The "who" they 
had been no longer fit the "who" they were to become. The public 
projection of the loyalist identity was perceived by outside 
observers, the rebels in particular, as yet another identity: traitors,
2Loyalist Claims, John Fowler, vol. XIV, p. 255.1 do not wish to suggest an 
inordinate emphasis on Chrisitianity or religion in the decision-making 
process. While religion may have had a role in the course chosen by some, it 
was not a deining factor in the same sense as the shared aversion to 
rebellion and usurped government so frequently expressed by the loyalist 
writers.
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men inimical to their country. The rebels perceived their former 
neighbors as radically different from the "who" that was projected. 
While the loyalists projected the identity of those who stood for the 
protection of longstanding traditions and rights under the age-pld 
constitution, the rebels perceived them to be enemies of liberty and 
agents of oppression.
The responses of the rebels and the uncommitted in the 
community took two forms. Prior to and dining the first years of the 
rebellion, the rebel response was dominated by active measures 
designed to intimidate the loyalists or drive them from their homes. 
Mob action was supplem ented by housebreaking, disarming, 
shunning, harrassment, imprisonment, and ritualized oath-taking. 
The last, the ritual of publicly signing an oath of allegiance was 
designed as much to identify potential enemies as it was to secure 
the support of those whose choice was as yet unmade.
For those loyalists who remained after the initial diaspora, a 
new strategy was initiated around the time in which independence 
was declared. The formalization of provisional governments allowed 
for the creation of local and provincial committees which exerted 
police powers. Bands of armed men harrassed and arrested loyalists 
and suspected loyalists who could then be tried before the 
committees. In New Hampshire, at least, the committees were used 
by the rebel government as a substitute for the court system until 
1777.
The provisional government and the network of local 
committees was perceived by the loyalists as a perversion of the 
legitimate sources of authority. The lack of a traditional basis made
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the assembly and state committee in Exeter an usurping power. The 
men who constituted the government were rebels, insurgents, and 
usurpers. The institutions they created were unnatural in the eyes of 
the loyalists. This profound aversion to a system they perceived to 
be illegitimate solidified for many the decision to remain loyal.
Whether active physical penalties drove the loyalists away or 
not, the rebel government extended their strategy to identify the 
loyalists by means of law. Their first step was to redefine the crime 
of treason and to incorporate language into the law that supposed a 
loyalist to be a traitor simply because he or she had left the province. 
Further means of identifying a traitor included the suspicion or 
charge that the accused had taken up arms with the British, or that 
the accused had engaged in any activity that might be deemed 
harmful to the state. Left deliberately vague, the law was designed 
not to preserve the rights and liberties of Englishmen, the avowed 
design of the rebellion to begin with, but rather to identify almost 
anyone as an enemy should the rebel authorities see fit. Once the law 
of treason was in  place, the rebel government moved to attaint 
specific individuals and anyone else who met a rather loose 
definition. Those so attainted were banished from the province on 
pain of death. Closely on the heels of that act was yet another which 
confiscated loyalist property, both real and personal, the sale of 
which would benefit the state. The process of legally identifying a 
loyalist was left deliberately vague, the easier to apply it as needed.
Equally anonymous in terms of its targets was the campaign 
carried on by rebel writers in the press. The rebellion was as much a 
civil war as it was a war for independence from Great Britain. One of
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the theaters of action in the civil war was a discursive struggle, a 
culture war. The loyalists and rebels each had differing views as to 
the face of the America in which they sought to live. Since a t the 
outset of the rebellion neither side cocould claim as supporters a 
majority of the populace, a battle was waged in terms of public 
discourse. From the first the high ground belonged to the rebels. 
Even before the reigns of government had slipped from John 
Wentworth's hands, the control of the press had gone to the rebel 
faction. The rebels were free to promulgate their agenda at will in 
the only readily available medium, the New Hampshire Gazette of 
Portsmouth. Certainly loyalist pamphlets might have been brought 
into the province from the presses in the garrison town of New York, 
but no evidence exists that significant numbers of such publications 
were circulated in New Hampshire. The only other medium of any 
account, the pulpits, were solidly with the rebels. Dissenting voices 
from Anglican churches were silenced by mob action. Despite the 
printer's attem pt at objectivity, few works sympathetic to the 
loyalists were printed, and those were soundly criticised in 
subsequent numbers. As with the military conflict, the culture war 
was lost.
At some point in the years from 1774 to 1783 each loyalist had 
to face the realization that the war was lost. That fact meant far more 
to the loyalists than it ever could to the British government. The loss 
of the war in America meant the loss of homes and shops, goods and 
slaves, in some cases the loss of families. Each loyalist had to confront 
the identity he had fashioned for himself and that which had been 
fashioned for him, and somehow make sense of them both.
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Each individual loyalist created a personal identity that no 
longer corresponded to the identity previously held. Stephen Holland, 
for example, was no longer Colonel Stephen Holland from 
Londonderry, no longer a prominent, wealthy, and influential 
backcountry gentleman, but rather became Stephen Holland, hunted 
tory, condemned counterfeiter, British spy, and suffering loyalist. 
Holland and the rest of the active loyalists of New Hampshire could 
no longer identify themselves as readily and comfortably as they 
might have in 1773.
By the end of the war new communities formed among the 
loyalists. Wartime communities formed and reformed in the garrison 
towns. Refugee enclaves coalesced in London and Bristol. Eventually 
mass emigration produced permanent loyalist presences in Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick. Spanning all of these, this study suggests 
the formation of an ideational community based on the emergence of 
the loyalist identity, an identity formed by the shared experiences 
and traum a nearly all loyalists underwent. Primarily, the evidence 
for such a community lies in the shared vocabulary used by loyalists 
from throughout the provinces to express their sense of loss and 
outrage while attempting to find some compensation from the 
government they had sacrificed so much to preserve, and which in 
the end, many felt, had betrayed them.
This study describes the development of the loyalist identity, 
communal and individual, as a result of the traumatic experience of 
the rebellion. For many, that identity would be ephemeral. Robert 
Fowle returned to New Hampshire and lived out his life in Brentwood 
and Rochester. Joshua Atherton, one of S tephen H olland's
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counterfeiting ring, became a United States Senator. And for the 
unknown number of loyalists who remained quietly living out their 
lives amid the turmoil of the rebellion, when it was over, and their 
side had lost, no alternative remained but a resigned acquiescence to 
the new community, the new government, the new nation.
For others the loyalist experience, and the communal and 
individual identities it fashioned, remained the dominant force of 
their lives. Thousands of loyalists fled their homes and embarked on 
a journey to a new land where they still retained that new identity 
to their graves. In Nova Scotia and New Brunswick the loyalist 
identity became a defining mark, a source of pride and a source of 
division.3 Even today, the loyalist legacy survives in eastern Canada. 
A considerable number of loyalists took up residence in England and 
other parts of Great Britain. For some, the time there was brief, a 
stopping off point before they ventured on to the West Indies or 
Canada. For others, the stay would become permanent, in a sense a 
return to the womb which had birthed their colonial experience. 
There too the loyalist identity blazed brightly for a while but then 
guttered into obscurity as the government slowly finished its task of 
compensating the loyalist sufferers for their services and losses.
3See Ann Gorman Condon, "The Loyalist Community in New Brunswick;" Janice 
Potter-Mackinnon, "Loyalists and Community: The Eastern Ontario Loyalist 
Women;" Jane Errington and George A. Rawlyk, "Creating a British-American 
Political Community in Upper Canada;" and Neil Mackinnon, "The Nova Scotia 
Loyalist: A Traumatic Community," in Calhoon, et al, eds., Loyalists and 
Community in North America. Westport, CT: 1994. In addition, a number of 
books consider the loyalist population of Canada beginning with North 
Callahan's Flight from the Republic. Indianapolis: 1967; Hazel C. Matthews, 
The Mark of Honour. Toronto: 1965;
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The study of loyalists and the identity they fashioned from the 
shards of their shattered lives reminds us of the resilience and 
strength of character we have always believed transformed colonists 
into Americans. In continuous juxtaposition to their effort wa* the 
rebel effort to fashion an American identity as well. By e x a m in in g 
the "other" against which the new American identity was created we 
may arrive at a better understanding of who we once were and who 
we are today.
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